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This study investigates the role of the Nigerian government in the implementation of the 
state’s oil-related environmental policy in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.  This work 
specifically examines the pattern of relationship between oil companies and the government 
on the one hand and local justice and environmental groups on the other hand in the 
implementation of national environmental policy. The key finding of this research is that oil 
and environment-related conflicts in the Niger Delta are reflections of the failure of various 
Nigerian governments to implement effectively pertinent environmental policies meant to 
ensure sustainable development. This failure is premised on the notion that the goal of 
sustainable development as clearly outlined in Nigeria’s national environmental policy can be 
pursued through the activities of government, individuals and business organisations that are 
capable of engendering economic and social progress for communities that depend on the 
environment for their survival.  In fact, available evidence shows that government and oil 
company activities (or failures to act) actually contribute to the despoliation of the 
environment in the Niger Delta.  Despite existing environmental legislations and guidelines, 
unsafe waste disposal, flaring of gas and oil spillage remain key features of oil industry 
operations in the Niger Delta.  Not surprisingly, findings of this research show a lack of 
synergy between government and oil company activities and the attainment of sustainable 
development as a key goal of the environmental policy of the government.   In other words, 
the activities of the government and oil companies do not sufficiently promote sustainable 
development.  The net consequence is reflected in the frustrations of local justice and 
environmental movement groups about the political processes which deter (rather than 
enable) their agitation for improvements in local living conditions and development in the 




aggressive and violent behaviours against oil companies and government security agencies 

















1.1. Historical Background 
My interest in the topic of this research was stirred during a field-work I conducted in 2006 
on “Irregular Forces and Security in the Niger Delta” for the Security and Development 
Group at King’s College, London.  The Focus Group discussions during the research gave me 
new insights into some of the critical issues of the crisis in the region.   This shaped my 
thinking on how the issue of violence could be explained and explored through a better 
understanding of the Nigerian national environmental policy process in relation to oil 
company practice. 
 
There is also a major gap in the literature concerning the lack of systematic assessments of 
the implementation of the Nigerian government’s environmental policies and the associated 
pattern of political action by justice and environmental groups. This work explores how 
frustrations with the political context of the environmental policy process influence patterns 
of collective action in the Niger Delta.  
 
A strong need exists for more systematic research for understanding the dynamics of conflict 
in the Niger Delta. It is expected that the findings of this research would be useful in different 
ways, namely: 
1. For environmental policy makers interested in finding workable solutions to the oil 
related environmental problems and conflicts in the Niger Delta; 
2. For enhancing current understanding of specific issues pertaining to the dynamics of 
environmental politics in the region; and 




1.2. Background to the Study 
In recent years, oil companies in the Niger Delta1 have come under violent attacks from local 
Justice and Environmental Movement Organizations (JEMOs), (see Omeje, 2006; Ikelegbe, 
2001: 208; Mickwitz, 2003: 85; Frynas, 2001: 473; Obi, 2001; Babawale, 2002: 7; Ibeanu, 
2000: 19-22; Pegg,1999; 473). Indeed, these groups have threatened to terminate the 
operations of the oil companies in the region. The situation has worsened since the beginning 
of the 1990s with foreign and local oil company workers being taken hostage with regularity. 
For instance, in April 2002, an Ijaw armed gang in Ekeremor took ten expatriates working for 
Shell hostage. On the 11th of November, 2003, nine crew members working for Shell and 
four military escorts of oil barges were kidnapped by armed members of JEMOs in Bomadi, 
Bayelsa State. In November 2003, fourteen persons working for Chevron Texaco were 
kidnapped by Ijaw armed youths in Bayelsa State. In April 2004, seven expatriate staff of 
Chevron Texaco were murdered by armed groups along Benin River in Delta State. In 
essence, between April 2005 and May 2007, over two hundred expatriate workers have been 
taken hostage in the Niger Delta.  It is thus not surprising that since 2002 an average of over 
sixty expatriate workers are kidnapped and taken hostage annually in the Niger Delta region. 
 
Many of the groups claim, among other things, environmental destruction by oil companies 
as the basis for their violent activities (Ojakorotu and Okeke Uzodike, 2006: 85-106; Ibeanu, 
                                               
1 The Niger Delta currently refers to Nigeria’s nine states with deposits of oil, namely Akwa-
Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, Rivers, Ondo, Edo, Cross Rivers, Imo and Abia states. Incidentally, 
this is the political meaning attached to the Niger Delta which some have traced to the Niger 
Delta Development Commission. See Isoun, T.T. (2001). “Environmental Challenges of the 
Niger Delta,” Ozo-Eson, P.I. and Ukiwo, U. (eds.) Challenges of the Niger Delta, Port 
Harcourt: CASS pp. 7-8; Omeje, K. (2006). “Petrobusiness and Security Threats in the Niger 
Delta,” Current Sociology, May, Vol. 54, No. 3, pp. 477-499; Mickwitz, P. (2003). “A 






2000:119; Ibeanu, 1999: 4; Obi, 1999:5; Obi, 1996: 1-22; 85).2 It is widely known and 
accepted that oil companies operating in the Niger Delta pollute the environment by way of 
gas flaring and regular incidents of oil spills (Ajao and Anurigwo, 2002:441-445; Moffat and 
Linden, 1995: 527-529). In short, oil pollution from spills, oil well blow-outs, oil ballast 
discharges and improper disposal of drilling mud from petroleum prospecting have resulted 
in a wide array of problems: damage to marine wildlife; modification of the ecosystem 
through species elimination and delay in biota (fauna and flora) succession; and decrease in 
both fishery resources and farm yields (Ojakorotu and Okeke Uzodike, 2006: 96-97; Obi, 
1999: 436; Obi, 1997: 13-18; Moffat and Linden, 1995: 527-529).  
Already, there exists a wide assortment of intervention instruments meant to protect the 
environment in Nigeria. They include:  
 Oil Pipelines Act Cap 145, 1956, 1958 and 1965; 
  Petroleum Act 1969; 
 Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act (Decree No.58 of 1988), the National 
Guidelines and Standards for Environmental Pollution Control in Nigeria (published 
in March, 1991); 
 National Effluent Limitation Regulation, of 1991; 
  Pollution Abatement in Industries and Facilities Generating Wastes Regulations of 
1991;  
 Waste Management Regulations of 1991;  
 Environmental Impact Assessment Act (Decree No.86 of 1992)  
 National Policy on Environment (first published in 1989 with a revised edition 
produced in 1999);  
                                               
2 Ibeanu, O. (1999).  “Bringing the Local People Back In:  Community-Based Environmental Conflict 
Management in the Niger Delta, Nigeria.” Paper presented at the Open Meeting of the Human Dimensions of 
Global Environmental Change Research Community, Shonan Village, Kanagawa, Japan, 24-26  June 
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 National Agenda 21 of 1999, which touches on the various cross-sectoral areas of 
environmental concern and maps out strategies on how to address them;  
 Procedural and Sectoral Guidelines for EIA of 1999;  
 Natural Resources Conservation Action Plan; 
 National Fuel Wood Substitution Programme;  
 National Guidelines on Waste Disposal Through Underground Injection, 1999;  
 National Guidelines & Standards for Water Quality in Nigeria; 
  National Guidelines for Environmental Audit in Nigeria, 1999;  
 National Guidelines on Environmental Management Systems in Nigeria, 1999;  
 National Guidelines for Spilled Oil Fingerprinting, 1999;  
 National Guidelines on Registration of Environment Friendly Products and Eco-
labelling, 1999.  
By 1998, each of the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory had established their own 
environmental protection agencies. The Federal Ministry of Environment was created in June 
1999. The Federal Environmental Protection Agency was then absorbed and its functions 
taken over by the new Federal Ministry of Environment.  The states have also created 
ministries of environment to replace moribund environmental protection agencies. 
Nigeria’s national environmental policy is embedded in the National Policy on the 
Environment (NPE), which states as follows: “Nigeria is committed to a national policy that 
ensures sustainable development based on proper management of the environment in order to 
meet the needs of the present and future generations” (FEPA 1989: 5). The goals of the NPE 
as formally stated are specifically and unambiguously to:  
… secure for all Nigerians a quality of environment adequate for their 
health and well-being; conserve and use the environment and natural 
resources for the benefit of present and future generations; restore, 
5 
 
maintain and enhance the ecosystems and ecological processes 
essential for the functioning of the biosphere to preserve biological 
diversity and the principle of optimum sustainable yield in the use of 
living natural resources and ecosystems, raise public awareness and 
promote understanding of essential linkages between environment and 
development and to encourage individual and community participation 
in environmental improvement efforts; and to cooperate in good faith 
with other countries, international organisations and agencies to 
achieve optimal use of transboundary natural resources and effective 
prevention or abatement of transboundary environmental pollution 
(FEPA 1989: 5-6).  
Although the NPE has well-defined goals (FEPA 1989: 5), there are several other Acts that 
are meant to protect various aspects of the environment in Nigeria.  Examples are: the 
Environmental Impact Assessment Act of 1992 (EIA), and the others listed above.  The EIA 
is a framework that provides a process for prior assessment of potential impact of 
development activity on the environment.  It affords opportunity for the public or affected 
groups to make recommendations to public policy makers over the proposed human activity. 
Clearly, the goal of sustainable development is central to both policy documents (NPE and 
EIA). Logically, their full implementation should result in improved living conditions for all 
Nigerians. 
Policies3 relevant to the oil industry in the Niger Delta and whose implementation might have 
implications for the protection of the environment in the region include: 
 Mineral Oils (Safety) Regulations, 1963; 
 Oil in Navigable Waters Regulations 1968; 
 Oil in Navigable Waters Act No. 34 of 1968; 
 Petroleum Regulations 1967; 
 Petroleum Decree (Act) 1969; 
                                               
3    For the purpose of this study, relevant laws as stated above and environmental policies meant to 
achieve sustainable development fall into the same regulatory framework for management of the 
environment in Nigeria.  They will therefore be referred to as policies. 
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 Petroleum (Drilling & Production) Regulations 1969; 
 Petroleum (Drilling & Production Amendment) Regulations 1973; 
 Petroleum Refining Regulation 1974; 
These policies give specific authority to relevant governmental agencies to ensure the 
protection of the environment. In the case of the oil industry, the Department of Petroleum 
Resources (DPR) administers oil laws and regulations (UNDP, 2006:188). These laws are 
meant to ensure that oil companies drill for oil in ways that protect the environment.  The 
natural resources of the environment had long (before the beginning of oil exploration) been 
the principal source of livelihood for local communities in the Niger Delta.  Gas flares and oil 
spills destroy farmlands and aquatic resources. The laws are meant to ensure sustainable 
development by, among other things, checking gas flares and oil spills, and controlling the 
disposal of hazardous wastes by oil companies. 
Unfortunately, despite the putative environmental policy framework, successive Nigerian 
governments have not done much in reality to implement either the NPE or any of the 
supporting environmental policy Acts (UNDP, 2006:188). The net result in the Niger Delta 
has been not only the neglect of environmental resources but also their decay and systematic 
abuse in the hands of oil companies whose activities have imposed huge burdens on both the 
environment and the host communities. It will be argued that, unable to gain meaningful 
hearing due to their political marginalization (Obi, 2006:1-53; Omeje, 2006: 477-499; 
Uzodike and Allen, 2005: 1-42) and lacking adequate means of extracting curative responses 
to achieve redress, host communities have responded through violence.4  
                                               
4    The United Nations Development Programme report on the Niger Delta of 2006 reveals that local 
communities in the Niger Delta are faced with problems of livelihood due to damage to the 
environment by oil companies.  Unable to secure justice in the form of adequate compensation for the 
loss of their livelihoods, many have resorted to confrontations with the oil companies. 
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It may appear necessary in this study to categorise government environmental policies that 
are being implemented and those that are not.  This is difficult to achieve, given that none of 
these policies is being fully or effectively implemented by the government.  Indeed, 
government officials at the DPR and the Federal Ministry of Environment claim substantial 
progress in the implementation of these legislations.   In reality, however, these policies are 
marked by failures at the level of implementation. In visits by the researcher to some oil-
producing communities in the Niger Delta during the field data collection, there were ample 
evidence that gas is still being flared by oil companies in the communities where oil is 
extracted.  This suggests clearly that despite the reputed goal of ensuring an end to gas 
flaring, the effective implementation of relevant government environmental policies remains 
elusive.  This is despite the fact that some of the relevant regulatory frameworks are already 
in place.  For instance, if fully implemented, the Environmental Impact 
Assessment decree alone is sufficient to regulate effectively gas flaring and oil spillage.  Clea
rly, much depends on oil company compliance and the enforcement of the provisions of the 
enacted policy by Nigerian government officials.5 The consequence of the persistent non-
implementation or enforcement of the laws is in part seen in the continuous massive flaring 
of gas in the Niger Delta as in the case of Rumuekpe, Adibawa, Obirikom and Erema in 
Rivers State.  Indeed, several regulatory frameworks or regimes fall into this category of 
policies that are not being effectively implemented.  They include: Environmental Impact 
Assessment Act (Decree No.86 of 1992); Mineral Oils (Safety) Regulations, 1963; Petroleum 
(Drilling & Production Amendment) Regulations 1973;  Procedural and Sectoral Guidelines 
                                               
5 Some participants from JEMOs interviewed by the researcher insist that environmental impact assessment by 
oil companies and officials of the government at the DPR is not transparent.  They argue that, contrary to the 
provisions of the policy, communities where oil is produced are neglected in the process.  For example, 
environmental impact assessment statement or report, usually an initial outcome of an environment impact 
assessment of a development project, must be displayed for the public to review for a period of two weeks.  This 
is procedure is often not followed religiously by oil companies. In any case, government officials at the DPR 
claim that much of the problems of poor implementation of the policy emanate from insecurity created by  youth 
unrest and cult activities  in these communities.  As a result government officials who are expected to monitor 
the process are often scared away by likely troublesome youths. 
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for EIA of 1999; Natural Resources Conservation Action Plan; National Fuel Wood 
Substitution Programme; National Guidelines on Waste Disposal through Underground 
Injection, 1999.  A key aspect of these policies is the lack of synergy between the activities of 
government officials and oil companies with the aim of protecting the environment on which 
local populations in the Niger Delta depend for their survival.  An example of such synergy is 
in the use of adequate technology for the purpose of the cleanup or prevention of oil 
pollution.6  It is against this background that this study focuses on the implementation of 
government environmental policies in relation to oil company practices and likely 
consequences of continued conflict in the Niger Delta.  As such, the problem is not just about 
the sufficiently enforcement of these policies; it is also that the government has not 
implemented its environmental policies.  Oil-related legislations on the environment are 
hardly implemented or enforced in Nigeria.7   In addition to the delay by the government in 
formulating a comprehensive national policy on the environment, existing legislations are 
ineffectively implemented due to many social, economic and political factors including 
differential perceptions of security8 by the government on the one hand and local oil bearing 
communities on the other hand.  In many ways, this conflict of perceptions with respect to 
security seems to be paramount in explaining delayed responses to environmental problems 
                                               
6 See recorded tape of focus group discussion held on 24 April, 2008 at Social Action, 33 Orominike Layout, D-
line, Port Harcourt. 
7    Participants in both the focus group discussions and key informant interviews agree, not 
surprisingly, that the government does not implement or enforce effectively existing legislations 
meant to protect the environment from oil exploration and production activities in the Niger Delta.  
Local justice and environmental groups accuse the government of neglect of the environment by its 
failure to enforce adequately policies such as the Environmental Impact Assessment Decree No. 86 of 
1992. 
 
8    Since the emergence of oil as the main economic stay of Nigeria, the Federal Government has seen 
threats to sustained exploration and production of the oil as a threat to national security.  It is this 
perception that has informed security decisions of the government regarding its response to the oil and 
environmental conflict in the Niger Delta.  The failure of the government to implement or enforce 
relevant environmental policies related to the oil business has also been attributed in part to this 
understanding of national security.  See Ibeanu’s various works (for example, Ibeanu, 2008; 2006; 
2005 and 2002) on the Niger Delta for details of this thesis.  Field data also reveals that the thesis has 
empirical backing.  
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from oil production activities on the part of government through the formulation and 
implementation of relevant policies.  The research found substantial evidence of the influence 
of oil on national economic growth and politics.  For example, between 2003 and 2008, the 
Nigerian economy lost more than $100 billion to conflict and illegal bunkering of oil in the 
Niger Delta. (Asuni, 2009: 1).  In fact, the estimated value of shut-ins due to attack by armed 
members of justice and environmental movement organisations in 2008 alone stood at $33.8 
billion.9  Not surprisingly, threat to oil exploitation is seen by government officials to 
constitute a serious threat to national security.  Nevertheless, peaceful protests through letters 
and public speeches by leaders of the affected oil producing communities (from the 1980s to 
the end of the 1990s) did not provoke government to look sufficiently at the development of 
the oil economy and sustainable development in the Niger Delta.  
 
This section explains in part what has happened to environmental legislations related to the 
oil business in the Niger Delta and draws a causal pathway with environmental conditions 
that influence the livelihood (socio-economic conditions)10 of local communities. This is 
done against the background of the state’s putative overall goal of achieving sustainable 
development through proper management of the environment.  Assessment of “goal 
compliance”11 becomes a relevant component of this effort.  To do this, the researcher makes 
sense out of the responses to questions he asked participants in the questionnaire, focus 
groups and key informant interviews about their goals, strategies and activities to determine 
                                               
9 Coventry Cathedral quoted in Asuni, 2009. P.6 
10    Livelihood consists of assets and capabilities required to make a living. Sustainable livelihood 
seeks to utilise the resources of the environment for the benefit of the present generation without 
endangering such benefits for future generations. Traditional sources of livelihood for the people of 
the Niger Delta include: agriculture, hunting, farming, fishing, animal husbandry and boat building.  
All these have come to be severely affected by the development of the oil industry and its effects on 
the environment in Nigeria.  
 
11    “Goal Compliance” is the extent to which environmental legislation achieves its goals by the 




how they (goals, strategies and activities) comply with the overarching state goal of 
sustainable development.   
 
Two time-related periods are discernable in looking at environmental regimes in Nigeria,12 
namely: the era before 1988 and the post-1988 environmental regime.  The former consists of 
environmental policies related to oil business from the colonial era to 1988, while the latter 
consists of definite legislations, rules, standards, and regulations that emerged after the 
creation of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) in 1989.  One of the key 
features of the pre-1988 era is the absence of a national policy on the environment.  
Environmental awareness and integrating environmental concerns with development were 
hardly part of the dominant public discourse of the period.  More specifically, issues of 
conservation, effluent limitations and pollution abatement and sustainable development were 
not part of the agenda of government until 1988; hence, the accusation of lack of enforcement 
of environmental policies related to the oil business. Although environmental problems have 
been with human beings since creation in the case of the Niger Delta prior to 1988, 
government had neglected the environmental challenges associated with the oil business.  
Environmental laws or legislations were relegated to the background. They appeared to have 
been no more than appendages to other substantive legislations for the regulation of the oil 
industry.   
 
Nigeria’s environmental legislations take the form of Acts, Decrees, Laws and Edicts.  It is 
worth noting however that there is no single national environmental law.  Instead, there are 
various pieces of environmental laws, policies, guidelines and rules that do not in any way 
stand on their own but are embedded in other laws, such as oil laws.   For instance, the Oil 
Pipelines Act Cap 145, 156, 1958, 1965 and 1990 provided for granting licenses for the 
                                               
12See Ebomhe, S. (2006) “Environmental Legislation Changes in Nigeria: What Impact on Foreign 
Investment?” www.geplaw.com/environmental_law.htm (Accessed on the 3rd of August, 2008). 
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creation and ‘maintenance of pipelines, incidental supplementary to oil fields and oil mining, 
and for the purpose ancillary to such pipelines.’   It also made provisions as a matter of right 
and obligation to compensate victims of environmental pollution from activities of holders of 
licenses.  Though formulated by the colonial government at the time, the Minerals Act (CAP 
121) of 1958 contains specific measures that must be taken to prevent and control pollution 
of the environment.  This is laudable for a colonial government, traditionally criticised for 
lack of interest in the development of the colonised (there must have been some form of 
enlightened self-interest involved).  It is however worth noting that there was no enforcement 
of these provisions in cases of violation that affected local oil bearing communities. 
 
For both the Minerals Act of 1958 and the Petroleum Act of 1969, the federal government 
claims to have done fairly well in the area of implementation, mostly in the area of control 
and monitoring of effluent discharges, including drilling mud and cuttings; oil spill 
contingency planning; oil spill records; certification of oil spill clean-up of chemicals; 
establishment of standard oil industry practices; gathering of environmental baseline data and 
engaging in special research projects; and environmental awareness and education.  In 
implementing the above programmes, the government claims to have had the objectives: of 
ensuring that petroleum industry activities do not degrade the environment; that oil 
companies operated according to good practice; that oil companies developed capacity for 
adequate response to oil spill and other hazardous substances and that the public became 
aware and conscious of environmental issues.  As an official of the National Oil Spill 
Response Agency remarked on the 6th of August, 2008, in response to questions the 
researcher asked concerning activities of his agency during an interview: “The government 
has done fairly well in achieving objectives it set for protection of the environment.”  A 
similar remark was made several years earlier by ex-Petroleum Minister (also current 
12 
 
Minister for Petroleum) Lukman as follows: “We believe that most of these objectives have 
been achieved through the programmes we initiated but there is still room for improvement.” 
 
In reality, oil companies still conduct business activities in ways that damage the 
environment.  For example, there are regular cases of leakage at various pipelines as a result 
of failure of equipment and sometimes sabotage from third parties.  The consequence can 
only be imagined in most cases as crops, farmlands and other economic resources are 
damaged, with huge health and livelihood implications.  Oil companies have responsibility 
for the proper maintenance of pipelines.  But they hardly do.   Officials at the National Oil 
Spill Detection and Response Agency claim that it is the responsibility of oil companies to 
ensure that their pipes do not leak irrespective of how they leak or who caused the leakage.  
Failure to adequately and regularly maintain pipelines speaks volume of both oil companies 
and government’s inability to enforce the relevant sections of the Acts. Participants are 
unanimous in their perception that oil companies do not maintain these pipelines.13 Oil 
companies however blame pollution resulting from leakages from pipelines mainly on 
sabotage.14  Huge acres of land are regularly acquired without adequate compensation by oil 
companies for oil exploration and production activities. 15 The Oil in Navigable Waters Act 
of 1968 was enacted to prevent pollution in the navigable waters of Nigeria. This followed 
Nigeria’s adoption of the International Convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea 
                                               
13    Dr. Orike is an environmentalist who works for one of the oil companies (name withheld) in the 
Niger Delta and has experience in drilling.  He  spoke in the focus group meeting in Port Harcourt and 
laments  the level of pollution released through regular discharge of associated water during drilling 
and the leakages of piplelines, due to, first, government weakness to enforce relevant environmental 
laws and secondly, unwillingness of oil companies to comply fully with oil regulations. 
 
14    A senior staff of the Health Safety and Environment unit of the Department of Petroleum 
Resources stated that pipeline vandalilsation is the major cause of pollution from pipelines.  She 
indicated that leakages due to ruptures of pipelines are minimal. 
 
15   Participants from oil bearing communities insist that compensation for the type of land space 
which the oil companies usually acquire is meagre. 
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by oil of 1954 (amended in 1962).  Specifically, the Act prohibits discharge of certain oils 
into the sea areas.  
 
 
The Petroleum Act of 1969 is the principal Act.  It has been amended by Decrees No. 16 of 
1973, No.  49 of 1976 and No. 37 of 1977.  The Decree vests ownership of all petroleum in 
the state and also specifies obligation on holders of licences to: 
 prevent the pollution of inland waters, rivers, water courses, the territorial waters of 
Nigeria or the high seas by oil, mud or other fluids or substances which might 
contaminate the water, banks or shore line or which might cause harm or destruction 
to fish, water or marine life and where any such pollution occurs or has occurred, 
shall take prompt steps to control and if possible, end it.16 
 
Oil-related environmental laws for the pre-1988 era are not restricted to the above.  However,   
the laws contain sections that have implications for protection of the environment from the 
activities of oil companies (holders of licences) if enforced.  Although the Petroleum Act of 
1969 is not an environmental Act, provisions have been made in it for protecting the 
environment.  As Lukman (1991:78) notes:  
 
Neither the Petroleum Decree 1969 nor the Minerals Act of 1958 is an Environmental 
Act per se, but each contains statutory provisions that require those who operate under 
licences and/or leases granted by these Acts to take precautionary measures that 
would ensure that their actions do not degrade the quality of the human and ecological 
environment. 17 
 
Specifically, the Decree empowers the Minister of Petroleum Resources to make regulations 
pertaining to licences and leases granted operators which includes “the prevention of 
pollution of water courses and the atmosphere.” 18   There are other sections of the 1969 
Petroleum Regulation Act that prescribe expected manner of conduct of operators (oil 
companies) that conform to “good oil field practice.”  Specifically, Regulation 36 states that: 
                                               
16   Omorogbe, Y. (2001). Oil and Gas Law in Nigeria, Lagos: Malthous Press Limited, p. 24;  
Oremade, T. (1986) Petroleum Operations in Nigeria, Lagos: West African Book Publishers Limited, 
p.33. 
17  Lukman, R. (1991). “The Petroleum Decree and the Mineral Act as they Relate to the 
Environment,” proceedings of the International Workshop on Goals and Guidelines of the National 
Environmental Policy 12-16 September, 1988, pp.78-87.  Rilwanu Lukman was then Minister of 
Petroleum Resources in Nigeria. 




The licensee or lessee shall maintain all apparatuses and appliances in use in his 
operations, and all boreholes and wells capable of producing petroleum, in good 
repair and condition, and shall carry  out all his operations in a proper and work-man-
like manner in accordance with these and other relevant regulations and methods and 
practices accepted by the Director, Petroleum Resources as good oil field practices, 
and without prejudice to the generalities of the foregoing, he shall in accordance with 
those practices, take all steps practicable:  
a) to control the flow and to prevent the escape or avoidable waste of petroleum 
discovered in or obtained from the relevant area; 
 b) to prevent damage to adjoining petroleum bearing data;  
c) except for the purpose of secondary recovery as authorised by the Director, 
Petroleum Resources, to prevent the entrance of water through boreholes and wells to 
petroleum-bearing strata;  
d) to prevent escape of petroleum into any water, well, spring, stream, river, lake, 
reservoir, estuary or harbour, and 
 e) to cause as little damage as possible to the surface of the relevant area and to the 
trees, crops, buildings, structures and other property thereon. 
 
 
Other Regulations in the Act relating to the environment are numbers 40 and 45 that refer to 
expected practice in drainage of waste brine, sludge or refuse to avoid pollution of land and 
water and expected post-operation activities to ensure satisfactory condition of the 
environment after operator’s activities. 
 
In reality, oil drilling companies still discharge associated water into the seas in Nigeria 
unchecked by government officials at the Department of Petroleum Resources.  According to 
one participant, ‘government officials only come here to be fed with food and money and do 
nothing to check these companies.  Wastes are discharged into the sea recklessly. It is really 
amazing these things are happening in the face of laws prohibiting them.’19 
 
Corruption, weakness of institutional framework, lack of expertise and necessary equipment 
and personnel are some of the most significant explanations for the ineffectiveness of 
government officials at the DPR, FME and NOSDRIA to adequately enforce these laws.  The 
Harmful Waste Decree No. 42 of 1988 was promulgated by the Federal Government to 
prohibit the “carrying, depositing and dumping of harmful wastes on any land, territorial 
                                               
19    Key informant interview.  See recorded tape. 
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waters, contagious zone, exclusive economic zone of Nigeria or its inland water ways.” It 
prescribes severe penalties for any person or organisation found guilty.20   
 
 
Between 12 and 16 of September 1988, an international workshop on the goals and objectives 
of the National Policy on the Environment was held in Lagos.21   In the address of the Special 
Guest of Honour, Vice –Admiral Augustus Aikhomu, then Chief of General Staff, read by his 
representative, Brigadier Ishaya Bakut, the Federal Government declared its recognition and 
acceptance of the concept of sustainable development as valid for national progress. In the 
same vein, then president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, General Ibrahim Badamosi 
Babangida stated as follows: “We recognise the relationship between environment and 
development...we accept the concept of sustainable development as a valid approach for 
managing our national efforts towards progress”.22  What this implies is that, for the first 
time, the government of Nigeria would make a comprehensive effort to formulate 
fundamental goals and guidelines of a national policy on the environment through a 
stakeholder workshop that included all state governments in the federation.   
 
The workshop was a precursor to the formulation of the National Policy on Environmental 
(NPE) which was hitherto missing in the public policy.  The workshop opened a discourse 
that led to the formulation of the NPE in 1989.  The policy provided for the creation of a 
viable institutional framework for coordinating the management, protection and enforcement 
                                               
20 See Ebomhe, S. (2006). “Environmental Legislation Changes in Nigeria: What Impact on Foreign 
Investment.?” www.geplaw.com/environmental_law.htm (Accessed on the 4th of August, 2008). 
21    It was organised by the Environmental Planning and Protection Division (EPPD)  of the Federal 
Ministry of Works and Housing and the United Nations Programme on the Environment (UNEP) with 
participants drawn from key stakeholders.  At the time, the Federal Ministry of Works and Housing 
oversaw  Nigeria’s environmental concerns and had the responsibility of ensuring implementation of 
environmental programmes through its division of Environmental Planning and Protection. 
22 See babangida, I.B. (1991). “Environmental Issues as Top Priority,” opening remarks,  proceedings 
of the International Workshop onn the Goals and Guidelines of the National Environmental Policy 12-
16 September, 1988;  Aina, E.O.A. (1991). “Introduction,” proceedings of the International Workshop 
on the Goals and Guidelines of the National Environmental Policy 12-16 September, 1988. 
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of existing laws.23  It provided for the creation of a Federal Ministry of Environment and 
Environment Committees at the various states. FEPA was established by Decree No. 58 of 
1988.  The goal of the NPE is to achieve sustainable development in Nigeria.  Specifically, 
the goals are to:  
a) Secure for all Nigerians a quality of environment adequate for their health and 
well-being;  
b) Conserve and use the environment and natural resources for the benefit of present 
and future generations; 
 c) Restore, maintain and enhance the ecosystems and ecological processes essential 
for the functioning of the biosphere to preserve biological diversity and the principle 
of optimum sustainable yield in the use of living natural resources and ecosystems;  
d) Raise public awareness and promote understanding of essential linkages between 
environment and development and to encourage individual and community 
participation in environmental improvement efforts; and  
e) Cooperate in good faith with other countries, international organisations/agencies 
and effective prevention or abatement of transboundary environmental pollution.24 
 
Enforcement or implementation of the NPE depends on specific actions of relevant agencies 
or ministries towards certain sectors or areas of environmental concern such as the oil 
industry.  The policy adopts the approach that is holistic and comprehensive in environmental 
issues, such that actions envisaged will create or strengthen legal, institutional, regulatory, 
research, monitoring, evaluation, public information, and other relevant mechanisms for 
ensuring the achievement of sustainable development in the country. Furthermore, three areas 
in which results are expected from the above strategies for the enforcement of the policy are: 
‘establishment of adequate environmental standards as well as the monitoring and evaluation 
of changes in the environment; the publication and dissemination of relevant environmental 
data; prior environmental assessment of proposed activities which may affect the 
environment or the use of a natural resource.’ Public participation is an important component 
                                               
23  Prior to the creation of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) at least five Federal 
Ministries were involved in the coordination of environmental concerns of Nigeria.  They are: Federal 
Ministries of Works and Housing; Agriculture and Water Resources; Transport; Health; Industries 
and Budget and Planning. 
24  See Federal Republic of Nigeria (1989)  National Policy on the Environment 
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of the NPE.  Being a strategy, the policy recognises the role that individuals and communities 
may play in the formulation and implementation of environmental laws. 
 
It is important to note that the environment is currently not a substantive subject in the 1999 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria irrespective of its rise on the issues agenda of 
the country and its subsequent inclusion   in the policy document of the government.   This is 
significant for understanding the capacity and willingness on the part of government officials 
at the federal, state and local government legislative houses required to give NPE the desired 
legal framework for legitimacy. 
 
 
Nigerian law25 on oil spills stipulates that oil companies should “begin immediate clean-up 
operations following the best available clean-up practice and removal methods” in cases of 
oil spill.  The Oil Pipeline Act of 1990 orders oil companies to pay compensation to any one 
suffering damage resulting from any breakage or leakage from the pipeline or associated 
installation.  The law does not stipulate compensation in cases of spills caused by third party. 
A recent trend for SPDC is refusal to even contain effects of spills caused by third party by 
remediation.26  The Nigerian Petroleum Act of 1969 stipulates that oil and gas exploration 
and production should conform to good oilfield practice.   
 
In practice, oil companies fail to translate internal policies into reduction of gas flared or 
number of oil spills in the Niger Delta.27  This failure is linked to three oil and environment 
related conflicts that now characterise the Niger Delta: Resource Curse Conflict (RCC); local 
resource scarcity; and Complex Conflict.  Resource Curse Conflict refers to how trade in oil 
and its abundance has underdeveloped local populations in many respects such as loss of land 
                                               
25    Federal Environmental Protection Act 1988. 
26    This was disclosed by a senior field environmental scientist at NOSDRA but denied by a staff of 
SPDC contacted for confirmation in this study. 
27   Gas flaring and oil spills are the key causes of damage to the environment in the Niger Delta.   
They result in massive loss of means of livelihood for local populations and have defined illegal and 
destructive livelihood patterns that complicate problems of the environment. 
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and resources from the environment that previously sustained the local economy.  Local 
Resource Scarcity (LRS) captures the loss of land as the key instrument of production in the 
case of the Niger Delta.  Complex Conflict (CC) portrays the qualities of LRS and CC in the 
context of socio-economic and political conditions and interests   of stakeholders.28 
 
Being an integrated approach to addressing the problem of the environment occasioned by oil 
exploration and production activities in the Niger Delta, sustainable development requires the 
utilisation of political institutions and systems, economy, involvement of corporate 
organisations and cooperation of citizens to be realised.  This is as yet lacking in Nigeria.  It 
is therefore not surprising that struggles for access to the resources of the environment 
without regard for their sustainability continue to create conditions for mutual violent 
activities among key stakeholders in the Niger Delta. 
 
1.3. Research problems and hypothesis 
The violence in the Niger Delta is caused by the failure of the Nigerian government to 
implement effectively its national environmental policy.  There is a relationship between the 
failure of the government to implement its relevant national oil related environmental policy 
and the choice of violence by justice and environmental groups in the Niger Delta. 
 
 
1.4. Research Objectives 
The major objectives of this study are as follows: 
 
1. To identify and explain the pattern of relationship between the Nigerian government and 
the oil companies on the one hand and justice and environmental movement organisations 
on the other hand in the implementation of environmental public policy in the Niger 
Delta; 
                                               
28   For more information on  the theory, see CSS and Swisspeace (2008). Report on “Linking 
Environment and Conflict Prevention, The Role of the United Nations.” pp.1-117 
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2. To determine the extent to which oil and environmental policy related conflicts between 
justice and environmental movement organisations (on the one hand) and government and 
oil companies (on the other hand) depend on political opportunity structures in Nigeria. 
3. To identify and explain specifically what and why socio-economic and political interests 
shape the relationships between the Nigerian government and justice and environmental 
non-governmental organisations and oil companies in the implementation of 
environmental public policy in the Niger Delta. 
 
1.5. Research questions 
 The critical questions of this study are: 
  
1. What has government done to implement key environmental policies related to the oil 
business in the Niger Delta? 
2. What is the state of compliance of oil companies to government environmental policy 
in the Niger Delta? 
3. What political opportunity structures exist for local justice and environmental groups 
to influence policy implementation in the Niger Delta? 
4. What is the relationship between oil companies and local justice and environmental 
groups over the implementation of government environmental policy? 
5. What is the relationship between government and local justice and environmental 







Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
2.1. Introduction 
This section discusses the theoretical framework and methodology. The choice of 
Frustration-Aggression theory by the researcher is based on two key considerations: first, on 
the insights it provides through its key assumptions for explaining issues addressed in this 
work; second, for its synergy with the methodology -- Relational Content Analysis (RCA) in 
tackling or pursuing the objectives and questions posed in this research.  This relationship is 
demonstrated and explained in terms of how both the theoretical framework and the 
methodology relate in this work 
 
2.2. Theoretical Framework  
There are competing explanations in the discourse of both environmental public policy 
implementation and violent conflicts. They include Frustration-Aggression, Structural 
Conflict, Realist and Political Process theories.  Others are Economic, Systemic, Relational, 
and Resource Mobilisation theories (Ademola, 2006: 50-55; Collier, 2000: 2; Ross, 1993:4; 
Anifowose, 1982: 6; Morrison, 1978: 41; Morganthau, 1973: 4; Gurr, 1970: 24; Davies, 
1962: 6).  Most of these theories are useful but generally inadequate for this study for various 
reasons. For example, the Political Process theory refers to the impact of political context on 
social movement organisations’ choice of strategies in the public policy process (Alonso, 
Costa and Maciel, 2005: 56; Haynes, 1999: 222; Heijden: 1999: 201; McAdam, 1996: 35).  It 
stresses the importance of political institutions -- political opportunity structures -- in 
predicting patterns of collective actions (Dalton, Rechia and Rohrschneider, 2003: 743-754).  
As noted by Dalton, Rechia and Rohrschneider (2003: 760), “if conventional lobbying 
represents a real opportunity for influence, the sensible organisation will use this method; if 
protest or violence appears to be more effective, this mode will be preferred.” The choice of 
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strategies of confrontation by groups seeking to influence public policy might depend on 
whether or not the political process is open or closed. Often, democracy is credited with the 
ability to provide opportunities for access to the public policy process.  From this theory, 
assumptions would be that groups seeking to influence public policy are less likely to be 
confrontational or violent in a democracy.  
 
Ironically, the era of military regimes in Nigeria (1966-1979 and 1984-1998) were marked by 
substantial levels of popular resistance by local groups against the state and oil companies in 
the Niger Delta.  Degradation of the environment and associated problems were cited as 
reasons for the resistance.  One problem with the theory is that it takes political opportunity 
structures as neutral and rational in providing access and in responding to demands by groups 
in a society. The experience is usually different, especially with emerging democracies in 
Africa, where it seems that the interests of the political elite frequently dominate the 
democratic political process.  It appears that those interests are often different from those 
shared by the mass of citizens and are more deeply reflected in institutions and the public 
policy processes. The rationality and neutrality of such democratic institutions are therefore 
uncertain.  This might be a problem for the state regarding the perception of fairness and 
justice on the part of local community groups.  In essence, concerning this study, sustained 
violence in the Niger Delta in a supposed democracy such as Nigeria’s  is thus a call for a  
theoretical tool that  probes the integrity of democratic institutions by incorporating 
predisposing psycho-cultural factors of frustration that may actually account for current 
violence in the region.  Besides, the theory gives the impression that violence has only 
military connotation and on these issues does emerge only from social movements.  
Apparently, both the state and non-state actors are capable of using violence in pursuit of 




Following from a careful review of theoretical literature on conflict and the environmental 
public policy process, Frustration-Aggression theory (Anifowose, 1982: 6; Gurr, 1970: 2; 
Davies, 1962: 6) provides valuable insights for this study in explaining the collective actions 
of armed local populations seeking justice and the implementation of government 
environmental policy in the Niger Delta.  Assumptions of this theory will be deployed to 
explain how frustration with the inability of political structures (Alonso, Costa and Maciel, 
2005: 18; Van der Heijden, 1999: 199-221) to provide legitimate opportunities for the 
channelling of grievances of local populations through conventional modes might lead them 
to adopt violent strategies.  For instance, the judiciary, legislature and executive arms of 
government and their necessary agencies (such as specialised development commissions) 
should provide opportunities for legitimate channelling of grievances for groups in a 
democracy. Again, political opportunity structures refer to the degree of access to the 
political system and its institutions on the part of citizens or groups.  This theory will help to 
explain the incidence of frustration with the attainment of national environmental policy 
goals and how that frustration might be followed with aggressive behaviours. 
 
Etymologically, the Frustration-Aggression theory is credited to John Dollard (Ademola, 
2006; Yates, 1962: 23; Berkowitz, 1962: 34). Its central thesis is that violent behaviours stem 
from unfulfilled needs. Violent behaviour is the outcome of frustration, a condition or 
situation where legitimate desires of people (or an individual) are denied directly or indirectly 
as a result of the structure of the society or the political system.  The consequence is a feeling 
of frustration that can lead to violence. Such violence may be directed at the persons or 
institutions perceived to be directly or indirectly responsible for the frustration.  
 
This theory has the potential to explain how socio-economic, environmental and political 
conditions of the oil-bearing communities of the Niger Delta might lead to a sense of 
frustration, with implications for violent reaction.  The concern here is not just about 
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explaining meaningless access to environmental policy implementation process but how such 
access or its denial might shape behaviours towards the implementation of environmental 
public policy.  Frustration-Aggression theory incorporates aspects of the political process 
theory in terms of the political context in which unfulfilled needs of groups come to define 
their pattern of action.  It will help answer the basic questions of this study. 
 
There are enormous methodological challenges in the use of this theory in terms of 
measurement of necessary variables. This is because of the psycho-cultural nature of 
frustration.  While it may be easier to deal operationally with aggression, it is far more 
complex with frustration.  However, to address this problem, within the scope of this study, 
the independent variable of violence in this study will refer to the following: physical attacks 
on oil companies; hostage taking of oil company staff; violent protests; killing of government 
security and oil company staff; inter-communal killings; killing of local community members 
by government security operatives; and government policies that might deny groups their 
perceived rights to a fair share of resources derived from their region.  Frustration will be 
measured in terms of perception of local communities on pertinent issues of environmental 
policy and degradation of the environment including related issues that can possibly explain 
the violence in the region.  
 
2.3. Methodology 
This study utilises the content analysis29 mode of data collection. In using this 
methodological approach, the assumption is that words, phrases, statements or concepts 
                                               
29Content analysis is a method of gathering and organising non-structured data into a standardised 
format in order to be able to make inferences about motives or intentions and 
relationshipsbetween variables. See BJA Center for Programme Evaluation Glosary at: www.ojp.usdoj
.gov/BJA/evaluation/glossary /glossary_c.htm (Accessed on the 24th of December, 2007). See also 
Jonowitz, M. (1969).  “Harold D. Laswell’s Contribution to Content Analysis,” The Public Opinion 
Quarterly, Vol. 32. No .4 pp. 646-653; Yeh, C.J. and Inman, A.G. (2007). “Qualitative Data Analysis 
and Interpretation in Counselling Psychology: Strategies for Best Practices,” The Counselling 
Psychologist, Vol.35. No.3 
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mentioned most recurrently in both verbal and written communication on key questions of 
the work would be those suggestive of relevant concerns,30 and would represent indirect 
indicators of the relevant variables in the objectives of the study. The approach yields both 
qualitative and quantitative analyses.  It queries views, opinions, experiences and 
interpretations of social phenomena through systematic and well directed research 
instruments of primary and secondary sources of data.  An important advantage of content 
analysis31 for this study is the flexibility it allows and the fact that it is useful in qualitative 
and quantitative research (Yeh and Inman, 2007: 369-403; Janowitz, 1969: 646-653). 
 
 
Primary sources of data for this study include a questionnaire, focus group discussions and 
key informant interviews. For the secondary sources, the study relies on the extensive use of 
library materials such as books, academic journals, relevant periodicals, magazines and 
newspapers related to the study objectives. Other secondary sources include original 
documents, official government publications, gazettes, archival materials, oil company 
annual reports/newsletters, press releases, seminar papers, unpublished theses and the 
Internet. These means of data collection have specific advantages for this study.  For 
example, the questionnaire is appropriate because the target groups for data collection could 
be easily reached. Furthermore, the focus group discussion is flexible in application as well as 
interactive in the sense that it affords the researcher the opportunity to draw detailed 
information from participants through the interactive process.  Besides, the researcher is able 
to frame and reframe questions on the spot to help the understanding of participants. The key 
informant interview, which involves one-on-one interviews with key informants, is useful in 
sourcing data from local armed groups who were not willing to be part of the focus group 
                                               
30See Krippendorff, K.(1980) cited inWikipedia encyclopedia at htt://www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/co
ntent analysis (Accessed on the 24th of December, 2007). 




discussions due to fears of being identified and arrested by state security operatives. Its 
strongest advantage for this study is the opportunity it gave for access to first-hand and 
detailed information from those informants with experience and knowledge of the issues 
addressed in the research.  The use of each (or a combination) of these methods, however, is 
anchored on the objectives of the study, the relevant variables, and the nature or needs of the 
groups being targeted for data collection. 
  
Regarding objective one of the study, which is to identify and explain the pattern of 
relationship between the Nigerian government and the oil companies on the one hand, and 
environmental local groups on the other hand in the implementation of environmental public 
policy in the Niger Delta,   two relevant variables will be assessed. They are: the pattern of 
relationships between various stakeholders and the factors that shape or impede the 
implementation of environmental public policy.  Indicators of the pattern of relationships 
between the various stakeholders in the implementation of  environmental public policy 
include: government policies perceived to be injurious to the development of the Niger Delta;  
protests and disruption of oil production activities by local armed groups; hostage taking of 
local and foreign oil workers by local armed groups and funding of government security 
operatives  by oil companies; killing of state security operatives by local armed groups; 
killing of local environmental groups by state security operatives and physical attacks on oil 
company facilities by local armed groups. 
 
 Implementation of environmental public policy includes  the following indicators:  
achievement of policy goals such as the end to gas flaring; use of adequate and appropriate 
technology for cleanup purposes and prevention of pollution due to oil spills;  measurable 
improvements in the social, political and economic conditions of people from oil bearing 
communities in the Niger Delta; degree to which actions of implementing officials at the 
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Federal Ministry of the Environment, Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) and  oil 
companies conform with the goals embodied in environmental policy related to oil business 
in the Niger Delta.  Other operational meanings of implementation of environmental public 
policy are: executive orders from the presidency and court decisions concerning operations of 
oil companies and protection of the environment; government and oil companies’ 
implementation plans, structures and actions in response to environmental public policy 
related to the oil business in the Niger Delta; existence of mechanisms for gaining 
compliance from oil companies such as mutually held (shared values) goals, coercion in the 
form of threat of sanctions for failing to comply, and  reparation arrangements or incentives 
to make compliance with environmental rules and measures meant to protect the environment 
in the Niger Delta an attractive option. 
 
The targets for data collection include government officials at the Federal Ministry of 
Environment and the Federal Ministry of Petroleum Resources, oil company workers, and 
local environmental movement organisations. Instruments of data collection will include 
primary sources of data such as questionnaire and key informant interviews, and secondary 
sources of data such as library materials, including newspaper reports, journal articles, special 
reports, and the Internet. Relational content analysis shall be done on each of the variables in 
this objective.32  Fifty copies of questionnaire were distributed on the basis of quota 
sampling33 in order to ensure that all targeted groups for data collection are selected. 
                                               
32  There are two categories of content analysis: conceptual and relational content analyses.  
Conceptual content analysis refers to a process of determining the existence and frequency of 
concepts, often represented as words, phrases or statements in a text or recorded communication. 
Relational content analysis involves a step further on conceptual analysis to examine the relationship 
between concepts (variables) in a text or recorded communication in order to be able to make 
inferences about the characteristics of concerned variables.    
 
33    This involves obtaining the desired number of elements by selecting those most accessible and 
those that have the experience and knowledge of the issues under investigation in the research. The 
word quota implies a predetermined number that is desired. This is to ensure significant inclusion of 
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Copies of questionnaire (containing open-
ended questions) meant to generate data for testing relationships of relevant variables in 
objective two of the study were administered to the various groups.  
 
 
Relational content analysis of data from the questionnaire, secondary sources of data and 
recorded key informant interviews involve first, the conversion of words, phrases, statements 
or concepts associated with the relevant variables of objective one of the study to categories 
or codes.  Frequency counts and determination of the mode mean and percentage are then 
calculated to help in establishing and explaining relationships among categorised or coded 
variables that are specific to this objective. It is crucial to note that in using relational content 
analysis, the researcher sought to specify links between evidence (verbal and written 
materials) and inferences (regarding motivations and intentions) which, for this study, 
pertains to how failure of the government to implement environmental public policy shapes 
the pattern of relationships between the various stakeholders in the Niger Delta.   Establishing 
this link between evidence and inference is the aim of content analysed data in this study.34   
In addition, and for the purpose of clarity and explanation, coded themes (variables) are 
presented in tables and graphs. 
 
There are two basic variables in objective two of the study. They are: oil and environmental 
policy related conflicts between the various stakeholders and political opportunity structures.  
Indicators of conflicts in this study  between  local justice and environmental movement 
organisations  (on the one hand) and oil companies and the government (on the other hand) 
                                                                                                                                                  
all targeted populations for the study. See Obasi, I.N. (1999). Research Methodology in Political 
Science, Enugu: Academic Publishing House 
34See Mitchell, R.E. (1967). “The Use of Content Analysis for Explanatory Studies,” The Public 
Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 31 No. 2 pp. 230-241. The second stated objective of this study is to 
determine the extent to which oil and environmental policy- related conflicts between environmental 
movement organizations (on the one hand) and government and oil companies (on the other hand) 




include: demand for resource control by local environmental groups; killing of state security 
operatives; hostage taking of foreign and local oil  company workers by local justice and 
environmental movement organisations; attacks and seizures of oil company facilities by  
local justice and environmental movement  groups; and arrest, detention and  killing of 
members of local justice and environmental movement groups by state security operatives.  
Specifically, oil and environmental policies refer to the various Acts of the government meant 
to regulate the activities of oil companies in the interest of the environment; measures taken 
by the government and oil companies to implement government policies meant to protect the 
environment in the Niger Delta and oil policies that vest control of oil business in the hands 
of the government.  Political opportunity structures refer to various legal institutional 
mechanisms35 that provide access to various stakeholders to participate in the implementation 
of environmental public policy in the Niger Delta.  An example is access to the courts by 
local environmental groups seeking redress against the state for policy implementation lapses 
or failures, and oil companies for violating environmental laws.  Other indicators of political 
opportunity structures include the existence of various formal and informal groups or 
agencies that provide platforms for the involvement of local communities in the 
implementation of environmental public policy in the Niger Delta.  
 
The target groups for data collection include: local environmental groups, oil companies, 
government officials at the Federal Ministry of the Environment and Federal Ministry of 
Petroleum Resources, and local public opinion leaders in the Niger Delta.  For this objective 
(#2) and the identified variables, instruments of data collection comprise: a questionnaire, key 
                                               
35  Institutions can be social, cultural, economic, political and formal or informal. However, the fields 
of political science and economics tend to highlight formal institutions. Political opportunity 
structures refer to formal political institutions of the state and state-related institutions such as the 
bureaucracy, interest groups, rules, party systems, political actors, groupings and agency. See 
Sangmpam, S.M. (2007). “Politics Rules: The False Primacy of Institutions in Developing Countries,” 




informant interviews and focus group discussions.  In respect of relational content analysis of 
data generated from the use of a questionnaire, key informant interviews and focus groups 
discussions were undertaken.  This involves initial coding of responses to open-ended 
questions in copies of the questionnaire on the basis of categorised themes (variables or 
concepts) of the objective of study and is presented in tables and graphs showing frequency 
counts and calculated mode, mean and per cent of coded variables.  Establishing the 
relationships among the variables through this process facilitates inferences. 
 
 
Two key variables in objective three of this study, namely,  to identify and explain 
specifically what and why socio-economic and political interests shape the relationships 
between the Nigerian government and oil companies (on the one hand) and local justice and 
environmental non-governmental organisations (on the other hand) in the implementation 
environmental public policy in the Niger Delta, -- are: the varied socio-economic and 
political interests (of local  justice and environmental groups in the Niger Delta, the Federal 
government, and the oil companies in Nigeria), and their impact on the implementation of 
environmental public policy.  Socio-economic and political interests consist of socio-
economic and political factors that impede or shape the pattern of relationships between the 
various stakeholders in the implementation of environmental public policy in the Niger Delta.  
Indicators of socio-economic interests include but are not restricted to various political 
representational and general issues of livelihoods (on the part of local justice and 
environmental groups) and corporate and national issues of economic development (on the 
part of government and oil companies). Indicators of implementation of environmental public 
policy are as already defined above (See objective 1).   
 
The targets for data collection regarding variables for objective three of this study include: 
government officials at the Federal Ministry of Environment and the Federal Ministry of 
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Petroleum Resources; oil company officials; local environmental groups and local opinion 
leaders. The means of data collection comprise: key informant interviews and a 
questionnaire.  A relational content analysis of data generated from the various targeted 
groups for data collection was undertaken for each of the two variables in this objective.  As 
defined earlier, relational content analysis for this objective shall also involve utilisation of 
frequency counts of the mode,36 mean and percentage to aid inferences and explanation of 
coded relationships of variables. In short, frequent recurrence of relevant coded words, 
statements or concepts in verbal and written texts (data) suggest relevant relationships among 
variables. Since content analysis is both a technique for data collection and a tool for analysis 
of data, it serves this dual purpose for this study. 
 
A 29-page open-ended questionnaire in three sets of questions meant for officials of oil 
companies, government  officials at the Federal Ministry of  Environment (FME) and 
Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), and members of local justice and environmental 
movement organisations covered several themes: the pattern of relationship between the 
Nigerian government and the oil companies on the one hand and environmental local groups 
on the other in the implementation of environmental public policy in the Niger Delta; what 
and why socio-economic and political interests  shape the relationships; and  the extent to 
which oil and environment related conflicts depend on political opportunity structures.37   
Section one of the questionnaire was meant to generate data on socio-demographic details 
and background of participants.  Section two was meant to generate data from the local 
                                               
36    The mode is a measure of central tendency that tells which score or value in a distribution that is 
observed most frequently.  The mode is also known as the average which will be presented with the 
aid of graphs for this study.  The choice of analytical techniques of the mode is due to its potential to 
give the researcher a better idea of the most popular variable in a frequency distribution, whereas the 
mean is chosen because it is least affected by extreme values in any frequency distribution.  Content 
analysis typically uses frequency counts or similar measures as the basis for making inferences, for 
which the mode, mean and percentage statistics will be useful. 
37 The research stresses the importance of how conflicts related to oil exploration and exploitation and 
environmental consequences are dependent on political institutions or political opportunity structures. 
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environmental groups whereas sections three and four were intended to generate data from oil 
companies and government officials respectively. 
 
Two focus group sessions were conducted, although only one was originally designed to 
generate data from members of the local justice and environmental groups.  Attempts to reach 
top members of these local groups became complex. It took the intervention (support) of 
some organisations in Port Harcourt -- Social Action and Ogoni Solidarity Forum -- for us to 
organise the focus groups.  In short, because members of the armed sections of local justice 
and environmental groups would not join with any other group for discussions, the researcher 
organised a separate discussion with them and conducted a second focus group with a 
mixture of target populations.  The criteria for selecting participants from local justice and 
environmental groups included: organisations with broad political interest; active 
participation in national politics; armed groups who emphasize environmental, socio-
economic and political issues in the oil politics of Nigeria.  International professional 
environmental non-governmental organisations were excluded in the first focus group but 
included those amongst them involved in mobilising local groups on justice and 
environmental issues in the second focus group. 
  
 
Regarding the use of library materials, a two-stage strategy was utilised to draw samples of 
articles or scholarly papers on the conflict in the Niger Delta.  First, the researcher searched 
the major academic journals in the Proquest and Ebsco databases, using key words such as 
violence in the Niger Delta; government environmental policy implementation in the Niger 
Delta; conflict between oil companies and local communities in the Niger Delta; and oil and 
environmental policy in the Niger Delta between January 1999 and April 2008. This time 
period was selected because oil and environment related conflicts in the Niger Delta began to 
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assume its violent bent from the 1990s.38  Second, the researcher checked the reference list of 
the articles obtained through the process to see more works that had already been done in the 
area.  On the whole, this search yielded 120 articles. 
 
 
 As earlier noted, the researcher then utilised relational content analytical mode to analyse 
data obtained from journal articles and books, and transcribed texts from taped interviews and 
discussions.  It also included analysis of data generated from newspapers.  The process began 
with specifying pertinent themes based on key objectives of the study. 
 
Table 2.1.  Data, target population, themes and samples 
 
Type of data Author /Target population  Themes/Focus of data/Variables Sample   
01 01 01; 02; 03; 04; 05; 06 120 
02 02  
03 
01; 02; 03; 04; 05; 06 45 
03 04 01; 01; 03; 04; 05; 06 20 
04  01; 02; 03; 04; 05; 06  
05 05 01; 02; 03; 04; 05; 06 8 
06  03  
 
Keys: 
Type of data: 
01=Scholarly articles in journals 
02= Open-ended questions in questionnaires 
03= Field notes 
04= Newspapers  
05= Focus group 
06=Government documents  
 
Author/Target population: 
01=Scholarly articles  
02= Oil company officials 
03= Government officials 
04= Justice and Environmental Movement Organisations 
05= Local opinion leaders 
                                               
38 This does not in any way downplay the 12 Day Revolution of Isaac Borro and his Ijaw colleagues in 




Themes/Focus of data/Variables39: 
01= Implementation of environmental public policy  
02= Conflict/violence 
03=Political opportunity structures  





The researcher conducted 15 key informant interviews among the staff of oil companies and 
members of local justice and environmental groups (7 from oil companies and 8 from local 
justice and environmental groups).  One focus group discussion of 8 persons drawn from 
local opinion leaders, oil companies, and local justice and environmental groups was 
conducted at Social Action conference hall at the D-line area of Port Harcourt in Rivers State.  
The other focus group discussion was conducted in Yenagoa, Bayelsa State.  The key areas 
on which data were tested include: government and implementation of environmental 
policies; compliance of oil companies; political opportunity structures; oil companies and 
justice and environmental movement organisations: and government and justice and 




For this study, assumptions of the Frustration-Aggression theory will be effectively deployed 
to explain the violent behaviour of local justice and environmental movement organisations 
in the Niger Delta.  The study will seek to demonstrate that the violence in the Niger Delta is 
primarily a direct consequence of the failure of government to implement effectively relevant 
oil-related national environmental policy frameworks.  Although other factors -- whether 
economic, political, social or cultural – are sometimes contributory to the problems, the key 
feature that underscores and provides the raison d’etre for the violence is the environmental 
devastation that oil company activities have imposed on the lives of millions of Niger Deltans 
                                               
39 See Table 2.1 for indicators of variables in each of the objectives. 
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with the tacit consent of successive Nigerian governments through their non-implementation 
or enforcement of enacted national policies.   
 
Frustration-Aggression theory is also relevant for operationalising the key variables as 
contained in the objectives of this research.  In fact, the choice of Relational Content Analysis 
by the researcher for data collection and analyses has been largely informed by a goal of 
linking evidence and inference of content analysed data which is often associated with the 
method; hence, making the theoretical framework and methodology mutually reinforcing in 
achieving the objectives of this work.  This chapter has sought to explain how this is 















This section of the study discusses existing literature under three thematic areas, namely: 
sustainable development, implementation of environmental policy and conflict in the Niger 
Delta.  The aim is to determine whether there are gaps in and around the existing body of 
thought and to point out specific gaps that inform how this research contributes to existing 
research in the area of study.  It is instructive that Nigeria’s oil related environmental 
legislations and regulations aim to achieve sustainable development.40 For instance, Nigeria’s 
National Policy on Environment specifies sustainable development as its key goal. This 
imposes a need to understand whether or not this goal is being achieved in relation to oil-
related conflict.   There is substantial literature on the issues of oil company operations, 
environment and conflict in the Niger Delta region.  However, such studies do not link 
violence in the region to failure by government to implement oil related environmental 
legislations to promote sustainable development.  In fact, a critical element in the 
implementation of these legislations is the extent of compliance by oil companies, and this 
can be assessed by examining the oil companies’ environmental policies and practices as well 
as studying the actions of implementing officials to ascertain whether such practices or 
actions conform to the goal of achieving sustainable development.  A review of the literature 
shows that this has not been sufficiently studied, especially in relation to understanding the 
motivation for violent conflict in the Niger Delta where certain local environmental groups 
                                               
40    Although, for environmental legislations enacted before 1989, the concept of sustainable 
development is not stated clearly, provisions of those legislations seem to seek the goal of sustainable 
development at different degrees depending on the level of compliance by target groups.  For example 
the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation Act of 1969 does not express the concept in the 
policy document but contains in many ways principles and objectives of sustainable development. 
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and oil companies and the Nigerian government are involved in waging “violent wars” 
against each other.  
 
3.2. Sustainable development 
 
 
Though understood differently by scholars, the most widely accepted definition of sustainable 
development41 is the one given by the Brundland Report, which defines it as development 
that meets the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs (Schaltegger, Burritt and Peterson 2003: 21-27; WCED 
1987).  Its key feature is embedded in the notion that it is possible to have economic 
development while also protecting the environment (Neil, 2001: 195).    
 
 
Often, sustainable development is contrasted with traditional policy paradigms.  Both have 
shaped the ways governments address problems of the environment (Neil, 2001: 161-164; 
Meadowcroft, 1999: 220).  The former emerged in the 1970s and policy makers influenced 
by it often use regulatory policy instruments.  The traditional paradigm plays down the 
interdependence among economic, political, and social systems and the environment, and 
regards the degradation of the environment as one of the unfortunate undesired effects of 
economic activities.  Though often criticised for being reactive, tactical and piecemeal, the 
traditional paradigm seems to have dominated environmental policy making among policy 
elites who many scholars believe have given more consideration to economic growth than to 
what actually happens to the environment (Weale, 1992: 17; Haque, 1999: 455).  Perhaps, 
this is why Haque (1999: 456) argues that policy orientation in neo-liberal regimes in 
                                               
41   The terminology Sustainable development was popularised by what is today referred to as the 
Brundland Report of 1987.  The United Nations General Assembly created the World Commission on 
Environment and Development in 1983 as a global institutional response to the growing concerns 
about degradation of the environment and economic crisis.  Gro Harlem Brundland, then Prime 
Minister of Norway, chaired the Commission and made wide consultations for four years.  The 
Commission finally produced its report in 1987, Our Common Future, now commonly referred to as 




developing countries is a challenge to sustainable development.  Indeed, a few scholars have 
linked this dominance of the traditional paradigm with the structural power of producers and 
their lack of interest in issues pertaining to the protection of the environment.  However, even 
if one accepts that, producers do wield tremendous power to shape environmental policy 
agenda, it must also be noted that they are effective to the extent that (because) most 
governments also appear to be uninterested in protecting the environment.  Consequently, 
such, governments normally do not need to be lobbied by producers on issues of effective 
environmental policy (Neil, 2001: 165). 
 
 
Literature on sustainable development, presents three threads, namely: attempts by scholars 
to explain or interpret the concept; discursive research on the  approach and strategies for its 
realisation; problems of implementing sustainable development policies and conflict in the  
developing countries (See for example, Haque and Mudacumura, 2006; Constantinos, 2006; 
Mudacumura, 2006; Barclay, 2006; Obi, 2004: 25; Livesay,  2002: 316; Meadowcrowft, 
1999: 315; Hajer, 1997: 37; Moffat and Linden, 1995: 312).   
 
 
For example, the meaning, approaches, strategies and problems of implementing sustainable 
development in developing countries have been reported in research carried out by Haque 
and Mudacumura (2006).  According to them, the idea of sustainable development has been 
promoted to the point of “ideology” in both developed and developing countries during the 
course of the past three decades.  This is due to the global awareness created through 
seminars, conferences, books, journals, and reports, multilateral institutions like the United 
Nations, conventions and protocols.  At the multilateral institutional level, heads of state and 
their representatives have been part of the debate on sustainable development and the ways to 
actualise it.  Obviously, this has been reflected through their role in multilateral initiatives, 
protocols and conventions on protection of the environment.  In their findings and, 
38 
 
regrettably, Haque and Maducumura report that in spite of the current state of awareness on 
the importance of sustainable development and the efforts so far made towards addressing 
environmental degradation, not much has been achieved.  Some countries that have 
formulated sustainable development policies have done so in response to pressure from 
domestic or global environmental regimes. This speaks volumes about the attitude of the state 
and corporate organisations towards sustainable development and its implications for the 
global environment.  Haque and Maducumura claim that economic development based on 
rapid industrialisation, patterns of consumption, urban expansion and so on, by governments 
of countries continue to worsen global environmental conditions.  These concerns by Haque 
and Maducumura raise critical questions of conceptualisation, approaches, strategies and 







First, they identify two approaches to sustainable development, namely, utilitarian and 
ethical approaches.  The former (utilitarian) recommends trade-off in welfare benefits from 
environmental protection between generations.  It also contends that there is no need to 
change existing mode of economic activities that generate greenhouse gases if the 
environmental cost for future generations in terms of global warming is greater than that of 
existing generation.  On the other hand, the ethical approach prescribes welfare inequality 
between existing and future generations.  It recommends, as a matter of moral obligation, that 
the current generation should ensure that future generations have an equal opportunity to 
benefit from environmental quality and resources.  By this approach, future generations are 
entitled to equal levels of environmental quality and resources with current generations.  In 
addition, the poor and the deprived are implicitly entitled to rights of enjoying the same 
quality of environment and resources with the upper class in society. 
 
Narrow welfare issues in terms of economic benefits render the utilitarian approach less 
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useful for the realisation of sustainable development goals. The approach is insensitive to 
environmental implications of both present and future generations.  As Haque and 
Maducumura note about the ethical approach: 
On the other hand, although the ethical approach does address the question of 
intergenerational equality in welfare, it remains human-centred in terms of its 
emphasis on the maintenance of environmental resources for human species without 
much concern for the environmental sustainability as an end in itself, which can be 
observed in various traditional cultures or belief systems.  Thus in studying 
sustainable development, it is necessary to emphasize environmental sustainability not 
only for the current and future generations (including all classes and group in each 
generation) but also for the environment itself.42 
 
 
From these arguments or findings in Haque and Maducumura’s research, it seems that there 
are three dimensions to sustainable development.  The three are required to be integrated in 
whatever approach adopted by governments for ensuring sustainable development.  They are 
the economic, environmental and social dimensions of sustainable development.  
Environmental sustainability refers to development practice that is sensitive to biodiversity as 
well as limits to resources.  Economic sustainability refers to environmental cost of 
development activities. Social sustainability suggests involvement of citizens in the 
management of development and the environment.  On these issues, Haque and Maducumura 
argue that: 
These major economic, social and environmental dimensions of sustainable 
development are mutually complementary rather than exclusive.  For instance, in 
pursuing development, one needs to consider its environmental costs, make sure that 
it does not put excessive pressure on environmental capacity, and ensure its 
implementation based on people’s participation...Thus in both theory and practice of 
sustainable development, it is multi-dimensional in nature (Haque and Maducumura, 
2006: 6). 
 
The problem with both the utilitarian and ethical approaches lies in their lack of integration of 
                                               
42   See Haque, M.S. and Maducumura, G.D.M. (2006).  “Rethinking Sustainable Development Policy 
and Administration,” G.D.M.  Mudacumura et al (eds.) Sustainable Development Policy and 
Administration, New York: Tailor and Francis, pp.4-30. 
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the above three dimensions to sustainable development as reported in Haque and 
Maducumura’s research.  Studying the implementation of sustainable development as 
embedded in Nigeria’s national environmental policy in the Niger Delta region presents a 
specific and unique challenge in respect of looking at these three dimensions and the 
approaches   that have   characterized the Nigerian case.  Furthermore, it poses the need to 
interrogate claims of sustainable development goals in Nigeria’s national policy on 
environment with those of economic growth.  These challenges have yet to receive adequate 
research attention in the case of Nigeria.   
 
 
Following from the review of relevant literature an area that needs to be further studied in the 
case of the Niger Delta pertains to how integration of the social dimensions of implementing 
sustainable development policy relates to conflict.  This is due to arguments made in some  
recent research reports by scholars that realisation of the goal of  sustainable development in 
countries depends largely on the support and participation of citizens, especially by groups 
that are directly affected.  To be sure, Hyden (1997: 4) argues that “most development 
analysts now maintain that developmental wisdom is lodged not in government bureaucracies 
but in local communities and institutions.”  Such an approach suggests active involvement of 
stakeholders in the implementation of sustainable development policies.  It also implies the 
integration of wide assortment of regulatory and non-regulatory mechanisms.  A key finding 
in Hyden’s research is that development and environmental management approaches that 
promote citizen participation is a condition for avoiding development failures and conflict 
that usually follow.  This conclusion spells a need in this study to question sustainable 
development practice of the government and oil companies, as well as those of local 
communities in the Niger Delta in order to understand how development failure correlates 
with their specific approaches to management of the environment and development.  The 
present study makes important contributions to the existing body of knowledge in the case of 
41 
 
the Niger Delta, specifically in terms of understanding how environmental practice by 
government and oil companies promote social conditions that might lead to violent conflict 
among key policy actors. 
 
 
Most works reviewed on the subject express serious doubt about possibilities of sustainable 
development in Africa.  For example, Odukoya (2006:  253)43  argues that Nigeria’s variant 
of capitalist development is rooted in colonial imperialism and lacks the capacity to engender 
sustainable development in the Niger Delta.    He asserts that colonialism was basically 
exploitative. According to him, the colonial style or mode of governance is yet to change in 
Nigeria.  Instead, the domestic ruling class that took over from the colonial leaders is now 
working in alliance with foreign oil capital in a manner   that alienates citizens.   In fact, 
Odukoya examines the extent to which politics, policies and programmes of the government 
and operations and practices of oil companies doing business in the Niger Delta are designed 
to ensure the realisation of sustainable development in Nigeria.  His conclusion is that the 
Nigerian state is incapable of this role.  This type of conclusion, which is common with the 
neo-radical school, throws up a challenge of questioning the character of the Nigerian state, 
its traditional role of providing good governance of the environment and addressing questions 
of violent conflict in the Niger Delta.  Although the literature highlights the environmental 
consequences of oil company operations in the region, it is not well understood how these 
environmental problems relate specifically to the broader concept of sustainable development 
as a key environmental policy goal in Nigeria.  This research contributes to filling the gap. 
 
 
 Good governance has been identified by Constantinos (2006: 50) as key to successful 
formulation and implementation of sustainable development policies in developing countries.  
He asserts that the civil society is an indispensable institutional component of governance 
                                               
43   See Odukoya, A.O. (2006). “Oil and Sustainable Development in Nigeria: A Case Study of the 
Niger Delta,” Journal of Human Ecology, Vol.20. No. 4, pp. 249-258. 
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processes even as its role in policy formulation and implementation is perceived as necessary.  
Often, the lack of good governance is blamed for sustainable development policy failures. 
Similar arguments have been made in other studies. Most have illuminated the role that the 
state may play relative to the civil society.  Constantinos (2006: 52) identifies and explains 
various factors -- economic, social, political and cultural -- that hinder the civil society from 
playing roles that promote sustainable development in society.  He alludes to the importance 




Constantinos (2006: 52) argues that the institutional character of long-term political exclusion 
of citizens or affected communities by state and civil society institutions have partly 
frustrated the realisation of sustainable development.  To explain how this happens, he points 
to the harm that political exclusion of relevant groups with knowledge and capacity for 
contribution to policy formulation and implementation causes.   As he notes: 
In the creation of the nation-state, independent governments have tended to impose 
authority on local people.  This has resulted in the support for nationalisation of 
natural resources and policies that take little account of local needs and interests.  In 
the forestry sector, this has too often been reflected in the approach to forest 
management that excludes local people and emphasizes forest utilisation for 
commercial purposes only.  This approach has resulted in the undermining of local 
capacities to mange natural resources sustainably and led to a situation in which 
people are forced to cope as best they can even if this threatens their long-term 
survival.  This has stifled local initiatives, broken down indigenous systems, and 
created an attitude of resignation among communities which in turn present a 
challenge to efforts for revival of local control.  Conflict arises because central 
authority attempts to retain control by imposing official structures and co-opting local 
leaders (Constantinos, 2006: 52)44 
 
 
Three areas of analyses found in Constantinos’ work that add value to the debate on 
sustainable development debate are: 
 
 Recontextualisation of the interfaces among economic efficiency, ecological stability, 
political, and social equitability aspects of citizen participation in the context of 
                                               
44   See Constantinos, B. T. (2006). “Sustainable Development and Governance Policy Nexus: 
Bridging the Ecological and Human Dimensions” G. M.D.  Mudacumura et al (eds.) Sustainable 




 Definition of the process and strategy of sustainable development in the context of 
policy and  role of the policy community (organisations and their vested interests) as 
well as their implications for policy outcome  and management of the process; 
 Formulation of a broad way of understanding the policy process as 
characterised by a multi stakeholder approach to formulation and implementation of 
sustainable development policies. 
 
Sustainable development seems to represent a middle ground between dominant socio-
economic paradigm whose fundamental principles derive from neo-classical economics and 
radical environmentalism (Livesay, 2002: 316).   This may be truer with countries often 
described as the First World, where the concept appears to have received wider acceptability 
both in principle and in practice.  For instance, issues of protection of the environment in the 
US, Canada and the UK have come to occupy an important place in the development plans 
and economic activities of industries.  This contrast with a view in literature that sees 
sustainable development as representing “the space of dissention and socio-political 
struggle”45 in the competing discourses of economic and environmental issues (see for 
example, Hajer, 1996: 246).46   This might well be the situation in developing countries given 
the fact that many environmental groups articulate their demands for protection of the 




Apparently, since the emergence of the concept of sustainable development, the debate on its 
realisation in developing countries has been at split levels.  One section is actually sceptical 
about the capacity of developing countries to realise this dream in the face of globalisation of 
                                               
45   Foucault is cited in Livesey, S.M. (2002). “The Discourse of the Middle Ground,” Management 
Quarterly, Vol.15, No. 3 February, p.318. 
46 See Hajer, M. (1996).  “Ecological Modernisation and Cultural Politics,” in S. Lash, B. Szerszynski and B. 
Wynee (eds.), Risk, Environment and Modernity:  Towards a new Ecology, London: Sage, pp.246-68. 
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market forces (Haque, 1999: 197-218).  This section of the literature does not only condemn 
pro-market policies associated with neo-liberalism as inappropriate for protecting the 
environment but argue that they are indeed the main cause of environmental destruction.  
This is often demonstrated, for example, by the minimalist role of the state towards the 
welfare of citizens as reflected in the reduction of various forms of subsidies and anti-poverty 
programmes in these countries. 
 
Although sustainable development is said to be a paradigmatic shift from theories of 
development and growth, sceptics insist that with the intensification of market-oriented 
policies in Europe and North America and increasingly in developing countries, a serious 
challenge to the realisation of sustainable development has been thrown up.  Haque 
(1999:198), for instance, argues that prospects of sustainable development for countries in the 
Third World have been seriously undermined by pro-market reforms. Following this 
argument is the inference that sustainable development is more likely to be realised in 
developed countries than in developing countries.  It does appear then that the contour of the 
process of industrialisation or pro-market forces and institutions in developed countries is 
different from that of developing countries.   
 
 
 In some specific sense, empirical analyses in literature on the Niger Delta with regard to the 
paradigmatic shift shows that the goal and priority of the Nigerian government  between 1957 
and 2009 has been that of gradual deepening of the free market system such as privatisation 
and deregulation of key sectors of the economy in order to expand market forces, facilitate 
open competition, reduce government expenditure and involvement in business, attract 
foreign investments and maximise production.  This arrangement was the net outcome of the 
externally-driven policy framework put in place during the 1980s in direct response to 
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pervasive economic stagnation and decline  (Ebeku, 2008: 414-417; Akinrele, 2002: 2-3).47 
 
 
Although the environmental consequences of such massive marketisation of the economy has 
been a subject of debate among scholars and environmentalists, government response through 
public policy formulation and implementation in the case of the oil business in the Niger 
Delta  has received insufficient systematic research attention.   In fact, some aspects of the  
literature actually implicate the government in failing to handle adequately the environmental 
fallout from the  expansion of market forces and, in consequence, not committing itself to the 
realisation of sustainable development  in Nigeria (Obi, 2004: 25; Meadowcrowft, 1999: 315; 
Moffat and Linden, 1995: 312).   
 
As a result, oil related environmental problems in the Niger Delta continue to assume 
different dimensions.  As Moffat and Linden note, there seem to be three dimensions of 
environmental problems associated with sustainable development, namely, biochemical 
contamination of the air, water and soil; destruction of biodiversity; and environmental 
problems related to consumption.   Certainly, these three aspects have not received adequate 
attention from scholars in the case of the Niger Delta.  In nearly all cases in the literature, the 
aspect of consumption values of external and internal populations is under-highlighted when 
researchers explain sustainability crises and how that might affect conflict in the Niger Delta. 
This study identifies in the empirical analyses, the interface between consumption-values 
(external linkages), environmental problems and conflict in the Niger Delta.   For instance, 22 
percent of the world’s population in the developed countries consume about 70 per cent of 
the world’s energy (Haque, 1999: 202).  This type of level of consumption by developed 
countries may have damaging implications for the environment and depletion of natural 
resources.  
                                               
47 See Akinrele, A. (2002).  “Privatisation and Deregulation in Nigeria.” Paper  presented  at the workshop 






An illuminating issue of concern in the debate on sustainable development is the argument 
that sustainable development has been more successful within the neo-liberal order in 
developed countries than in the Third World (Van der Heijden, 1997: 200).  It is important 
then to understand why sustainable development is easier to implement in the developed 
countries when compared with the developing countries like Nigeria.  Even supposing neo-
liberal policies have been pursued by the government for more than 30 years in Nigeria, it 
seems there is no guarantee that the implementation of sustainable development will be as 
successful as those in the developed countries. 
 
Neil (2001: 206) has identified some core features of sustainable development to include 
equity, democracy, precautionary principle, policy integration and planning.  Most scholars 
interested in environmental politics and policy and who advocate sustainable development 
agree on these five basic features of sustainable development but are diverse in their 
interpretations and emphases.  Given the centrality of the idea of sustainable development to 
this study, I will examine briefly each of those features with an eye (ultimately) on their fit to 
the Niger Delta context. 
 
 
Equity means that governments should consider the distributional implications of measures 
taken by them to prevent environmental problems.  It is significant, at least in principle that 
economic and social issues are now at the forefront of environmental concerns for 
governments.  However, the literature lacks unity as issues are not linked in clear and precise 
manner in the case of Nigeria’s Niger Delta region. 
 
Some argue that attainment of sustainable development goals by governments depends 
substantially on democratic inclusion of citizens (Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2006: 332; Neil, 
2001:205; WCED, 1987:65; Sabatier, 1986:21).  Pellegrini and Gerlagh argue that democracy 
influences the outcome of sustainable development policies.   In a similar vein, WCED notes 
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that, “sustainable development requires a political system that secures effective citizen 
participation in decision-making...” Neil insists that the attainment of the objectives of 
sustainable development in terms of environmental policy decisions and their implementation 
depends on the nature of the political system. As he puts it, “sustainable development 
emphasises the importance of democracy in solving environmental problems.”  Indeed, 
generally, the role of democracy in the implementation of public policies has been lauded in 
the literature.  For example, the framing of approaches to successful policy implementation in 
terms of “Top-down” and “Bottom-up” approaches with preference for the later clearly 
signals citizen participation in the process.  It also suggests some kind of available alternative 
approach to determining what exactly to study in public policy implementation strategies by 
researchers.  For Backstrand (2006:467), democracy is a dependable model for global 
governance of the environment. He argues for a stakeholder democracy model for the pursuit 
of sustainable development goals at the multilateral level. In his article, “Democratising 
Global Environmental Governance? Stakeholder Democracy after the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development,” Backstrand posed the question, “how can global governance, 
multilateral institutions and intergovernmental negotiations be designed to function in more 
representative, accountable and effective way?”48  He further argues that the question of 
democracy in governance of the environment has become necessary for overcoming existing 
shortcomings in governance, democratic practice and public policy implementation by 
national governments of countries.  In fact, as he puts it, “sustainable development rhetoric 
has put a strong emphasis on grass-root and civil society engagement, representation and 
transparency in policy process.”49  The problem with this argument is that there is no model 
of democracy anywhere in the world that is perfect.  Most of the so-called advanced 
                                               
48   See Backstrand, K.  (2006). “Democratising Global Environmental Governance? Stakeholder 
Democracy after the World Summit on Sustainable Development,” European Journal of International 
Relations, Vol. 12, No.4, P. 467-468. 
49 See Backstrand, (2006). p. 469. 
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democracies have also had it very rough when it comes to protecting the environment.  All 
the same, the nature of institutions of politics, whether they are open or closed has 
implications for the choice of political actions by local groups in the Niger Delta.   Relevant 
research questions have been posed in this study in order to make contributions towards 
filling the knowledge gap in this area.  
 
Precautionary principle means that governments will not use excuses of lack of scientific 
knowledge to withdraw from taking measures to prevent the degradation of the environment.  
Again, it is difficult for public policy to achieve its objectives without commensurate or 
corresponding emphasis on research.   It is clear that only sufficient information about a 
particular social problem can guarantee an informed decision.   
 
Policy integration implies integration of environmental issues in development in all sectors.  
For instance, hitherto agriculture, industry and other sectors stood independently without 
adequate environmental content in their policies in the developing world.  Policy integration 
as a principle of sustainable development means integrating environmental concerns into 
policies in all the sectors of the national life of a country. 
 
Planning is integral to sustainable development.  Scholars of market-based instruments to 
environmental policy suggest that market forces should not be planned.  Again, it is important 
to understand the dynamics of sustainable development in ways that clearly show what and 
how planning fits in to help understand environmental policy within wider issues of politics, 
economy and development in the case of Nigeria’s Niger Delta.  This requires understanding 
the effectiveness of the institutions saddled with the responsibility for planning sustainable 
development, what socio-economic and political processes affect the system, and its outcome. 
 
 
It appears that a number of political, social, economic and cultural factors hinder the 
realisation of sustainable development in many countries.  As Okoko (2002: 124) notes in the 
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case of the Niger Delta, the politics of extraction of the oil   and distribution of its revenues 
among federating units in Nigeria have had negative implications for the sustainable 
development of the region.  He argues that all definitions given of sustainable development 
have underlying elements of equity.  Specifically, he reasons that lack of equity in the sharing 
of revenues accruing from production of oil is an important factor of failure to achieve 
sustainable development in the Niger Delta, where the oil is produced.    According to him: 
The exploitation of oil in the Niger Delta has severe consequences for the people.  It 
results in oil spillage, the destruction of farmlands, and the degradation of the 
ecosystem and the disempowerment of the people.  Yet, the income generated from 
the proceeds of these activities are siphoned to develop other areas other than those 
which produce the oil.50 
 
 
Similarly, Borofice (2008: 15) argues that for an area in conflict such as the Niger Delta, a 
sustainable development approach to resolving the conflict would entail addressing a range of 
issues: the problem of food security; shelter for displaced people; expansion of health and 
education services; repair and construction of roads, rail and communication; and 
establishment of emergency response systems.  As he notes, “these key areas are fundamental 
to the sustainable development of the society’s cultural practices and the natural environment 
in pre-and post conflict.”51  So far, several other works by scholars and special reports by 
non-profit organisations highlight the issue of sustainable development and its interface with 
conflict in the Niger Delta but without signal of harmony of the ideas.  The linking of all 
issues in the Niger Delta to the need for sustainable development  rather mystifies the concept 
and compounds   interpretation which  ought to inform actions and practices of key actors in 
policy and conflict in the region (see for example Oyefusi, 2007; Jike, 2002; Ukeje, 2001: 
338; Okonmah, 1997: 43)).  Indeed, Jike argues that youth restiveness and general social 
                                               
50  See Okoko, K.A.B. (2002). “The Politics of Resource Extraction, Distribution and Sustainable 
Development,” Nigerian Journal of Oil and Politics (Special Edition), Volume 2, No. 1, pp. 118-128.  
51  For details see Borofice, R.A. (2008) “The Role of Space Technology in Conflict Management,” 
Proceedings of International Conference on The Nigerian State, the Oil Industry and the Niger Delta, 
held at the Niger Delta University, Bayelsa State, March 11-13, pp. 12-20. 
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unrest in the Niger Delta cannot be understood outside government and oil company 
environmental practices that undermine sustainable development.  For Okonmah (1997: 43), 
sustainable development provides the basis for citizens’ claim to the right to a clean 
environment in the Niger Delta where oil companies pollute the environment by regular oil 
spills and gas flares.  Being a key point of campaign against the government and oil 
companies, it may well offer some impetus for reduction of violence in the region if laws and 
the court of law in Nigeria recognize citizens’ rights to a clean environment.  In analysing the 
motivation for violent activities of youths in Ogoni against oil companies and the 
government, Ukeje (2001: 399) highlights the issue of sustainable development in the midst 
of abundant oil resource in the Niger Delta.  In the words of Ebeku (2008: 403) “the people 
of the Niger Delta have continued to complain bitterly about mass poverty, hunger, disease, 
environmental degradation and loss of their traditional means of livelihood,” pointing directly 
to the issue of sustainable development and conflict in the region. 
 
In spite of these efforts at exploring the concept of sustainable development and its related 
issues in developing countries, there is still much confusion about its meaning.  Besides, 
systematic and adequate attention has not been given to the causal relationship between 
issues of sustainable development and conflict in the specific context of the Niger Delta.  
This work attempts to contribute towards conceptualising the subject as part of effort to 
understand how its related issues of environmental policy implementation relate with violent 
conflict in the Niger Delta region. Besides, some scholars who have addressed the issue of 
sustainable development have done so without exploring how local environmental groups’ 
understanding of the concept influences their political action.  This study attempts to reverse 
the trend.   To address the conflict in the region, more research efforts are   needed in 
understanding what sustainable development means to the various parties in the conflict.  At 




The goal of national environmental legislations, including the National Policy on 
Environment in Nigeria (1989) is to achieve sustainable development (FEPA, 1989: 5).  A 
key goal of this study was to assess and understand what went wrong with the 
implementation of these policies in the Niger Delta and how that may have contributed to the 
emergence of violence in the relationship between the people of the region on the one hand 
and the Nigerian state and oil companies on the other.   The literature points to social, 
economic, political, environmental, technical and bureaucratic factors for the poor 
implementation of these legislations but shows that scholars have paid less attention to 
understanding how policy and conflict actors in the region interpret the concept.  Much less is 
how their conceptualisation of sustainable development is related to their choice of political 
actions and motivation for violence in the Niger Delta.  This study fills those gaps.   
 
 
3.3. Implementation of oil-related environmental policy in Nigeria 
First, environmental policy is defined on the basis of function, institution and purpose 
(Mickwitz, 2003: 45; Lundqvist, 1996: 16; Egonmwan, 1990: 1; Uppenbrink, 1988: 224; 
Aina, 1988: 17).  Defined functionally, it means those policies that affect the environment 
(Lundqvist, 1996: 17).  Institutionally, it refers to policies made by institutions such as the 
Ministries and Agencies of Environment (Uppenbrink, 1988: 225).  Defined in terms of 
purpose, environmental policy is the “course of action which is intended to affect society in 
terms of values and beliefs, actions and organizations in such a way as to improve or to 
prevent the deterioration of the quality of the natural environment” (Lundqvist, 1996: 16).  
Accordingly, government environmental policy refers to the course of action of government 
intended to protect the environment through various policy instruments.  According to 
Cochran and Malone (2005: 1), public policy is the study of ‘government decisions and 
actions undertaken to address problems of public concern.’  As Van Meter argues, the process 
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of implementing public policies “encompasses those actions by public, private individuals, 
groups of people and organizations that are directed towards achievement of objectives set 
out in prior policy decisions” (cited in Hill, 2002: 46)  In fact, in  much of the literature, 
public policy implementation is understood as the execution and delivery of public policies. 
Government may use institutions such as government agencies, companies, non-profit 
organisations and other levels of government to implement its programmes. 
 
 
Generally, enormous research on implementation of public policy has been done in the past 
three and half decades (between 1969 and 2009) (see for example, Henry, 2007; Lasswell and 
Sabatier, 1986; Hjern, 1982; Hanf, 1982).52  According to Ikelegbe (2006: 92), 
implementation is the “process of translating policy mandates into action, prescriptions into 
results and goals into reality.”   Unfortunately, there is paucity of research that seeks to 
contribute to the conceptualisation of environmental policy and   establish a link between its 
failure at the level of implementation and social conditions that might   fuel anger and 
frustration among groups from the oil-bearing communities of the Niger Delta.  This study 
attempts to fill the gap by exploring the process of implementing national environmental 
policy and its role in defining the pattern of relationship between local environmental groups 
on the one hand and government and oil companies on the other hand.   
 
 
Initial works (Widasvsky, 1973)53 on the subject of implementation of public policy were 
inspired by perceived failure of government programmes.  Indeed, pioneer American scholars 
came to very pessimistic conclusions about the ability of government to effectively 
                                               
52   See Kenneth, H. (1982). “The Implementation of Regulatory Policy: Enforcement as Bargaining,” 
European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 10, June, 159-72;   Robert, A. (1982) “Implementation: 
Does a Literature Add Up to a Theory?” Journal of the American Planning Association, Winter, pp. 
132-55; Benny, H. (1982). “Implementation Research -- The Link Gone Missing,” Journal of Public 
Policy, Vol. 2. No. 3, pp.301-8 
53  Eugene, B. (1974). The Implementation Game, Cambridge: MIT Press, p.22; Donald, V. and Carl, 
V. (1975). “The Policy Implementation Process: A Conceptual Framework,” Administration and 
Society 6, February. pp. 445-88 
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implement public policies. Subsequent generations of work were more analytical and 
comparative. Even so, most of these scholars -- mainly European scholars -- made the same 
pessimistic conclusions about the ability of government to implement public policies 
successfully, especially in developing countries. (Sabatier, 2007: 21).  Generally, focus on 
Nigeria has been limited, which is why this work makes a justifiable contribution towards 
reversing the trend.  
 
A review of what scholars have written on environmental policies shows substantial 
documentation of environmental regulations, laws or policies associated with oil company 
operations in the Niger Delta (Ibidapo-Obe, 1990; Omotola, 1990; Fekumo, 1990; Imevbore, 
1988; Adeniyi, 1988; Aca, 1986; Etikenrentse, 1985; Olisa, 1987).  In fact, a body of 
literature that emerged in the l980s on environmental policy framework had a section that 
merely compiled pertinent oil related laws.  For example, according to Ibidapo-Obe (1990: 
232) the most “comprehensive legislation on oil related environmental problems or pollution 
is the Oil in Navigable Waters Act, 1968.”  His analysis of this law in respect to government 
response to environmental consequences of oil exploration and production shows that 
government intervention through policy takes mainly forms of legal regulation and control 
through civil and criminal laws.  Ibidapo-Obe (1990: 234) identifies nine criminal liabilities 
under the Oil in Navigable Waters Decree of 1968 which include: 1. discharge of oil into 
prohibited sea areas; 2.discharge of oil into Nigerian waters; 3.failure to install oil pollution 
prevention equipment on ships; 4.failure to keep records of oil matters; 5.habour authority 
failing to provide oil reception facilities; 6. failure to report presence of oil in harbour waters. 
Violations of these criminal liabilities under the decree attract various levels of fines.  In spite 
of the importance which Ibidapo-Obe accords this law for protecting the environment from 
environmental degradation, he notes that the problem usually with the law is non-compliance 
or “disregard of these operating guidelines that results in many pollution incidents.”  Ibidapo-
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Obe then blames this non-compliance on the alliance of interest of the oil majors whom he 
refers to as the Seven Sisters-Mobil, Shell, Esso, Texaco, Gulf, Chevron and B.P. in the early 
1980s.  The answer, according to him, lies in forcing these companies whom he argues are 
more concerned with making profits than any social responsibility, to comply with provisions 
of the law by the government of Nigeria. 
 
Ibidapo-Obe further examines criminal liability of  environmental degradation caused by oil 
companies under other related environmental laws such as state environmental laws, Federal 
Environmental Protection Decree No. 58 of 1988 (FEPA), Harmful Waste Decree of 1988, 
and Criminal and Penal Codes.  Although some of these environmental laws do not directly 
relate to oil related degradation of the environment, their provisions are such that can be used 
to address general issues of environmental degradation.  Specifically, Ibidapo-Obe notes that 
the case of the FEPA Decree is designed to  
 Cover all aspects of environmental protection.  With particular reference to oil 
pollution, the decree is a great improvement on the other laws governing the matter: 
there is a comprehensive criminalisation of discharge of hazardous substances into the 
air, water, and oil land (Ibidapo-Obe, 1990: 248). 
 
The Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) was created by the Nigerian Federal 
Government in 1988 with a clear mandate to deal with issues of environmental protection in 
Nigeria.  It was to deal with problems of standard, water, air and atmospheric quality, along 
with effluents limitation and advice the federal government on key national environmental 
policy issues.   Directly following the establishment of FEPA was the formal launch of 
Federal Republic of Nigerian National Policy on the Environment.  It was the first time that a 
comprehensive environmental policy framework was created with clear goals to achieve 
sustainable development through proper management of the environment in Nigeria.  
Specifically, the goals of the policy are to: 




 conserve and use the environment and natural resources for the benefit of 
present and future generations; 
 restore, maintain and enhance the ecosystems and ecological processes 
essential for the functioning of the biosphere to preserve biological diversity 
and the principle of optimum sustainable yield in the use of living natural 
resources and ecosystems; 
 raise public awareness and promote understanding of essential linkages 
between environment and development and to encourage individual and 
community participation in environmental improvement efforts; and  
 cooperate in good faith with other countries, international 
organisations/agencies to achieve optimal use of transboundary natural 
resources and effective prevention or abatement of transboundary 
environmental pollution (Okonmah, 1997: 43-67). 
 
 
Section 2 of the Petroleum Act of 1969 empowers the Minister of Petroleum Resources 
(defunct or fused with the presidency between 1999 and 2008)54 to grant oil exploration 
licence, oil prospecting licence or oil mining lease.  In exercising these rights conferred by 
the licence or lease in a manner that unreasonably interferes with fishing rights of local 
communities, the licensee or lessee shall pay adequate compensation to any person whose 
rights have been violated 55 (Olisa, 1987: 15-17; Etikerentse, 1985: 24: 21).   The Act vests 
ownership56 of all petroleum in Nigeria in the state.  All petroleum “under the territorial 
waters of Nigeria or forming part of the continental shelf, as defined by the Convention on 
the Continental Shelf signed in Geneva in April 1958 to which Nigeria is a party” belong to 
the state.  “The Offshore Oil Revenue Act No. 9 of 1971 specifically vests all offshore 
revenues and the ownership of  the territorial waters and the continental shelf in the Federal 
Government” (Aca, 1986: 33).  In any case, legal framework for exploration of oil in Nigeria 
rested on the Mineral Oil Ordinance of 1914 which vested rights to exploration of oil in 
British companies (Okonmah, 1997: 44).   
 
                                               
54   Between 1999 and 2007 the president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria has served as the 
Minister of Petroleum Resources.  Former President Olusegun Obasanjo started it and the current 
government of President UmarMusa Yar’ Adua has followed suit until 2008 when he appointed a 
Minister of Petroleum Resources. 
55   See Section 8 of the Act. 
56   See Section 1 of the Act. 
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The Oil in Navigable Waters Act of 1968 was made to prevent pollution in the navigable 
waters of Nigeria as a direct consequence of Nigeria’s position as a signatory to the 
International Convention for the Prevention of the Sea by Oil 1954, amended in 1962.  Under 
the Act, the owner of a Nigerian ship shall be guilty of an offence if certain oils are 
discharged into prohibited sea areas. 
 
The Associated Gas Re-Injection Act of 1979, among others, provides for mandatory 
submission of programme for gas re-injection by oil companies to the federal minister for 
Petroleum Resources not later that 1st of April 1980.  It also demanded that oil companies 
must submit detailed plans not later than 1st October, 1980 for the implementation of gas-
reinjection.  Specifically, oil companies were by the Act not to flare associated gas in Nigeria 
without written permission from the Federal Minister of Petroleum Resources after 1st 
January, 1984.  
 
Almost all of these laws came out of the legal foundation of colonialism. That is, given the 
nature of the colonial state, indigenous peoples of the Niger Delta were not   involved in the 
processes leading to the formulation of the laws.  For instance, the 1959 Petroleum Profit Tax 
Ordinance initiated a half-and-half sharing formula between the government and oil 
companies without considerations for the oil-producing communities of the Niger Delta 
(Human Rights Watch, 1997: 20-46; Pearson, 1970: 24-26).  
 
 The second body of literature of the period was critical of the old order57 of environmental 
laws and practice in the Niger Delta.  Spurred by the   sensitisation activities of    
environmental (non-governmental) organisations on the environmental problems in the delta 
area, some of the scholars began to present commissioned papers at workshops that were 
either organised by university or government departments leaning towards policy 
                                               
57   Old order environmental laws were colonial in nature.  Oil prospecting in Nigeria began in 1937 in 
Owerri.  As such the laws and guidelines for oil exploration activities were initially colonial in nature. 
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formulation.  For instance, Lukman argues that the Petroleum Act of 1969 is not primarily an 
environmental Act although it contains provisions on protection of the environment.  Besides, 
the Act was silent on issues of land pollution caused by oil operations.  Lukman also 
observed that the Act has no provision to compel oil companies to be socially responsible for 
oil spills not directly traceable to their operations.  On the whole, the Act was too general on 
the issue of protection of the environment from oil damage.  Dabholker (1988:153) has also 
highlighted the fact that environmental protection in Nigeria is not a constitutional matter58 
(Lukman, 1988; Adedipe, 1988; Imevbore and Fubara, 1988; Akanle, 1988).  
 
The Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Decree No. 86 was promulgated in 1992.  The 
Decree as stated in section 1 has the following goals: 
 to establish that before any public or private activity that may likely have 
significant environmental effects, is undertaken, such effects shall first be 
taken into account; 
 to promote the implementation of appropriate policy throughout the country 
through which the goal and objectives in paragraph (a) above may be realized. 
 to encourage the development of procedures for information exchange, 
notification and consultation between organs and persons when proposed 
activities are likely to have significant environmental impacts across state 
boundaries or on the environment of towns and villages (Umeh and Uchegbu, 




                                               
58   Environmental policies may take the form of provisions of individual rights to a clean 
environment whose implementation would involve citizen action against any violation of the rights.  
Algeria, China, Chile, Cuba, Ghana, Ecuador, India, Iran, Korea, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Panama among 
others are examples of nations with national constitutions providing for individual rights to clean 
environment.  The other form is by general authority of government to take action on matters of the 
environment, usually implemented through legislative actions.  Mandated government action may also 
take three dimensions: anti-pollution law; codification of environmental and natural resources law 
and, environmental framework law. While anti-pollution law and codification of  environment and 
natural resource laws refer to the  response of the  legislature as an arm of government towards 
systematic  revision of   all  environmental laws , environmental framework laws refer to the  broad or 
“umbrella” national policy that gives basic legal principles without attempting to spell out details in 
terms of codification of all statutory provisions.  Usually, it begins with a declaration of national 
environmental goals and policies and then institutional arrangements. See for example, Dabholker, U. 
(1988). “Environmental Management in Developing Countries,” paper presented at the international 




The effectiveness of these laws is doubted by Ibidapo-Obe.  For instance, he argues that 
prosecution of offenders under the Oil in Navigable Waters Decree requires approval of the 
Attorney-General of Nigeria.  This means that where there are political interests, the 
Attorney-General may be required to give approval to a person or group seeking to bring an 
action under the Act.   As Ibidapo-Obe observes, this is in part the reason for the 
ineffectiveness of these laws to adequately regulate oil companies against pollution of the 
environment in their areas of operations -- the Niger Delta.  He concludes by saying that: 
Government must not be seen as being hand in glove with foreign oil interests to the 
detriment of the welfare of her citizens.  The existing regime of criminal liability for 
oil pollution is inadequate, haphazard, and ineffective.  One can justifiably conclude 
that there is indeed no coherent philosophy of criminalisation of pollution offences 
(Ibidapo-Obe, 1990: 252). 
 
In a similar vein, Omotola (1990:285) explains the relevance and performance of statutory 
regime for oil pollution compensation as a mechanism for   checking environmental pollution 
caused by oil companies in their areas of operation in Nigeria. These statutes include: The Oil 
Pipelines Act of 1956 Cap. 145; the Petroleum Act of 1969 and Petroleum (Drilling and 
Production) Regulations, 1969.   These oil statutes have implications for protection of the 
environment from oil pollution through provisions for payment of compensation by 
organisations for exploring and production of oil to those who suffer environmental damages 
from their activities.  Unfortunately, as inferred by Omotola, adequate enforcement of these 
laws is problematic.  Enforcement of laws requires specifying   roles that affected groups or 
individual citizens might play.  In this case, communities so affected are to contend with 
economic and political interference of local elites who frequently present themselves as 
leaders in their communities, but in reality work to quell community resistance in exchange 
for financial rewards extended by oil companies.  Besides, government sets the tone for all 
negotiations between oil companies and affected local communities in a way that what is 
often offered in compensation for environmental degradation is the result of amounts fixed by 
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relevant government ministries.  In any case, the laws are too weak to check oil pollution in 
the Niger Delta. 
 
Writing on civil liability for damages caused by oil pollution, Fekumo (1990: 254) argues 
that ineffectiveness of environmental laws is partly due to the imposition of burden of proof 
on the claimant seeking compensation.  As he notes, since victims lack the technical 
knowledge to offer such proof they should therefore be spared of details of how oil pollution 
has caused damages to them.  Instead, offenders such as oil companies should be left to prove 
their innocence of wrong-doing concerning pollution of the environment in the court of law. 
The idea is that the problem of proof at the level of implementation of these laws in the 
context of common laws of Trespass to Land, Nuisance, Private Nuisance and Public 
Nuisance has proved difficult to check environmental degradation caused by oil companies. 
 
 
The other group, which emerged during the period penultimate 1990, also  adopted a critical 
perspective to issues of environmental laws related to oil exploration  but  lamented the 
absence of a national environmental policy framework in Nigeria at the time.59 (See for 
example, Adedipe, 1991: 126; Dabolker, 1991: 156; Imevbore and Fubara, 1988: 35-37)   A 
number of papers presented at an international workshop on the goals and guidelines of the 
National Environmental Policy for Nigeria (held on 12-16 September, 1988) suggested oil 
related environmental laws were not at the time strange in Nigeria.  The problem is that since 
then these laws are yet to be integrated into a single national policy document on the 
environment.   Aside issues of inadequate environmental policies or laws, the papers point to 
the issue of weakness of many of these laws in respect of protecting the environment from 
damages caused by oil company activities.  Imevbore (1991: 35) argues that “existing laws 
governing the environment in Nigeria are more international than national in content.  There 
                                               
59   Aca’s work represents this class of literature.  See Aca, T.O. (1986). Petroleum Operations in 
Nigeria, Lagos: West African Book Publishers Limited. 
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is no comprehensive national environmental law or policy which secures the wholesomeness 
of the environment...”   He claims that this was in spite of Nigeria’s awareness of the global 
campaign for environmental protection in which it has been part of through various 
multilateral treaties.  It would seem that it took Nigeria a rather long time to show interest in 
the development of a national environmental policy.  Part of the insinuations would be that 
political leaders (whose focus seems to have been on the need to engender economic growth 
through development of the oil sector against any environmental considerations) might have 
lacked sufficient will to do so or   constrained by economic interests.   Although, up to 1988, 
Nigeria had no “articulate comprehensive policy on the environment,” Imevbore and Fubara 
(1988: 37) reason that there were various sectoral laws with environmental protection 
components that could have facilitated the emergence of a national policy on the 
environment.  They continue that although the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
1979 had no direct provision for protection of the environment from damages caused by oil 
exploration and production activities, it had elements of environmental policy as specified in 
some sections of the constitution.  However, he regrets that by virtue of the ownership 
structure of land and natural resources in Nigeria, the Federal Government has no rival in the 
claiming of rights for a clean environment. Power is concentrated at the federal government 
level over these matters to the detriment of individual freedom or rights to a protected 
environment from oil pollution.   
 
 
Imevbore and Fubara further identify Nigeria’s National Development Plan of 1981-85 as 
containing some elements of environmental policy by its recognition of the necessity to 
integrate issues of economic growth with environmental concerns.   While some scholars (for 
example, Ferrari, 1988: 75; Emovon, 1988: 74; Williams, 1988: 89) have actually reasoned 
that Nigeria lacks adequate laws or comprehensive national policy to protect its environment 
from damages caused by oil company activities, Imevbore believes that there are various 
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existing laws or policies that if sufficiently enforced would substantially impact the 
environment in a positive way.  The rest of such laws or policies as identified by Imevbore 
and Fubara include: National Policy on Science and Technology 1986; The Criminal Code; 
Petroleum Decree 1969; Nigerian Atomic Energy Commission Decree, 1976; Queries Decree 
1969; Territorial Waters Decree, 1967; Oil in Navigable Waters Decree, 1969; Forestry Act, 
1958; and Land Use Decree, 1978.  Imevbore emphasizes that adequate enforcement of these 
national laws as well as various international laws with provisions for the protection of the 
environment would result in better protection of the environment in Nigeria.  As he notes the 
Land Use Decree: 
We believe that if the provisions of the Land Use Decree were strictly observed  it 
would not only ensure the realisation of the laudable objectives set out in the 
preamble to the Decree but would also aid a sound development of our environmental 
landscape from ecological and aesthetic perspectives (Imevbore, 1991:43). 
  
The above statement suggests that the Land Use Decree has the potential to protect the 
environment from damages caused by human activities such as oil companies.  Second, the 
provisions of the decree are not strictly observed or enforced.  Imevbore and other scholars 
however, fail to ask further questions on the consequences   of failure by government to 
enforce these laws in the Niger Delta.  This gap has been noted in this study as a point for 
intervention, especially in our attempt to understand what and how lack of enforcement of 
these laws by the government created social, economic, environmental and political 
conditions for people in the oil-rich Niger Delta leading to violent conflict in the region. 
 
 
Imevbore and Fubara also note that apart from national laws or policies, several international 
environmental laws have the potential for protecting the environment from damages caused 
by oil companies- if properly enforced or domesticated in Nigerian laws or policies.  For 
example, Phyto-Sanitary Convention for Africa South of the Sahara of 1954, to which 
Nigeria became a signatory on 8th of November in 1961, has the potential for protecting the 
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environment if domesticated and enforced at the national level.  The aim of the treaty is to 
prevent the initiation and spread of diseases and other adversities to plants into any part of the 
continent of Africa, south of the Sahara.  Signatories (countries) are expected to domesticate 
the provisions of this treaty and ensure their full implementation.  Given the role that 
agriculture played in the traditional rural economy of the Niger Delta people, adequate 
enforcement of provisions of this treaty would have probably helped in preserving local 
agricultural practice which many now claim has been lost to damage caused by oil company 
activities. 
 
Nigeria is also a signatory to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of 
the Sea and by Oil, 1954.  It acceded to this treaty on 22nd April 1968.  The treaty outlaws 
discharge of oil and related substances in specified zones.  This treaty is intended to stem 
pollution of the sea but it has largely been ineffective owing to failure by national 
governments who are expected to domesticate it.  The same is true of the Convention on 
Continental Shelf 1958; Convention on Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and other Matters 1972; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas 1958 and United Nations’ Convention on the law of the Sea 
1982.   For example, Nigeria became a signatory to the treaty on Convention on the 
Continental Shelf and Convention on Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes 
and other Matters with specific provisions aimed at preventing damage to the environment by 
persons or organizations on 28th May 1971.  In any case, some of these conventions have 
been domesticated already, but adequate enforcement has been noted as key obstacle to the 
realisation of their stated objectives. 
 
 
A report on environmental policies in developing countries  conducted by Gour-Tanguay in 
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1977 and cited by Adedipe (1991: 126)60 notes that key features of environmental policies of  
developing countries, including Nigeria at the time were: the multiple administrative bodies 
of environmental management such as the different ministries and departments of 
Agriculture, Forestry, urban planning, Health, Works, and so on; diffused nature of 
environmental policies; and lastly, difficulty in enforcing limited environmental laws or 
policies due mainly to diffusion and confusion concerning these laws.  As such, Dabholker 
(1991: 150) suggests that effectiveness of government policies on the environment depends 
substantially on translating such policies into legislative and administrative action.61 
Dabholker argues that though the idea of comprehensive environmental policies and 
administration is recent, at least in comparative terms, this should be understood in the 
context of historical evolution that puts different countries at different  stages,  identified as 
(a) “primary protection against environmental risks; (b) natural resource use and 
conservation; (c)  and ecological planning  and management.” According to him, 
institutionally, environmental policy administration in developing countries like Nigeria 
should play three critical roles. They are: (a) “strategy- including policy making and 
coordination; (b) operations-including sectoral standard-setting and implementation; (c) 
intelligence-including information gathering, monitoring and assessment.”   Dabholker thus 
suggests that the environmental policy and strategy in Nigeria should not be left with some 
single environmental ministry or agencies but should be given broad political base for 
defining environmental goals through the establishment of a national commission or boards.  
On the other hand, regulatory functions in environmental policy or management involving 
enforcement of policies and laws require collaboration with other levels of government or 
                                               
60   See  Adedipe, A.O. (1991). “A Workable Structure for the Proposed Federal Environmental 
Protection Agency,” Proceedings of international workshop on the goals and guidelines of the 
National Environmental Policy for Nigeria, 12-16 September 1988, pp. 126-142. 
61   Dabholker, U. (1991). “Environmental Management in Developing Countries,” Proceedings of 
international workshop on the goals and guidelines of the National Environmental Policy for Nigeria, 




agencies.  Concerning environmental monitoring and assessment, Dabholker asserts that  
the formulation and implementation of environmental policies must be based on a 
reliable information base and continuous assessment of new information, including 
monitoring and assessment of the effectiveness of actions taken.  Environmental 
intelligence thus provides constant feedback for strategies and operational functions 
and institutions. (Dabholker, 1991:157) 
 
  
It appears that whether centralised at the level of federal government or decentralized to the 
levels of individual states, local governments or oil companies play the role of environmental 
policy administration in protecting the environment from damage caused by oil companies. 
The case of Nigeria deserves more research attention.  This study then certainly makes a 
modest contribution towards filling the lacuna. 
 
Environmental policies may take the form of legal or normative languages at different levels 
as in the case of provisions in a country’s constitution.  As can be seen from the foregoing,  
environmental policy may also take the shape  of anti-pollution laws, codification of 
environment and natural resource laws, environmental framework law as well as  
environmental implementation and enforcement tools (Dabholker, 1991: 156).62 
 
The literature shows that initially Nigeria’s environmental policy took the form of anti-
pollution laws and later -- in the 1990s -- the form of environmental policy framework.  Little 
effort has been made to understand Nigeria’s environmental policy from the angle of 
implementation failure and its consequences for conflict.  This gap in the literature, especially 
in relation to questions pertaining to conflict between local groups and oil companies over 
degradation of the environment has not been given substantial attention by scholars.  Our 
study helps to fill this gap. 
 
                                               
62   Environmental policy implementation and enforcement tools may be voluntary on the part of 
individuals and organizations or may require strict surveillance by the government.  The choice of 
approach depends on prevailing social, economic, cultural and political conditions.  It may even take 
the form of a combination of different approaches. See Dabholker, (1991), p. 156. 
65 
 
In 2005, the National Assembly of the  Federal Republic of Nigeria  enacted the National Oil 
Spill Detection and Response Agency Act whose objectives include, to: 
establish a viable national operational organization that ensures a safe, timely, 
effective and appropriate response to major or disastrous oil pollution; to 
establish the mechanism to monitor and assist or where expedient direct the 
response, including the capability to mobilize the necessary resources to save 
lives, protect threatened environment, and clean up  impacted sites by best 
practice; maximize the effective use of the available facilities and resources of 
corporate bodies, their international connections and oil spill cooperatives i.e 
Clean up Nigerian Associates(CNA) in implementing appropriate spill 
response; ensure funding and appropriate and sufficient pre-positioned 
pollution combating equipment and materials, as well as functional 
communication network system required for effective response to major oil 
pollution; cooperate and provide advisory services, technical support and 
equipment for purposes of responding to major oil pollution incident in the 
West African sub-region upon request by any neighbouring country, 
particularly where a part of the Nigerian territory may be threatened 
(NOSDRA, 2005:1-17). 
 
Section 6(1) of the Act states that the functions of the agency shall include: 
 
 be responsible for surveillance and ensure compliance with all existing 
environmental legislation and the detection of all spills in the petroleum 
sector; 
 receive reports of all spillages and coordinate oil spill response activities 
throughout Nigeria; 
 coordinate the implementation of the plan for the removal of hazardous 




Section 6(11) of the Act states that: 
 
an oil spiller by this Act to report an oil spill to the Agency in writing not later 
than 24 hours after the occurrence of an oil spill in default of which the failure 
to report shall attract a penalty in the sum of five Hundred  Thousand Naira 
(N500,000.00) for each day of failure to report the occurrence.  Failure to 
clean up the impacted site to all practical extent including remediation shall 
attract a further fine of one million naira (NOSDRA, 2005: 1-17). 
 
The Department of Petroleum Resources, Federal Ministry of Environment and the National 
Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency are expected to cooperate in the management of the 
environment in Nigeria.   However, critical perspectives to the various regulations and laws 
related to oil exploration in Nigeria argue that the regulations and laws provide little or no 
protection for victims of oil pollution in the Niger Delta (Okonmah, 1997: 43).  Since the 
right to a clean environment is yet to be a constitutional matter, Okonmah, for example, 
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argues that the common law regime in Nigeria cannot guarantee safety or protection of the 
environment given the problems of burden of proof.  Ideally, pursuit of protection of the 
environment whether by individuals or corporate bodies, should be done through human 
rights law.   As he comments, the difficulty of the common law guaranteeing protection of the 
environment in Nigeria shows that: 
 The right to a clean environment currently is regarded as ‘soft’ law at the 
international level, and can only be realized in public law, against the backdrop of 
sustainable development.  This right was aptly made in 1981 by a party, but has 
incorporated into her corpus juris by the African Charter (Ratification and 
Enforcement) Act, 1983 (Okonmah 1997: 43). 
 
A section of the literature insists that national environmental laws related to oil business are 
rarely implemented or, if at all, ineffectively done in the Niger Delta (Orubu, 2004: 203; Ojo, 
2002: 11; Anago, 2002: 1-3; Ifeka, 2001: 99; Human Rights Watch, 1999: 54).  For example, 
Human Rights Watch notes that “regulatory framework for managing protection of the 
environment in the Niger Delta lacks enforcement.” Many reasons for this lack of 
enforcement of environmental laws have also been identified by various writers.  They 
include: lack of funding, trained staff, technical expertise or adequate information.  Others are 
lack of analytical capability of and other skills needed for implementation of policies and 
programmes and; broad political and economic factors which scholars associate with the 
nature of federalism and ethnicity in the Nigerian state.  Apart from clear indication from the 
literature that adequate attention has not been paid to exploring issues of environmental 
policy implementation and conflict, there is also an aspect which this study now addresses 
that requires serious probing whether issues of environmental degradation and social and 
economic conditions in the Niger Delta reflect failure of the government to effectively 
enforce pertinent environmental laws. To be sure, there exist research gaps on issues of 
relevant environmental policies and level of compliance by oil companies in Nigeria.  At 
best, the subject has only been captured substantially by way of over 20 documented national 
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environmental regulations, laws and policies.  The causal link between the failure of these 
laws and violence in the Niger Delta is yet to be properly addressed.  This is one gap that this 
work also seeks to fill.  
 
 
In fact, a section of the literature insists that Nigeria lacks adequate environmental laws to 
address various environmental, social, economic and political challenges associated with oil 
business in the Niger Delta but fails to explore the extent to which some of these laws, in 
spite of their shortcoming, may partly explain the dynamics of   conflict in the region.  The 
logic is that the realm of policy failure due to poor implementation may have several effects 
(such as violence) that might have been basically overlooked or which lack sufficient 
systematic attention by scholars.  This work has provided us with ample opportunity to 
attempt to understand the linkage of failure of government to implement its national 
environmental policies and violence in the Niger Delta. 
 
 
Adelegan (2004: 1) asserts that “so far there are no clear formulated policies in Nigeria aimed 
at coordinating and monitoring the relationship between environmental policy and sustainable 
development.”63  As already observed, this thinking reflects the position of a good number of 
scholars on the Niger Delta who see environmental policy in the Niger Delta as inadequate 
for   managing the environment by oil companies and the government.    
 
 
Adelegan (2004: 1) admits that Nigeria has long established laws and institutions to tackle 
environmental problems but suggests that these laws and institutions have not been quite 
successful in achieving their aims.  He notes that regulations, standards, bans, permits and 
quotas are preferred environmental policy instruments by policy makers in developing 
countries because of the less costly outcome and enforcement that they promise.   
                                               
63   Adelegan, J.A. (2004).  “The History of Environmental Policy and Pollution of Water Resources 
in  Nigeria (1960-2004): The Way Forward,” unpublished article. 
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Nevertheless, according to him these promises are hardly achieved in such developing 
countries.  As he asserts concerning the case of Nigeria, “experience from the Nigerian 
environmental policies and implementation has shown that the traditional command-and-
control system to pollution abatement has not produced the desired result both economic and 
environmental wise” (Adelegan, 2004: 3).  This reinforces the argument that these policies 
are hardly enforced to produce desired objectives.  Furthermore, Adelegan’s reflection on the 
history of environmental policy and pollution control measures in Nigeria between 1900-
2003 shows that though environmental policy specific to the oil sector were basically limited 
even up to the 1970s, existing laws with environmental contents were poorly implemented.  
This means that because environmental laws or policies were inadequate does not mean that 
if they were fully enforced environmental conditions would not improve.  In fact, over the 
years since the colonial days, several laws have been formulated and institutions with powers 
to initiate environmental policies established by the federal and state governments of Nigeria.  
As Adelegan asserts the Federal Environmental Agency (FEPA) (now Federal Ministry of 
Environment) was established by the federal government of Nigeria to protect, restore and 
preserve the environment in Nigeria.  By the provisions of the decree establishing it, FEPA 
was given the power to initiate environmental policies or regulations   as well as power to 
formulate and implement environmental management.  FEPA was given additional powers of 
enforcement and inspection of facilities and arrests of persons who violate environmental 
laws, standards or guidelines for prosecution.  It is difficult to consider environmental policy 
in Nigeria without reference to FEPA.  However, Adelegan suggests like many others that 
FEPA did not do sufficiently well in carrying out its responsibilities.  
 
 
It would appear that the use of market-based instruments of environmental policy such as 
pollution tax and charges to complement traditional command-and-control approach in 
Nigeria discussed so far would bring substantial progress in protecting the environment from 
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damage caused by oil business.  Adelegan asserts that lack of adequate enforcement, 
corruption, shortage of funds, administrative or managerial capacities have made such 
policies ineffective in Nigeria.  
 
 
 Nineteen years after the formulation of the National Policy on the Environment (NPE), 
several other laws meant to address environmental pollution caused by oil companies have 
been enacted by the National Assembly in Nigeria.  A body of the   literature mirroring the 
perspective of the federal government    insists that the government has done fairly well in 
protecting the environment in the Niger Delta.  For example, Okediran (2005: 3)64 explains 
that the passing of a bill by the Nigerian parliament in 2004 to provide for the establishment 
of the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency charged with the responsibility of 
cleaning up any oil in the country and other related matters is commendable.  Similarly, he 
commends attempts by the parliament to permanently address the problem of gas flaring in 
the Niger Delta by amending the Associated Gas-Reinjection Act, Cap 26, to ensure the 
phasing out of all gas flares by 2008.  Ironically, by 2009, gas is still being flared in Nigeria, 
which means that these efforts by the Nigerian parliament have not yielded much progress.  It 
also signals the need to understand why the efforts are yet to cause an end to gas flaring, or 
explain violence in the Niger Delta.  Already, the environment and lack of development are 
presented in the literature as serious grievance issues causing violence in the Niger Delta.  
Although this is commendable, these findings are not based on sufficient and systematic 
research that specifically highlights the relationship between implementation of government 




Again, although most of the aforementioned laws have been analyzed in the literature, their 
                                               
64   Okediran is current member of the Federal House of Representatives, National Assembly in 
Abuja, Nigeria.  See paper entitled “Parliamentary Initiatives in Energy Legislation and Sustainable 
Development-Nigerian Perspective,” in a conference on Parliamentary Initiatives in Energy 
Legislation and Sustainable Development in South Africa in 2005.  
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analyses are inadequate.  They do not pay sufficient attention to possible link between how 
implementation of the laws may fuel violence between local environmental groups on the one 
hand and oil companies and the government on the other hand.  Instead, most of the laws are 
condemned for being unable to protect the environment and bring development or provide 
opportunities for socio-economic advancement to the Niger Delta.  The review of literature 
shows that scholars are yet to fully address   the implementation process of oil laws with 
environmental policy contents.  The same goes for the National Policies on the Environment 
and other environmental laws that have emerged since 1991.65 The researcher hopes to 
reverse this trend by making attempt in this study to see how understanding implementation 




Besides, although, the principle of sustainable development and proper management of the 
environment and its resources under many of these laws have been examined, the literature 
does not adequately capture how specifically failure of these laws to achieve their sustainable 
development goals relate with conflict in the Niger Delta.  For example, Umeh and Uchegbu 
(1997: 3)66 suggest that existing oil and environmental laws in Nigeria are fairly adequate to 
ensure sustainable development in the Niger Delta, they however fail to explain how this may 
help in understanding the conflict there.  Specifically, Umeh and Uchegbu (1997: 20) argue 
that the Environmental Impact Assessment Act (EIA) of 1992 in Nigeria has the potential of 
ensuring sustainable development in Nigeria.  In fact, as they argue further, the fundamental 
requirement of public participation should facilitate the process of attaining sustainable 
development in the implementation of the EIA Act.   
                                               
65    This was the year that the federal government of Nigeria came up with a national policy on the 
environment.  It is significant for being the first time ever for the country to have a policy on the 
environment that is considered to be comprehensive by some scholars. 
66    See Umeh, L.C. and Uchegbu, S.N. (1997).  Principles and Procedures of Environmental Impact 




As can be gleaned, most of the works on environmental policy or degradation of the 
environment are of the position that the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria does 
not make adequate provision for the protection of the environment by oil companies in the 
Niger Delta.  Makinde and Ayanbule add credence to arguments made by Umeh and 
Uchegbu.   In fact, they assert that:  
the basis of environmental policy in Nigeria can be found in Section 20 of the 1999 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which contains provisions for the 
protection and improvement  of the environment and safeguarding of water, air and 
land, forest and wildlife of Nigeria (Makinde and Ayanbule, 2008: 281).67 
 
They maintain that environmental laws and regulations enacted by the federal government are 
adequate to protect and safeguard the environment in Nigeria.  Makinde and Ayanbule pay 
specific attention to: 
1. The Federal Environmental Protection Agency Act of 1988 (FEPA Act now 
moribund).  In pursuant of this Act, the following regulations were made: National 
Environmental Protection (Effluent Limitation) Regulations; National Environmental 
Protection (Pollution Abatement in Industries and Facilities Generating Wastes) 
Regulations; and National Environmental Protection (Management of Solid and 
Hazardous Wastes) Regulations. 
  
2.  Environmental Impact Assessment Act (EIA Act) of 1992; 
3. Harmful Wastes (Special Criminal Provisions and so on) Act of 1988 (Harmful 
Wastes Act); 
 
4. The Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria 





                                               
67    See Makinde, O.and Ayanbule, B. (2008).  “Environmental Law 2006,” Global Legal Group 
www.iclg.co.ul (Accessed on 27th March, 2009). 
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Table 3.1. Relevant environmental laws and regulations in Nigeria 
 
The data in Table 3.1 shows some national environmental policies widely acknowledged in 






















1. Federal Environmental Protection      
Agency Act of 1988 
2. Environmental Impact Assessment of 
1992      
3. Harmful Wastes (Special Criminal 
Provisions and so on) Act of 1988 
(Harmful Wastes Act); 
4. The Environmental Guidelines and 
Standards for the Petroleum Industry in 
Nigeria (EGASPIN) 2002, published 









Makinde and Ayanbule maintain that both the Nigerian Constitution of 1999 and various 
environmental laws and regulations (See Table 3.1) enacted by the federal government are 
capable of protecting the environment in Nigeria.  For Ebeku (2003: 204) the Petroleum 
(Drilling and Production) Regulations of 1969, FEPA Act of 1988 and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples Rights are the most important environmental protection laws in Nigeria.   
The reason, according to him, first, is that oil companies contribute the greatest amount of 
damage to the environment in Nigeria.  Second, the FEPA Act is the most comprehensive 
environmental Act that cuts across virtually all sectors in Nigeria.  Third, The African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights has already been incorporated into Nigeria’s legal regime, 
which means that its provisions can be invoked in Nigerian courts by those seeking justice for 
violation of their rights (including rights to environmental protection).68  Specifically, Ebeku 
argues that the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation of 1969 is sufficient to ensure 
that the environment in the Niger Delta is protected from damages caused by oil companies.  
To him, Regulation 23, 25 and 36 of that Act provide adequately for what is expected from 
oil companies to protect the environment from destruction.  Regarding the FEPA Act, Ebeku 
asserts that two dimensions of redress for damage to the environment are provided, namely, 
remediation of the affected environment and payment of compensation to victims of the 
damage.  Specifically, Sections 20 and 21 of the Act prohibit the discharge of certain amount 
of harmful substances upon the waters, air and land in Nigeria except on permission by 
relevant authorities.  Concerning the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Ebeku 
asserts that it is now part of the domestic law of Nigeria.  The Act provides for the right to 
healthy and satisfactory environment.  Section 16 of the Act reads that “every individual shall 
have the right to enjoy the best attainable physical and mental health.” 69 Whereas Section 24 
                                               
68    See Ebeku, K.S.A. (2003).  “Judicial Attitudes to Redress for Oil-Related Environmental Damage 
in Nigeria,” Reciel Volume 12, No. 2. pp.199-208. 
69    See document on African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right (ACHPR) Section 16(1) 
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reads, “all peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to 
their development.” 70 Since the Act is already domesticated in Nigeria, it is expected that its 
effective enforcement would ensure adequate compensation for environmental damages 
caused by oil companies in the Niger Delta.    At the moment the literature predominantly 
portrays these laws as poorly implemented. 
 
 
In the same vein, Fryna (2000: 216) concludes in her research that the role of the judiciary in 
the implementation of environmental regulations through litigations has improved in favour 
of victims of environmental damage caused by oil operations in Nigeria.  She points out that 
in the past the Nigerian judiciary did not attach much importance to the substance of the law 
in matters of environmental damage by oil companies.  Instead, it viewed itself as part of the 
political and economic elite of Nigeria.  She argues that Nigerian judges are now pro-
environmental protection.  Her conclusion suggests that environmental laws in Nigeria are 
adequate to tackle environmental problems created by oil companies.  The impression is also 
given that victims of environmental damage by oil companies now have access to substantial 
justice in Nigeria courts.71  This type of impression throws up the question of political 
opportunity structures associated with the Political Process Theory whose basic elements and 
assumptions this study integrates with the assumptions of the Frustration-Aggression theory 
in order to provide the map for this work.  It then calls for interrogation in this study, of 
access and on whether these assumptions (see section on theoretical framework) can be 
applied to understanding the motivation for violence in the Niger Delta in relation to how 
                                               
70    See Section 24 of the same document 
71 Individuals and groups from the oil bearing communities have sued oil companies for various oil related 
pollution and violation of human rights and received favourable judgements in Nigeria and abroad.  For 
instance, on the 14th of November 2005, a Federal High Court under Justice C.V. Nwokerie, ordered all oil 
companies in the region to stop flaring gas.   On June 8, 2009, a District Court in New York gave judgement 
against Shell Nigeria for the violation of fundamental human rights of the Ogoni people. The court ordered Shell 
to pay the sum of USD15.5 million to the families of the late Ken Saro Wiwa and the eight others that were 
executed by the government of General Sani Abacha on November 10, 1995. See Environmental News Service 
(ENS) (2009)  http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jun2009/2009-06-08-02.asp (Accessed on 9 November, 2009) 
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open or closed basic institutions of politics or governance are on matters of environmental 
regimes and their violation.72 It is thus worthwhile to seek to understand how access to 
environmental justice through   open and closed political opportunity structures prevent or 
promote violence.  This is an area of scholastic enquiry that this study is also interested in but 
has not received satisfactory research attention by scholars. In fact, scholars are yet to give 
systematic and sufficient attention to how failure of the government to effectively implement 
its national environmental policies relate to violence in Nigeria’s delta region.  This study is a 
serious attempt to fill the gap. 
 
 
Clearly, the inference from the works which believe that oil related environmental laws are 
either inadequate or poorly implemented in the Niger Delta is that these laws affect 
management of the environment by oil companies and the government.  As Okotoni (2004: 3) 
asserts, “legislation ...affects environmental management.”73  This has to do with law making 
prescriptions and/or prohibitions on certain actions on the use of the environment.” As a 
result, there is a rich documentation of the impact of oil companies on the environment in the 
Niger Delta (see for example, Dalby, 2009; Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Ikelegbe, 2005: 171; 
Okotoni, 2004).74 Okotoni argues in this respect that conflict in the Niger Delta is 
predominantly caused by what oil-producing communities see as negligence of 
environmental management or poor approach to its management.  Although much of this is 
                                               
72     The literature is scanty on the complex relationship between political opportunity structures, 
frustration and choice of political actions by local environmental groups over matters of 
environmental policy and damage caused by oil companies in the Niger Delta. 
 
73    Management of the environment is a reflection of the nature and performance of existing laws.  
Formulation and implementation of relevant policies or laws are therefore important in understanding 
how individuals and organisations manage their environment.  Proper response to the environment by 
oil companies in the case of the Niger Delta may depend to a large extent on the performance of 
existing environmental policies.  
  
74    Some of these studies are further discussed in the next segment of the literature review under the 
resource curse thesis of conflict in the Niger Delta. 
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not based on any independent scientific scrutiny of such impacts on the environment, the 
literature insists that violent conflict in the region is in part caused by damage to the 
environment by the oil industry.  The researcher notes that there is a need to go a step further 
in this study to explore the relationship (of environmental change and conflict) from the angle 
of implementation of government environmental policies, something that the literature seems 
to fail to admit or even attempt to integrate in explaining environmental practice of oil 
companies and their relationship to conflict in the Niger Delta.   The Toronto School led by 
Homer-Dixon (1991) insists that environmental changes cause acute conflicts in most natural 
resource endowed countries.  The content of this argument requires expansion.  This study 
provides a good opportunity to widen the scope of how environmental issues lead to violent 
conflict in oil resource endowed regions of the world.  The logic is that if environmental 
change leads to acute conflict, there is need to explore the various ramifications in which it 
might occur by critically and systematically examining the   implementation of pertinent oil 
related environmental policies which at the moment remain under-studied.  In fact, it is not 
wrong to say that though there is a rich body of literature that  reflect the  social, economic, 
environment and political origins of environmental change  from extraction of natural 
resources, the surprisingly thin focus on the nature of environmental policy implementation 




A remarkable feature of the discourse on the environment, since 1960, is its rising profile as a 
subject of importance to politics and policy both at the national and international levels (see 
for example, Paterson, 2007: 545; Carter, 2001: 1; Van der Heijden, 1997: 205). This 
attraction is well demonstrated in the text written by Carter (2001:1) whose objectives were 
to expand core areas of study of “political theories and ideas relating to the environment; 
examination of political parties and environmental movements and the analysis of public 
policy-making and implementation at international, national and local levels” associated with 
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environmental politics.”  Paterson (2007: 545) even argues that the environment has gone far 
beyond a mere attempt to establish itself as a political and policy problem.  In the same vein, 
Van der Heijden (1997: 199) argues that the environment has now been entrenched on the 
political agenda of many nations.   As Carter (2001: 2) notes, the rise to prominence by the 
environment in political discourse “reflects a widespread public concern about the state of the 
environment.”  As such, it is no surprise that literature has captured the trend.  It follows that 
the environment has become both a political and policy problem given its interconnectedness 
with economic and social systems and practice.  In any case, it also implies that the 
environment faces political and economic forces with entrenched interests struggling to shape 
politics and policy.  This explains why both state and non-state actors have become integral 
to understanding the politics of environmental degradation or implementation.  The case of 
the Niger Delta has been highlighted (also see, for example, various works by Ibeanu) in the 
literature but there exists a gap in the systematic examination of the link between the politics 
of environmental degradation, implementation and violence in the Niger Delta.  This study 




Already, a section of the literature has expressed doubt about the willingness of the 
government to implement pertinent environmental policy because of the fundamental interest 
of the state which depends on oil for over 90% of foreign exchange earnings and 90 % of its 
national revenue. Oil exploration and production is paradoxically responsible for the bulk of 
environmental degradation in the region.  But this has not received sufficient attention from 
scholars in terms of the   specific ways it causes violence.   Besides, traditionally, scholars 
seem to have explained conflict in the region in terms of direct result of oil damage to the 
environment but fail to see this from the point of view of failure or reluctance of the 
government to implement environmental policies related to oil company operations.  For 
example, Carter (2001:2) argues that “governments frequently talk ‘green’ but, in practice, 
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usually give priority to economic growth over environmental protection.  It seems that the 
sustainable society is still a distant dream.”   It follows that politics is a major determinant of 
how the environment is degraded and how environmental policy is implemented.  Of course, 
all that is not to suggest that economic growth and environmental protection are mutually 
exclusive.  It is not the case.  This is despite not only some arguments that sustainable 
development is a middle-ground position that gives consideration to economic growth but 
also the seemingly endemic tendency among proponents of sustainable development to blame 
many environmental challenges on economic initiatives. This explains why the 
environmental movement, though acknowledged to have been responsible for placing 
environmental issues on the political agenda at international and national levels, is said, in the 
case of the third world, to have often articulated its demands for protection of the 
environment with demands for development.  The case of the Niger Delta has not been given  
sufficient attention from researchers, especially in the assessment of the socio-economic and 
political conditions that environmental degradation from oil operations generate  and  which  
policy implementation is expected to reverse.  In any case, it is commendable that a 
substantial body  of work has addressed broader political issues of  minority agitations in the 
Niger Delta over what is now seen as the neglect of the goose that lays the golden egg 
(Lubeck, Watts and Lipshutz, 2007: 1; Alapiki and Allen, 2006: 1; Douglas et al, 2003: 1-8; 
Fayemi, 2003: 122; Ibeanu, 2002: 2; Adejumobi, 2000: 59;  International IDEA, 2000: 5; 
Egwu, 1998, 2;  Nnoli, 1994: 555).   This study complements these efforts but also addresses 
how failure to implement policy related to oil exploration might explain the tempo of 
violence now being experienced in the Niger Delta. 
 
 
An interesting aspect of the discourse on degradation of the environment by oil companies 
and conflict in the Niger Delta is the incorporation of the idea of environmental security 
(Lubeck, Watts and Lipshutz, 2007; Douglas et al, 2003; Fayemi, 2003: 122; Ibeanu, 2002: 
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5).  Buzan (1991: 19) defines security as “the pursuit of freedom from threat.”75  
Environmental security should then logically refer to the pursuit of freedom from threats 
associated with destructive human activities to the environment and its resources.  A number 
of studies have been done from this perspective on   the Niger Delta. (Ibeanu, 2002:6). The 
environment, as a human security issue derives essentially from its development role as a life 
supporting system for humanity and supplier of basic material resources needed for socio-
economic advancement.  As such, threats to the sustainable realisation of this objective and 
utilisation of what resource the environment offers can be logically viewed as threat to 
security.   For instance, it is a widely held notion in academic and policy circles that the oil 
industry generates environmental conditions that threaten livelihoods for local population 
who hitherto depended on the resources in the environment such as fish resource, livestock, 
crops, and forest in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria  
 
In essence then, despite deepening concerns for the environment, there are insufficient 
systematic studies on these issues in the case of the Niger Delta.  It is also evident in the 
literature that perceived differences among key stakeholders in the region for the most part 
also help to define the structure of conflict in the Niger Delta.  This study fills that gap by 
linking conflict in the Niger Delta to the pervasive failure by government to either implement 
or enforce pertinent measures to protect the environment in the region. 
 
                                               
75    Classical notions of security dwelt on security of the state, which is claimed to be attainable 
through ‘realist power’ and ‘idealist peace.’  It was far less concerned about security of individual 
citizens since the logic was that the interest of the state was superior to that of the individual.  
Changing discourse on security now incorporates human security or security of the individual in all 
ramifications.  Embedded in this new discourse is the concept of ‘environmental security,’ which by 
way of blend of Buzan’s definition of security means, the pursuit of freedom from environmental 
threat caused by human or non-human activities. See Buzan, B. (1991). People, States and Fear:  An 




3.4. Conflict in the Niger Delta 
The post-Cold War era is marked by an increase in the number and severity of violent 
conflicts in different parts of the world (Bannon, 2005: ix).  In fact, as Collier (2005: xiii)76 
notes, civil wars have killed roughly 20 million people and displaced at least 67 million since 
1945. It is therefore no surprise that scholars have done extensive research in attempts to 
explain or understand the causes, nature and impact of these conflicts. Whether in Europe, 
Africa Central Asia or other regions of the world, the subject of violent conflict has attracted 
the interest of scholars.   For example, Kalyvas and Sambanis (2005:191)77 explain the 
origins and violence dynamics of the Bosnia’s civil war which started in 1980.  Following 
from their analysis of the war, ethnicity played a significant role in the conflict. The case of 
Northern Ireland, a fairly developed country in Europe, might have been least expected by 
peace and conflict researchers.  As Woodwell (2005: 161)78 puts it “during the period from 
1969 until 1994, Northern Ireland became the scene of the worst political violence in Western 
Europe.  Woodwell’s analysis of the war identifies political dominance of Protestants against 
the Catholics as key cause and major factor for the duration of the war -- 1969-1994.  Since 
the 1970s Africa has become notorious for frequent and long-lasting violent conflicts. In fact, 
the continent is seen by many scholars and expert observers as a region prone to wars. Degila 
(2008: 1)79 describes the case of West Africa as a system of wars, suggesting that the scale of 
violent conflicts in certain countries of the region is massive.  Violence erupted in Liberia in 
                                               
76  Collier, P. (2005).  “Preface” Collier, P. and  Sambanis, N. (eds) Understanding Civil War , 
Washington DC: World Bank, p. xiii 
 
77    Kalyvas, S.N. and Sambnis, N. (2005). “Bosnia’s Civil War, Origins and Violence Dynamics” 
Understanding Civil War , Washington DC: World Bank, p.191 
78  Woodwell, D. (2005).  “The Troubles of Northern Ireland, Civil Conflict in an Economically Well-
Developed State” Understanding Civil War, Washington DC: World Bank, p.161. 
 
79   Degila, E.D.  (2008). “Armed Conflicts in the Sub-Saharan Africa since the end of the cold war: 
An Analysis of New Conflictuality in West Africa,” paper presented at the Second World 




1989.  Two years later (1991), Sierra Leone was also engulfed by war.  Malecjacq (2007: 43) 
refers to the wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea as a set of conflicts and explains them 
from a human security perspective by focusing on their causes and impacts on individuals.  
As Malejacq80 puts it “violence in West Africa has later been analysed as systemic.” In any 
case, violent conflict in Africa assumes different forms.  For example, wars of independence 
(as in the case of Namibia and Angola), secessionist wars (such as the civil war in Nigeria-
Biafra 1967), rebellions (such as the war in Ethiopia) and interstate conflicts (Chad and 
Libya over Aozou Strip between 1973 and 1994) (Michaiof et al, 2002: 3)81  In fact, on a 
general note, various theories have been proposed for explaining and understanding violent 
conflicts.   These theories are based on the following perspectives: economic (Atakpu, 2007: 
1-6; Collier, 2003: 4; Collier and Hoefllier, 2002: 1;   Berdal and Malone, 2000: 182)  psycho-
cultural (Lake and Rothchild, 1996: 51; Ross, 1993: 18; Crighton,1991:127; Northrup, 1989: 
65),83 greed-grievance (Collier, 2003: 4; Collier and Hoefllier, 2002: 1-44), frustration-
                                               
80   Malecjacq, R. (2007). “Looking at the Individual in Liberia and Sierra Leone: From a Regional 
Conflict to a 'Human Insecurity Complex” Human Security Journal, Issue 3, February, p.43. 
 
81    See Michailof, S., Krosker, M. and Devictor, X.  (2002). “Post-Conflict Recovery in Africa: An 
Agenda for the Africa Region” Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 30, April, pp.1-30. 
 
82 See Collier, P. (2000) “Policy for Post-Conflict Societies: Reducing the Risks of Renewed 
Conflict,” paper prepared for The Economics of Political Violence conference, March 18-19, at the 
Princeton University Centre of International Studies, Princeton University and the Development 
Research Group, World Bank; Collier, P. et al (2003). “Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and 
Development Policy, Washington: The World Bank; Berdal, M. and David, M. (2000) Greed or 
Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Boulder: Lynne Rienner.  
 
83   See Lake, D. and Rothchild, D. (1996).  “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic 
Conflict,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2; Berdal, M. and Malone, D.M. (2000). Greed or 
Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, Boulder: Lynne Rienner; Northrup, T.A. (1989).  
“Dynamics of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict” in Kresber et al eds. (1989).  Intractable 
Conflicts and their Transformation, Syracuse University Press; Ross, M. (1993). The Management of 





aggression (Anifowose, 1982: 6;  Davis, 1962: 6),84  and physiological and human needs 
theories of conflict (Burton, 1990: 72).85  Efforts to explain conflicts with environmental 
problems by researchers have also become popular.  As a result, the use of the concept, 
environmental conflict, to describe the connection between violent conflict and 
environmental change appears also to have informed empirical research in many conflict 
zones  where resources scarcity or abundance matter in the eruption of violence among 
groups endowed with natural resources. Specifically, each emphasises definite cause or 




Because theories should normally have explanatory, predictive and problem-solving values 
and not just mere intellectual exercise, many of the already existing theories are not useful for 
explanation, prediction or problem-solving. Only a handful appears to accommodate the three 
qualities.   Although argument is rife that each researcher writing from a unique background 
and conflict situation would find at least one of those features analytically useful and, as 
such,  have some level of particularism (Faleti, 2005: 37), the case of the Niger Delta is yet to 
be given substantial theory-based analyses.  As noted by Cohen (1968: 2), the aim of any 
theory is to explain an occurrence or phenomenon with an underlying objective of addressing 
the problem leading to that crisis.   There exists an obvious hiatus in reaching this theoretical 
goal in the case of the Niger Delta just as non-governmental organisations seem to have been 
at the forefront of explaining the crisis. This study attempts to fill the lacuna. 
 
 
For instance, Structural Conflict Theory (SCT) is analysed in the literature as an explanatory 
variable of conflicts.  Its two aspects of radical and liberal orientations have not received 
                                               
84   See Anifowose, R. (1982). Violence and Politics in Nigeria: The Yoruba and Tiv Experience, New 
York: Nok Publishers; Davies, C.J. (1962). “Towards a Theory of Revolution” in American Sociology 
Review, xxviii, February. 
 
85  See Burton, J. (1990). Conflict: Human Needs Theory, London: Macmillan. 
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adequate or balanced utilisation by scholars in the case of oil and environment related conflict 
in the Niger Delta.  Both strands of structural explanations to conflicts identify structural 
factors in society in terms of how the society is organised.  They locate social problems and 
conflicts on   economic and political exclusion, inequality, injustice, poverty, sicknesses or 
disease, exploitation, and so on.  Specifically, the Marxist extraction of the theory locates 
conflicts in societies within the framework of exploitation, injustice and class domination. 
 
 
The liberal structuralist theory held by Galtung (1990: 240) argues that structural factors in 
society that cause conflict can be fixed by a process of policy reforms.  In contrast, Marxist 
structuralists envision violent strategies for fixing structural problems that lead to conflict in 




Jennings (2007: 7) and Honwana (2005: 31-52) refer to countries prone to conflict as conflict 
zones.  Judging from the literature, these conflict zones are portrayed as social spaces where 
the actions and reactions of key actors are shaped by existing socio-economic and political 
forces. These forces, often, are complex and interconnect with one another to explain violent 
conflicts in regions of the world such as Africa, Latin America and the Middle East.  The 
social space of conflict has both governmental and non-governmental actors. Incidentally, 
there are well documented studies on rival rebellions, criminal violence and warlike societies 
(Jennings, 2007: 8; Clapham, 1998: 1).  What is common to these studies of violent conflicts 
is the attempt to explain their cause or causes.  Why do groups arm themselves and fight?  An 
influential point of view in response to this question seems to have been the “greed and 
grievance” debate.86 Indeed, in recent years, the research agenda on causes of war, (especially 
in Africa) has been dominated by this debate.  It is essentially a perspective towards 
                                               
86    These words are associated with Paul Collier and his colleagues at the World Bank. See Collier, 
P. (2000). “Doing Well out of War: An Economic Perspective,” in M. Berdal and D.M. Malone (eds) 




explaining violent conflicts or motivations in terms of economic calculations.  As Jennings 
(2007:12) notes, such economic considerations may influence “how violence is used in 
conflict.”  “Greed and grievance” is now commonly used to refer to any argument that puts 
economic considerations at explaining the causes of conflicts. This is logical, but the subject 
itself has been under-studied, especially for Africa, let alone Nigeria’s Niger Delta, where 
problems of degradation of the environment and response of the government and oil 
companies appear to have been perceived in broader analyses of issues that are economic, 
social and political in nature.  
 
 
While it is difficult to tell whether or not the case of the Niger Delta fits neatly with the 
description of “greed” as a motivation for current violence in the region, Ibeanu and 
Luckham (2006: 5-7) warn of the emergence of a conflict economy where struggle for the 
illegal sale of oil and adulterated fuel, colloquially called condescent87 tapped illegally from 
oil pipelines seems to have become a major motivation or outcome for most of the violent 
activities of armed groups.  However, related to the aspect of “grievance” is the frustration 
aggression theory?  Although the grievances that motivated the initial violence might now 
seem to be disconnected from broader economic and political issues, an aspect of literature 
continues to insist on unsatisfactory policy response from the government and oil companies 




It should be noted that the usefulness of the greed and grievance argumentation has been 
                                               
87 The streets of Nigeria’s cities, especially in the southern and eastern parts, are often littered with 
young people selling condescent fuel in rubber/plastic containers.   They are often very popular with 
motorists because of the higher prices for fuel sold at the government approved petrol filling stations.  
Sometimes, some operators of the filling stations have been known to buy from these young people to 
re-stock their reservoirs at the filling stations for sale to the public. 
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seriously questioned by both non-African and African scholars such as Bray88 and Regan.89  
When indicators of grievances such as access to education, poverty and unemployment are 
used, the grievance argument remains a useful explanation to most of the conflicts in Africa.  
This is where the frustration aggression argumentation comes out clearly in similarity with 
the grievance argument.  To that extent, this study makes a modest contribution to the 
consolidation of the greed and grievance debate, although to some degree, this has been 
determined by the nature of this work’s research questions. 
 
 
The greed argument runs the risk of being dismissed for frivolous claims if restricted to 
armed groups, or seen from the point of view of groups and their members fighting because 
they want some physical or material security. This is because in some regimes, governmental 
leaders and their bureaucracies may also have economic motives that are reflected in policies 
whose consequences may include the starting or prolonging of violent conflicts (Jennings, 
2007: 13). This means that one should not consider the question of greed only with one party 
to a conflict. Although, as Jennings has noted, this is more of a function of research 
questions, greed (in the case of violence in the Niger Delta) might well be explored within the 
multi-layer–actors that include the government, oil companies and local armed groups in the 
light of violence in the region. 
 
These theories, laudable as they are in their limited usefulness (since many of the researchers 
worked in parts of the world where violent conflicts have lasted), do not adequately explain 
the case of the Niger Delta.  This clarification is necessary for understanding the imperative 
                                               
88  See Bray, J.  Leiv, L. and Murshed, M. S. (2003). “Nepal: Economic Drivers of the Maoist 
Insurgency,” in K. Ballentine and J. Sherman (eds) The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond 
Greed and Grievance, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 107-132. 
 
89 See Regan, A. J. (2003). “The Bougailville Conflict: Political and Economic Agendas,” in K. 
Ballentine and J. Sherman (eds.) The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and 
Grievance, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp.133-136 
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of a theory that enjoys all the three identified features, and importantly for problem-solving 
of protracted violent conflict in the Niger Delta.  The Frustration-Aggression theory utilised 
in this study thus   helps to fill this gap in literature.   Specifically, the Frustration-Aggression 
(F-A) theory is superior to the other theories of conflict for this study on the grounds that the 
theory  provides a near commonsense and practical way of understanding and explaining 
what it means to be actually frustrated.   Although this might be seen as too simplistic for 
explaining the choice of political actions among actors in the Niger Delta conflict, the theory 
provides the needed insight into the motivators or instigators of choice of political action on 
the part of local environmental groups regarding their circumstances-economic, political, 
environmental and socio-cultural in relation to government policies meant to achieve 
sustainable development.   For example, being frustrated in this context (Niger Delta) on the 
part of the local environmental groups might mean that peaceful access to benefits accruing 
from the oil, as well as to the political system in order to influence decisions about 
management of the environment and its resources is blocked or at least limited.  Annoyance 
or anger (another important aspect of frustration) in reaction, as a form of aggression may 
manifest in oral, written and physical expression.  The researcher notes the seeming weakness 
of the theory in giving the impression that frustration will always lead to aggressive 
behaviours.  In any case, such behaviours do not necessarily mean physical violence as can 
be expressed through show of annoyance or anger can be an instigator or motivator of 
aggressive behaviours including physical forms of violence.  For the local environmental 
groups, their frustration with their circumstances of lack of development, poverty, perceived 
political marginalisation and so on, along with other factors or sources of frustration might 
constitute sufficient motivators for aggression.   These issues in the context of the assumption 
of the F-A theory have not been given adequate attention by scholars in studying conflict in 





A review of the literature shows that although crisis in the Niger Delta has attracted the 
attention of the international community, national politicians, non-governmental 
organizations and scholars, systematic study of the conflict is still inadequate.  Although  the 
structure of the conflict (protests against oil companies, attacks on  oil company facilities, 
hostage taking, killing of oil company staff, killing of government security personnel, intra 
and inter community hostilities, attacks on government security personnel by local groups, 
attacks on local environmental groups by government security personnel and so on) has been 
highlighted in literature, theory building on complex causal relationships between issues of 
environmental policy implementation and violence in the region is yet to be given  sufficient 
attention by scholars.  However, this does not in any way discount efforts so far made by the 




 Production of oil is of immense importance to the Nigerian state, oil companies, and 
international community of buyers, investors and Niger Deltans.  This importance has altered 
the structure of the conflict and added an important element in analyses (of the conflict) by 
scholars.  Worse, since the beginning of the 1990s, armed groups have emerged, focusing 
their attacks on oil companies and government security personnel.  Kidnapping of oil 
company workers, hostage taking and killing of some of the victims are now routinely carried 
out by these armed groups.  Of these forms of conflict, armed attacks against oil companies 




Against this background, in reviewing the literature on conflict in the Niger Delta, the 
researcher considered questions around issues of oil, environmental degradation, character of 
the Nigerian state and development.  The review shows that though these issues have been 
highlighted in existing studies, the literature fails to adequately capture alternative 
explanations that incorporate environmental policy implementation by the government and 
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oil companies in relation to violence in the region. For example, O’Hara’s (2001:301-308) 
summary of the issues concerning violent conflict in the region since the beginning of the 
1990s include: oil, environmental destruction, development, character of the Nigerian state, 
human rights violation, and struggle for livelihood.  He is not alone on these issues (see for 
example, Ikelegbe, 2008: 107; Watts, 2007: 40), although a few scholars would like to argue 
that conflict in the Niger Delta is driven more by greed than grievance (for example, Collier, 
2000: 95).  Clearly, a complex and interconnected set of issues and practices are presented to 
explain the conflict.  At the centre is the impact of oil company activities on host 
communities in relation to the character of the Nigerian state.  From a detailed reading of 
O’Hara’s work, there is an underlying explanation of the issues from the angle of the popular 
thesis that oil is more of a curse than a blessing to countries that have it.  This is deduced 
from the way   oil companies and the government relate to the environment in the Niger 
Delta.  In order to address the conflict, government and oil companies are expected to be 
guided by the importance of listening to communities that have risen in protest against them.  
Simply, they ask for development and respect for their environment.  This view may sound 
somewhat prescriptive and simplistic.  All the same, it shows that scholars are worried about 
resolving the crisis by suggesting the path of peace -- via conflict resolution and sustainable 
development.  As O’Hara notes: 
The social impact of the oil industry on these communities has brought great 
frustration and anger to their lives.  Many of them feel that it is a curse on them.  
Essentially, the focus of their frustration and anger is due to the actual and perceived 
inability of the multinational corporations and the Nigerian government to carry out 
agreed reforms and measures to alleviate the deprivation experienced in their areas.  It 
seems, too, that the expectations and demands of the host communities are at an 
extremely high level, such that the oil companies and government agencies regard 
them as unreasonable and almost unjust (O’Hara, 2001: 302). 
 
 
O’Hara reports that although oil companies in the Niger Delta claim to have various 
sustainable development programmes, especially  for the protection of the environment and 
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its resources, in reality some of the oil facilities belonging  to the companies  have been  left 
to rot (deteriorate) without repairs or replacements.  In the case of SPDC, according to him, 
such oil facilities constructed in the 1960s, 70s and 80s have hardly been upgraded.  The 
result is frequent leakages that regularly destroy the environment and livelihood of the Niger 
Delta people.  O’Hara specifically mentions SPDC as being habitually insensitive to oxidized 
pipelines conveying oil to their various locations or terminals.  Worse, gas flaring is a regular 
occurrence.  O’Hara suggests an explanation to this gap between intention and practice on the 
part of oil companies by pointing to the influence of broader socio-economic and political 
context of interests of the government and other stakeholders.  He notes, regrettably, that 
SPDC has a tendency to see just about every case of oil spillage as caused by a third party 
(sabotage).  Although, it cleans up such spills, compensations are never made on grounds of 
sabotage.  In any case, matters of compensation are predetermined by relevant laws in terms 
of procedures for making claims and actual amount paid to affected communities.  In these 
matters, O’Hara argues that the affected communities remain on the losing side.  For 
example, amounts payable  by oil companies as compensation for crops destroyed by oil 
spillage were determined over three decades ago and are yet to be updated to tally with 
changing social, economic and political realities.  Ultimately, affected individuals, families 
and communities receive meagre amounts in compensation for crops destroyed by oil 
spillages whenever they occur.  Even though unacceptably meagre they grudgingly accept, 
knowing that the government is behind the oil companies. 
 
 
In fact, Ikelegbe (2008: 107), Ibeanu (2008: 96) and Agagu (2008: 238-245) argue 
independently in their researches that social, environmental, economic and political 
implications of extraction of the oil have to a large extent defined the structure of conflict in 
the Niger Delta.  They blame crisis in the region on the insensitivity of oil companies and the 
government to issues of justice and human rights.  As Ikelegbe notes: 
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The Niger Delta crisis is essentially but among others, a governance crisis.  It is a 
crisis of state and corporate governance…While the nature of relations of the Nigerian 
state with oil and the multinational oil companies (MNOCs) is at the root of the 
problems of the Niger Delta; its under-development, poverty, marginalization, 
oppression, inequitable and unjust treatment, repression and violence, the nature of 
MNOC governance in the Niger Delta region is also abundantly indicated. State and 
corporate governance are intricately linked in the three levels of conflict in the region; 
communities versus federal government, communities versus oil companies and 
communities versus communities.  The specific nature and character of the Nigerian 
state is indicated in the nature of relations it has foisted and has been foisted with it by 
the MNOCs.  Furthermore, the nature and forms of oil exploitation and the practices 
and behaviour of the MNOCs underpinned the politics of oil, the policies that flow 
from it and the nature of collaboration, regulation and control that exist between the 
Nigerian state and the MNOCs.90 
 
In the same vein, Ibeanu91 argues that discourse on human rights in the Niger Delta has 
shifted from traditional human rights issues to what he refers to as rhetoric of rights -- 
understanding of human rights in terms of resource allocation rights or rights to development.  
According to him,  
 the first way to link resource monitoring and human rights in the Niger Delta is by 
posing questions of environmental justice…A major dimension of environmental 
injustice that has become muted under the regime of rhetoric of two rights in the 
Niger Delta is the impact  on human rights of the indiscriminate discharge and 
dumping of toxic, non-biodegradable waste from the petroleum industry into very 
fragile environment… the people of the Niger Delta seem helpless in these 
situations… and are unable as a consequence to participate in decisions concerning 
the discharge of such waste (Ibeanu, 2008: 104). 
 
Finally, O’Hara argues that scholars have responded to these issues in the Niger Delta from 
three perspectives, namely, World Bank, Government and Human Rights. While a good 
number of them blame the Nigerian federal government and oil companies for the way 
conflict in the Niger Delta has transformed into a ‘war’ situation, others sound the tone of 
condemnation of recent activities of armed groups.92  Oil companies and the government are 
                                               
90 See Ikelegbe, 2008, p.107. 
91 Ibeanu, 2008, p.96 
92 From a greed argument perspective, some politicians see these armed groups as bands of criminals 
who are motivated merely by a desire to achieve quick wealth.   As a result, many of them are 
involved in theft of   oil.  Initially, many of them played the role of thugs who were hired by 
politicians to rig elections and eliminate political opponents in the pre-1999 and subsequent election 
periods.  However, some of them use language of grievance touching upon environmental 
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blamed for being insensitive to the social, economic, political and environmental implications 
of the oil-driven economy of Nigeria.  Psychologists93 who explain the causes and prevention 
of violence among youths in society would maintain that it was important at a certain stage in 
the development of violence in the region (through some social learning perspectives in 
combination with the Frustration-Aggression theory) for oil company and government 
authorities to pause for a moment and reassess their approaches to development in order to 
understand the frustration being experienced by oil company host communities.  Scholars 
who argue from the point of view of stakeholder democracy (for example, Runhaar, 
Dieperink and Driessen, 2006) would argue as follows:  
The multi-actor policy context implies that strategies for sustainable development 
usually have to relate to a form of “governance”: a non-hierarchical form of steering, 
where state and non-state actors participate in the formulation and implementation of 
public policy.  
 
O’Hara joins these scholars to locate violent crisis in the region within this context.    In  
Niger- Delta: Political Violence, Governance and Corporate Responsibility in a Petro-State, 
written by Ibeanu and Luckham (2006: 1-87), a serious attempt is   made to explain violent 
conflict in the Niger Delta in the context of the  oil-driven economy and its social, political, 
economic and  environmental implications.  In fact, Ibeanu and Luckham address the 
complex connection between oil and violent conflict in the Niger Delta.  They find that the 
Nigerian state is vulnerable to forces outside its control.  Thus it lacks   capacity to address 
                                                                                                                                                  
degradation, injustice, development and so on as cover for their nefarious activities.  See Daily Trust 
(2009) “How do we see the militant/JTF conflict” May 26 
93 There are several theories developed by psychologists (including Frustration-Aggression Theory) 
used for explaining how violence and aggressive behaviours develop; and to know when to intervene.  
Knowing when to intervene is enhanced by the application of the Social Learning theory.  The theory 
posits that aggressive behaviour is learned and not inborn.  Intervention by social, economic, 
educational and other means implies knowing what to do to discourage such aggressive behaviours.  
Social Learning and Frustration-Aggression theories complement each other rather than stand in 
competition. Scholars agree that intervention can occur at any time in the development of aggressive 
behaviours, but should the authorities wait until violence becomes full-blown as it is in the Niger 
Delta? See Amodei and Scott, 2002,  pp.511-526 
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pertinent issues of turning the oil into a blessing as it is meant to be94, in terms of its 
usefulness for development and improvement of living conditions of Nigerians, especially 
people from the Niger Delta.  Although this is not a predicament limited to the Niger Delta 
(researchers believe that most Nigerians complain of  insufficient benefits from the oil 
economy), the case of the region has become a global issue as violence there, too often,  
influences global oil prices and volume of supply.  As Fayemi notes in the Preface of Ibeanu 
and Luckham’s book: 
Oil has become the most powerful, and yet most volatile resource in the contemporary 
world by virtue of being the life blood of the modern economy.  The fact that the lives 
of people and the destinies of nations are shaped by the results of the operations of the 
industry is not unconnected with the sort of politics and violence that regulate this 
resource all over the world, including Nigeria.  While some oil-producing states have 
been able to counter the powerful economic forces compelling the violence in our oil-
driven world, the Nigerian situation has remained particularly complex and it is still 
determined by the relationships between the state and multinational oil companies.  
The feature, if anything, makes the Nigerian state increasingly powerless as it 
continues to be susceptible to the vagaries that make it difficult for it to be alive to its 
responsibilities of preserving and defending the rights of oil minorities. This equally 
makes it challenging to create an enabling environment for the latter’s easy access to 
substantial flow of corporate social responsibility opportunities, which has spawned 
conflicts that have the capacity to whittle down the viability of democratic governance 
in Nigeria (Fayemi, 2006: vi) 
 
Ibeanu and Luckham argue that politics and violence regulate the oil industry in Nigeria.   
Resort to violence by the government has been a common approach.  With the passage of 
time, armed groups have emerged with capacity to challenge the state and its coercive 
powers.  The authors highlight the inability of the Nigerian state to counter various forces that 
compel the violence (state and non-state sectors) as well as the danger it spells for a fledging 
democracy like Nigeria.  As they note concerning some of the forces propelled by economic 
interests,  
                                               
94 Economists in the early years of discovery of oil in Africa and other parts of the world predicted 
prosperity for countries that have it.  Unfortunately, many decades later, this prediction has been 
proved wrong by the mode of governance by a majority of leaders of countries with huge oil deposits 
and revenues from it.  In the case of Nigeria, the political class is more noted for its role in lining up 
individual pockets with public funds, mainly generated from oil production. 
93 
 
Shell and other oil majors have forged close alliance with Nigeria’s ruling classes, 
including its military dictatorships.  Little of the oil revenue has been invested in the 
communities in the Niger Delta, where most oil is produced.  These communities 
have borne the brunt of the extensive environmental damage from oil extraction, and 
have become increasingly alienated from the oil companies and from the federal 
government (Ibeanu and Luckham, 2006: 3). 
 
They cite evidence of a repressive and violent Nigerian state propelled by economic motives 
in the way it responded to peaceful protests by the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP) against degradation of their environment by SPDC and lack of 
development in the Ogoni area.  Members of the group were killed and repressed by 
government security personnel.  Finally, their leaders (nine), including the founding 
spokesman for MOSOP, the late Kenule Saro-Wiwa, were tried and executed by the military 
government under the now late General Sani Abacha on the charge of murder of four 
prominent Ogoni men who were killed by angry Ogoni youths.  The youths accused the four 
men of treachery in the course of the struggle of the Ogoni people against oil companies and 
the federal government.  To explain the character of the Nigerian state in relation to violence 
in the Niger Delta and the oil economy, Ibeanu and Luckham sought to understand how both 
violent conflict and its absence have been shaped by what they refer to as ‘shifting and 
troubled relationships between the Nigerian post-colonial state and the oil sector.”  What's 
more, they sought to understand how oil and violence have transformed and shaped Nigeria’s 
social formations, gradually creating a political economy and culture of violence in the Niger 
Delta and in other parts of Nigeria. The vital aspect of their findings is seen in their 
explanation of the evolution and peculiar nature of the rentier state of Nigeria.  They argue 
that emergence of the political economy of oil and the abundance of revenues from it forms 
the fundamental basis.  What followed, according to them, have been various tendencies such 
as corruption, lack of accountability in governance and weakness of the political system to 
contain budding culture of violence among forces competing for the economic and political 
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space provided by the oil economy.   It is therefore no surprise that these scholars (Ibeanu and 
Luckham) describe Nigeria as a vampire state95 with leaders who lack visions of 
development for the country.  The state is characterised by ‘prebendal politics’ of 
accumulation of wealth generated from oil.  Furthermore, it has little regard for delivery of 
public services.  Instead, competition among the political classes for state resources has 
deepened, weakening prospects for democratic consolidation.  According to them, various 
mechanisms are created by the political class for misappropriation of oil rents, including 
‘diversion into ‘special funds’ controlled by the President...bribes or tax paid on oil contracts, 
smuggling of petroleum products across Nigeria’s borders; illegal sale of oil and so on’ 
(Ibeanu and Luckham, 2006: 19).  For Omotola (2006: 5), the character of the Nigerian state 
has spelt trouble for the Niger Delta where Nigeria’s oil is mined.  This is seen in the reaction 
of the political class to threats posed by victims of environmental damage in the region.  
Omotola argues that the response pattern reveals the pattern of relationship between the 
Nigerian state and other key stakeholders in the oil business in Nigeria.  As he puts it: 
The colonial legacy bequeathed the Nigerian state certain characteristics.  First, the 
post-colonial Nigerian state, like its colonial progenitor and other African states, 
remain a law and order state based upon the use of force...in these perverse relations, 
the state lacked autonomy because its apparatuses were not only underdeveloped, but 
also captured by the governing elite to advance their parochial interests...the attendant 
privatisation of the state, defined as the appropriation of the state to service  private 
interests by the dominant faction of the elite became deeply engrained in the political 
system so as to thwart any attempt to reverse the trend.96 
 
An important feature of the Nigerian variant of the rentier state identified by the authors is its 
failed development approach and politics of socio-economic exclusion of groups from 
benefiting reasonably from the oil economy.  As a result, conflict in the Niger Delta has 
sharpened (Omotola, 2006: 6).   Poverty level in the oil-producing communities has risen.  In 
fact, since 2000, average per capita income has remained less than a dollar per day.  As 
                                               
95    The state and leaders are parasitic.  They depend on rent from oil and lack any productive base. 
96  Omotola, S. (2006). “The Next Gulf? Oil Politics, Environmental Apocalypse and Rising Tension 
in the Niger Delta,” ACCORD Occasional Paper Series, Volume 1, Number 3, pp.5-8. 
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Ibeanu and Luckham note: 
Far from bringing prosperity to the Niger Delta, oil exploration, production caused 
large scale environmental degradation, destroyed rural livelihoods and aggravated 
poverty.  It was all the more destructive because it occurred in densely settled forest, 
agricultural and creek areas. State neglect of the concerns of Delta communities was 
compounded by the skewed distribution of oil revenues, diverted into ‘development’ 
(or in practice elite accumulation) elsewhere in Nigeria...Nigeria’s emergence as a 
major petroleum producer has done little for the welfare of the people of the Niger 
Delta.  There has been glaring immiseration according to all social indicators (Ibeanu 
and Luckham, 2006: 37). 
 
Against this background, Obi (1997: 1-34) argues that oil and environment related conflicts 
in the Niger Delta pose severe threat to security on the domestic and external fronts.  No 
doubt, this argument has been reinforced by subsequent research findings by some scholars.  
Interestingly, this threat, as conceived and predicted by Obi, is more real today than it was 
then.  Indeed, it would be remembered that Ken Saro Wiwa’s comments at his trial before his 
death regarding the future security situation of the Niger Delta and indeed Nigeria has been 
captured in analytical literature with interpretations that clearly portray the roles that oil and 
the  character of the Nigerian state play in the conflict.  At the domestic front, in another 
study, Obi (2004: 1-4) alludes to the rentier character of the Nigerian state as a threat to 
democracy and security in Nigeria.  He prefers a topic for that research that clearly shows 
Nigeria as merely being in a process of experimentation of democracy.   
 
 
 Explanations of how oil and environment related conflicts pose threats to national and global 
security are at various levels.  For instance, Obi (2004: 4) argues that Nigeria’s oil political 
economy creates space for contests among groups.  At the centre of this contest are the state 
and its opposing forces.  Obi reports that unfortunately national perception of security does 
not include environmental issues.  This, to a large extent, is the result of external-domestic 
linkages around issues of political economy of oil.  According to him, this is why the oil is 
dominated by the alliance of the state and oil companies.   As he notes, “from the foregoing, 
it is clear conceptually, within the state’s view of national security, bereft of environmental 
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considerations, lies a source of conflict” (Obi, 1997: 14). The options available for protecting 
the environment and the people in the Niger Delta would include “broadening the notion of 
national security beyond militarist and elitist perspectives, integrating environmental 
concerns into national security and promoting sustainable development.”(Obi, 1997: 15)   
 
 
Obi (1997: 14-16) provides some economic explanations to oil and environmental conflict in 
Nigeria in order to expose the extent of their domestic and external linkages.  It shows that 
dependence on oil revenues, control of the oil industry by multinational corporations, 
worsening economic conditions since the 1980s and adoption of IMF and World Bank 
prescribed structural adjustment programmes are some of the economic dimensions.  Others 
include, lack of synergy between the oil industry and other economic sectors (Dutch disease).  
As he notes: 
Oil and environmental conflict are rooted in the inequitable social relations that 
undergird the production and distribution of profits from oil, and its adverse impact on 
the fragile ecosystem of the Niger Delta.  It involves the Nigerian state and oil 
companies on one side, and the six million people of the estimated eight hundred oil 
producing communities concentrated in the seventy thousand square kilometre Niger 
Delta.  In contention is the oil-rich environment, the manner of distributing its wealth, 
and the survival of its inhabitants who depend on the ecosystem for their basic needs 
and livelihood.  The host communities contend that because the oil is mined in their 
land, and they suffer from the pollution and environmental degradation attendant to 
oil production, they have a right to adequate compensation, a clean environment, and 
a fair share of oil rents, while the state and its partners, the oil multinationals, insist on 
the optimization of rents and profits on the basis of modalities defined exclusively by 
the patronage (Obi, 1997: 16) 
 
Obi’s study also explains how oil shapes social, economic and political structures of Nigeria.  
Specifically, it shows how the federal system and its structures have been shaped by it.  He 
argues that even the Nigerian Civil War was influenced by oil politics. The federal 
government contested the attempt by the eastern regional government to control the oil 
industry.  This contest fired the resentment of ethnic minorities in   the east and southern part 
of Nigeria in favour of the federal government because they wanted to prevent the then 
eastern regional government from gaining control and ownership of the oil in their territory.  
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Therefore, they fought in that war on the side of the federal government.  No sooner than the 
war was won on the side of the federal government, than the ethnic minorities discovered that 
control of the oil had been transferred to the Federal Government.  On the external front, Obi 
explains how the  global economic down-turn, reflected in the  fall of global oil price, 
coupled with acceptance of the pill of structural economic adjustment programmes from the 
IMF and World Bank have   influenced  violent  pressures from groups in the Niger Delta 
against the Nigerian state and oil companies. 
 
 
So far, oil remains a high-profile issue in explaining conflict in the Niger Delta (Actionaid, 
2008; Omotola, 2006; Omeje, 2006; Ejobowah, 2000).   The thesis that the oil has been more 
of a curse than a blessing in the case of Nigeria is quite extensive in the literature.  A number 
of works by scholars further buttress this issue.97  For example, in a special report by 
researchers at Actionaid Nigeria (2008: 1-5), they found linkages between oil and conflict in 
the case of the Niger Delta.  It is argued in that document that conflict in the region owes 
much to the inadequate utilisation of revenues generated from oil production for the benefit 
of the people.  Of course, with $54 million and $20 billion dollars generated daily and 
annually respectively, the report regrets that the welfare of people in the Niger Delta, let 
alone other Nigerians, have not improved in any substantial way.  Instead, their socio-
economic conditions have worsened even as oil production expanded in the Niger Delta and 
became key to the national development efforts of Nigerian governments.  In fact, United 
Nations Human Development Report on the Niger Delta (2005: 33) pre-empted these findings 
by stating that living standard in the region is at a low level of 0.564 per cent.  
Unemployment in Port Harcourt – the traditional informal headquarters or centre of the oil 
business -- stands at 30 per cent.  Poverty is still highly visible in the region.  Potable 
                                               
97    From the foregoing, it is clear that since the beginning of the 1990s a great deal of scholarly effort 
has gone into exploring the relationship between oil and conflict in the Niger Delta, with many 
explaining the specific ways in which the two relate. 
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drinking water is basically absent.  As a result, water-borne diseases are common.  According 
to Actionaid Nigeria (2005: 5), this socio-economic state is partly caused by the neglect of 
the Nigerian state in alliance with oil companies.  As the report notes: 
The way SPDC exploits this preeminent position and the general conduct of other 
global oil companies not in relation to the Nigerian state, but more especially the 
communities and the environment of the Niger Delta are largely responsible for the 
unique problem of development and underdevelopment of Nigeria’s Niger Delta 
(Actionaid Nigeria, 2008: 5)98 
 
Oil pollution,  has adverse effects on fishing and farming in the rural communities of the 
Niger Delta; unemployment and lack of basic infrastructure provide credible reasons for the 
emergence of  armed groups in the region (Ukiwo 2009: 1-4).   An open coding of Ukiwo’s 
work on “Causes and Cures of Oil-related Niger Conflicts” reveals the use of concepts such 
as “tense,” “military deployment,” “internal colonialism,” “Hobbessian state of nature,” “war 
zone,” in analyses of the pattern of relationship between oil companies and the government 
(on the one hand) and local environmental movement organizations (on the other hand).  In 
fact, Ukiwo dismisses the “new political economy” perspectives to analyses of the crisis 
which some scholars have adopted by arguing that violent conflict in the Niger Delta is 
motivated by greed and not grievance.  Such an argument, according to Ukiwo, is 
‘characterised by too much of economism, too little politics and is ahistorical.’99 The conflict 
owes much to the sense of exploitation on the part of the people of the Niger Delta.  Their 
clamour for resource control is based on the competitive federal system in which control of 
natural resources has gradually moved from regions to the federal government.   At first 
(1953-1960), regions retained 100 per cent of revenues based on the principle of derivation.  
Ukiwo argues that the slashing of what regions could retain as revenue to 50 per cent in 1960 
was due to the beginning of commercial exploitation of oil.   He claims that even the states 
                                               
98    Actionaid Nigeria (2008).  Ablaze for Oil, Abuja, pp.1-79. 
99    See Ukiwo, U. (2009).  “Causes and Cures of Oil-related Niger Delta Conflicts,” Policy Notes of 
Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, pp.1-2. 
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and local governments in the Niger Delta are distant from their rural communities.  He 
reiterates that this neglect is the cause of social crisis in the region.   As convincing as these 
issues  are, very limited efforts have been made by scholars to understand the  tension in the 
Niger Delta by specifically and creatively relating the issues to failure of government and oil 
company officials to implement government oil-related environmental policy. 
 
 
By and large, the Nigerian state is seriously implicated over the mode of exploration of the 
oil and utilisation of its revenues for the improvement of citizens’ well-being (Iyayi, 2008: 3-
4).   As Iyayi notes,  
The assumptions of the Nigerian state about development derive from the nature and 
character of the state.  The roots and character of the modern Nigerian state were 
planted in the colonial state, which related to the indigenous peoples as natives, 
subjects and a conquered people to be civilised. Civilising the natives meant of course 
exploiting them and treating them with disdain, disgust and distrust; in short, as 
inferiors. Resource exploitation activities were conducted on the basis that the 
resources belonged to the colonial power and that, in any case left with or to the 
natives, they would not be able to use such resources for productive purposes. The 
managers of the modern Nigerian state not only inherited and internalized these 
attitudes; over time, they deepened and expanded them. These characteristics of the 
Nigerian state have been reproduced in a set of assumptions that it deploys in relating 
with the Niger Delta (Iyayi, 2008: 5) 
 
 Iyayi argues that the character of the Nigerian state in relation to extraction of crude oil is 
based on a number of assumptions, including the following: that crude “oil is a national 
resource that belongs to the Nigerian state rather than the Nigerian people in general or oil – 
owning communities in particular;” “agitations for resource control or change in the 
derivation formula are either politically motivated, lack merit or orchestrated by trouble 
makers and criminals;” as well as the one that promotes the use of force or military solutions 
to deal with the demands of the Niger Delta communities.100 
 
 
                                               
100 See Iyayi, F. (2008). “Niger Delta Crisis: Development and Socio-Cultural Implications,” Paper presented at 
the Forum organised by PENGASSAN at Gateway Hotel, Ijebu Ode on 17th June.  
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Boele, Fabig and Wheeler (2001: 76) earlier noted that “...cooperation between the oil 
companies and the military dictatorship was an issue that the Ogoni felt strongly about.  From 
this point of view, two malign forces were combining to pursue their own interests,” and 
quoted Ken Saro Wiwa as saying that since the Nigerian state (then military dictators) 
“depended for survival on the availability of oil money, its violence is directed at oil-
producing areas such as Ogoni...”101  From the foregoing, it appears that violent conflict 
associated with oil in the Niger Delta is partly the result of struggle for control and ownership 
of the oil.  For example, Ikelegbe (2001: 437) argues that the involvement of various groups 
in the Niger Delta conflict is driven by quest for control of the oil resource.   According to 
him, the quest by local groups from the region is the result of deep-seated anger and 
frustration over the contradiction of wealth amidst poverty in the Niger Delta.  In fact, 
Ikelegbe argues that existing and frequent outburst of  violent confrontation, ‘disruption of oil 
production, seizures of oil platforms, installations and equipment, kidnapping of MNOC staff 
and militarisation of the region,’ is the result of frustration and anger over social, economic 
and political conditions of youths in the region.  He then clearly shows how the conflict is 
about struggle for benefits from oil.  As he notes: 
Oil based state-community, state-civil society, civil society/community-MNOC 
conflicts have emerged as the most serious threat to Nigeria and its new democracy.  
But more importantly, the conflict is a major contestation at two levels.  First, it is a 
challenge by civil groups and communities in the ND over the control and the 
distribution of its benefits among the constituent units of the nation.  Second it is a 
challenge to the state and its multinational partners of policies and practices that 
disadvantage the region, destroy its environment and impoverish its people (Ikelegbe 
2001: 438) 
 
From the review of Ikelegbe’s work, the key element in explaining the conflict is the oil, 
particularly its mode of exploitation, distribution and revenues.  The perception by Niger 
Deltans that they are denied access to power and control of the oil by the dominant ethnic 
                                               
101    See Boele, R. Fabig, H. and Wheeler, D. (2001). “Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni. A study in 
unsustainable development: the story of Shell, Nigerian and the Ogoni people-environment, economy, 
relationships, conflict and prospects for resolution,” Sustainable Development, Vol. 9, 74-86. 
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groups in Nigeria is the core grievance  in the conflict.  It would then appear that frustration 
resulting from these issues plays a substantial role in defining the response pattern of the 
people from the region.  This, according to Ikelegbe, is in spite of the fact that the initial 
response of communities from the Niger Delta was basically non-violent (writing of 
petitions) led by traditional rulers, and opinion leaders.  These strategies were ineffective.  
The struggle was also compromised by some of the opinion leaders, while the government 




In a manner akin to the above arguments, Ejoboweh (2000: 30-31) frames his response to the 
conflict by simply asking the question, “who owns the oil... in the Niger Delta of Nigeria?”   
Here again, the crisis in the region is portrayed as a mere struggle for control of the oil.  
Furthermore, he argues that the conflict is the result of conflicting claims of ownership of the 
oil resource by the Nigerian state and ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta.  Ejoboweh (2000: 
30)102 evaluates the grounds for these conflicting claims and rejects the sovereignty argument 
that since Nigeria belongs to all, resources found in it should also belong to all.  This also 
forms the basis of the Niger Delta Question.103  Indeed, claims of sovereignty rights to the oil 
resource by the Nigerian state dates back to the pre-independence era.  To frame the present 
conflict in the region in terms of struggle to control the oil as of right on the part of the 
Nigerian state is understandable, given the type and character of state inherited from 
colonialism.  However, the researcher reasons that though extensively reflected in the 
literature, the logic of the argument of conflicting claims to the oil resource is limited to the 
period when oil became an important national commodity for development in Nigeria. 
                                               
102  See Ejoboweh, J.B.  (2000). “Who Owns the Oil? The Politics of Ethnicity in the Niger Delta of 
Nigeria” Africa Today Vol. 47, No.1, Winter, p.31. 
103  The Niger Delta Question is prominent in the literature.  It means conflict in the Niger Delta, 
being the result of federal government’s control of the oil resource and distribution of its revenues 
among the three levels of government -- federal, state and local governments. It is the challenge of 
this structure where ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta are constitutionally excluded from control of 
the oil resource and distribution of its revenues (Ejoboweh, 2000:30). 
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Besides, it is difficult to properly analyse conflict in the Niger Delta by reducing the conflict 
to mere struggle for the oil resource.  If at all, oil plays such extensive role, it needs to be 
situated within the context of politics or political economy of its extraction.  In any case,   
single factor of need to control the oil does not seem to be sufficient motivation for the level 
of violence among the parties in conflict in the region.   
  
 
As can be seen from the foregoing, oil is highlighted in the literature on conflict in the Niger 
Delta, its contribution especially to the resource-war argument.  This does not in any way 
undermine a number of issues outside oil such as the struggle for control of farmlands and 
chieftaincy stool in explaining some inter-community or intra-community conflicts in the 
region as in the case of Okrika after the death of S.P.U Ogan in 2000.104  However, the 
researcher notes that the subject of oil deserves more systematic investigation.   In fact, 
scholars have paid limited attention to the need to explore emerging related issues of whether 
or not implementation of objectives of national environmental policy might influence 
violence in the Niger Delta.  This work attempts to fill that gap.  
 
 
Ejoboweh notes that claims of ownership of the oil by ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta is 
in part the result of abandonment of the derivation principle105 which Nigeria practiced when 
oil became  important for foreign exchange earning  and income  for the federal government.  
A second reason, according to Ejoboweh, is the creation of more local and state governments 
in the northern part of Nigeria.  By having more of these states and local governments, these 
                                               
104 Ogan was the Amayanabo of Okrika -- traditional stool of the Okrika people of Rivers State. 
105 This principle as explained elsewhere in this study means the practice of distribution of national 
revenues based on their states of derivation.  This means that states received shares of the revenues 
based on their contribution to the national purse.  Nevertheless, the emergence of   oil as an important 
commodity for national development in Nigeria changed the practice.  Derivation was eventually 
abandoned even as more states and local governments were created in the country with the result that 
the Niger Delta has numbers numerically inferior to any of the other regions -- north, east and west.  
Since revenues generated from the oil are distributed on the basis of states and local governments, 
regions with more of these states and local governments eventually receive more of the revenue. In 
all, the Niger Delta people claim to be at a disadvantage. 
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ethnic groups have had more shares of revenues accruing from oil production.  Poverty, 
unemployment and fear of depletion of the oil   are some of the reasons offered in 
Ejoboweh’s work in justification of claims to control of the oil resource by ethnic minorities 
in the Niger Delta.  In fact, reference is often made to Oloibiri where oil was first discovered 
in 1956.  Today, that village106 is without electricity, drinking water, roads, hospitals, or good 
primary or secondary schools. The village has been abandoned without development after 
many years of oil extraction.  This experience and similar cases in the region such as that in 
the Ogoni communities seem to have prompted more scholars to tow the same line of 
argument in their attempt to explain the conflict in the region.  In fact, Watts (2003: 5089-
5099) advances a similar argument by presenting the quest for benefits from oil as the basis 
of claims to its ownership by competing groups in the Niger Delta, including the Nigerian 
state.  As he notes, “petroleum in the Nigerian context has produced a combustible politics 
marked by violence” (Watts, 2003: 5089).  It is suggested in the literature that the story of oil 
is the story of regular “chronicle of naked aggression, genocide and violent law of the 
corporate frontier” (Watts, 2003: 5089).  Again, Watts argues that with over $400 billion 
revenues generated from production of oil over a period of four decades, social and economic 
conditions of people from the Niger Delta ought to be better.  Corruption plays a vital role in 
widening the gap between poor Nigerians who are increasingly unable to meet their basic 
needs of food, security and shelter and the political class.  Worse, as Watts notes, is the 
deteriorating living conditions of people from the Niger Delta due basically to environmental 
degradation caused by oil companies and poor utilisation of oil revenues for the welfare of 
citizens.  This paradox -- linkage of oil wealth and poverty -- has remained a key element of 
the foregoing discussion regarding the role of oil in the conflict.  What is less understood is 
how compliance or failure to comply with national oil related environmental policies by oil 
                                               
106    Now in Bayelsa state. 
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companies engender these socio-economic and environmental conditions of poverty and 
damage to the environment in the Niger Delta.  This study recognizes this gap and attempts to 




Watts107 adds credence to the resource curse thesis regarding the case of the Niger Delta 
(also see Collier and Hoeffler, 2005; Ross, 2001: 357; Leite and Weidemann, 1999: 29; 
Homer-Dixon, 1999: 11).108  Between the 11th and 13th of March, 2008, the first ever 
international conference on the Nigerian state, oil industry and the Niger Delta was held in 
the Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, Bayelsa State.  All ninety-six 
papers presented at the conference by scholars emphasized the role of the oil sector in the 
conflict in the Niger Delta.  More than half of the papers also highlighted the character of the 
Nigerian state in relation to oil and environment-related conflict in the region.  The clear 
message is that oil is a curse in Nigeria.  The danger in this type of deterministic posture 
among scholars is the risk of promoting some sort of cause/effect relationship between oil 
and conflict and neglecting any intervening variables or expansion of the scope of alternative 
explanations generated through scientific and systematic research.   For example, concerning 
the Nigerian state, Okaba (2008: 21-39)109 argues that the state is not neutral even as it is 
often perceived to be an instrument of domination by dominant groups in the country.  
Instead, the Nigerian state’s dependence on the oil sector for its economic and political 
survival has made the state rather violent on issues of oil and environmental conflicts with 
                                               
107    See Watts, M. (2003). “Economics of Violence: More Oil More Blood” Economic and Political 
Weekly, Vol.38, No.48, November 29-December 5, pp.5089-5099. 
 
108    For details see  Leite, C. and  Weidmann, D. (1999). “Does Mother Nature Corrupt?” IMF 
Working Paper, IMF, Washington DC; Homer-Dixon, T. (1999). Environment, Scarcity and 
Violence, Princeton University Press, Princeton; Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2005). “Resource Rents, 
Governance, and Conflict,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.49. No.4, pp. 625-633. 
 
109  See Okaba, B. (2008). “Petrodollar, The Nigerian State and the Crisis of Development in the 
Niger Delta Region: Trends, Challenges and the Way Forward” proceedings of conference on The 
Nigerian State , Oil Industry and the Niger Delta, Department of Political Science, Niger Delta 
University, Bayelsa State,  March 11-13 
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oil-producing communities in the Niger Delta.  According to him ‘generally the trend and 
pattern of the petrodollar state of Nigeria is that it stifles development and struggles to 
maintain control of the flow of the petrodollar.’  Edeogu (2008: 64-80) supports this 
argument by insisting that conflict in the Niger Delta is the result of contest for control of the 
oil in which the Nigerian state is an interested party.110  For Okowa (2008: 81-106)111 anger 
against the Nigerian state by local groups in the Niger Delta is legitimate and is due to 
frustration and poverty resulting from unethical management of the oil resource by the state 
and oil companies.   According to him, although the Nigerian state is supposed to be 
developmental, forces associated with interest in the oil business in Nigeria have made the 
state unable to perform that role.   Such interests have in essence captured the state, making it 
less autonomous to play any significant development role.  As he notes “the state in post-
colonial Africa, including Nigeria, has limited autonomy.”   Concerning the Nigerian state, 
oil sector and conflict in the Niger Delta, Ikelegbe (2008: 109) emphasizes that the Nigerian 
state and oil companies are to blame, to a large extent, for the current instability, insecurity, 
conflict, violence, crime, social tension and poverty in the region.   As he notes: 
The oil economy has disinherited and dislocated the local people who are dependent 
on the primary economies of farming, fishing and hunting. Besides, the region has 
been laid prostrate by massive oil based environmental degradation as a regime of 
massive oil spillages and gas flares have destroyed or devastated enormous land and 
water which has led to soil fertility loss, agricultural decline, forest loss, fisheries 
decline and biodiversity depletion...The Niger Delta region is today enmeshed in  
violent conflicts over oil.112 
 
                                               
110 See Edeogu, C.F.O. (2008). “Peacebuilding Strategies for Peace in the Niger Delta: A 
Comprehensive Four Phased Peace Model,” Proceedings of conference on The Nigerian State , Oil 
Industry and the Niger Delta, Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, Bayelsa State,  
March 11-13, pp.64-79. 
 
111 Okowa, W.J. (2008). “Oil, the Nigerian State and the Development Possibilities of the Niger 
Delta,” Proceedings of conference on The Nigerian State , Oil Industry and the Niger Delta, 
Department of Political Science, Niger Delta University, Bayelsa State,  March 11-13, pp.81-91. 
 
 
112 See Ikelegbe, A.O. (2008: 110). 
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In a similar vein, Thomas (2008: 275)113 focuses on how decay of the Nigerian state caused 
by external forces in search of oil is responsible for the current state of insecurity and conflict 
in the Niger Delta. According to him, oil and environment related violent conflicts in the 
region are reflections of failure of the Nigerian state regarding the performance of its 
traditional responsibilities towards citizens, especially, from the Niger Delta where Nigeria’s 
oil is mined.   As he notes: 
State failure connotes the lack or loss of capacity of the state to establish, execute and 
sustain its fundamental inherent and constitutional responsibilities of ensuring a 
secured people and its territory for sustainable development within a regulated 
society.  Capacity is used to mean the outputs of the state and the extent to which the 
state can affect the rest of society and economy.  It is thus related with governmental 
performances, particularly the magnitude, scope, and scale of political and 
governmental performances and the conditions that affect such performance114 
 
 
  As can be seen, the resource curse argument is highlighted in literature.115  But the effort is 
not satisfactory.  The literature shows insufficient attention by scholars to the critical 
elements that account for failure of government to implement environmental policy as an 
important factor in understanding conflict in the Niger Delta.  It fails to pose questions that 
creatively capture some of the questions posed in this research.   Certainly, this study makes 




Nevertheless, from the foregoing, impressive arguments have been made concerning conflict 
in the Niger Delta from the point of view of the natural resource curse thesis.  Clearly, in this 
                                               
113 See Thomas, A.N. (2008). “State Failure and Insecurity in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria,” 
Proceedings of conference on The Nigerian State , Oil Industry and the Niger Delta, Department of 
Political Science, Niger Delta University, Bayelsa State,  March 11-13, pp.275. 
114 Ibid.p.276 
 
115 Besides scholars who have written on the subject, some politicians also believe that the oil 
resource is a curse and blessing to Nigerians.  For example, Rilwan Lukwan (former and present 
Minister for Petroleum in Nigeria) once described the oil as a “curse and a blessing.” (Cited by Agagu 
and Adu 2008: 238). See Agagu, A.A. and  Adu, F. (2008) Problems and Effects of Oil Industry on 
the Niger Delta: Matters Arising,” proceedings of conference on The Nigerian State , Oil Industry and 





case (Niger Delta), resource abundance (oil), is said to have: rentier effects (discouragement 
of taxation, pressure for democracy and good governance); conflict effects (social, economic 
and political conditions that lead to violent conflicts): and repression effects (repressive 
tendencies of the Nigerian state).  These effects have been well highlighted in the literature 
reviewed.   Unfortunately, most of the analyses fail to adequately pose questions that include 
the what, how and extent of relationship between failure of the Nigerian state to implement 
its national policy on the environment and conflict in the region.   Our study attempts to fill 
this gap.  
 
 
 At any rate, our assumption that violence in the Niger Delta is caused by  failure of the 
government to implement its national environmental policy  is partly driven by the need to 
understand the conflict,  by exploring the specific  linkages between oil production and 
environmental policy implementation by the government.    This is something missing in 
most of the works on conflict in the Niger Delta as well as generally from the perspective of 
the resource curse thesis.   For example, Watts notes in the case of Nembe in Bayelsa State, 
that the structure of oil related conflict is that of struggle among various factions for control 
of benefits from the oil.  This struggle plays out at different levels even as it is seen in the 
conflict between youths and chiefs in Nembe (see for example, Watts, 2003:5093; Kemedi, 
2002: 5)116 
 
  Given the near general impression  in the literature that oil companies cause damages to the 
environment in the Niger Delta, and for the fact that there are existing national environmental 
policies meant to achieve sustainable oil exploration, the effort made by scholars in 
explaining conflict in the Niger Delta, cannot be said to meet expectation.    Many of these 
works fail to adequately and systematically capture specifically how failure of the 
                                               





government to implement its environmental policy might contribute to the violence in the 
Niger Delta.  This study attempts to make that contribution.  
 
 
The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violation in Nigeria’s Oil 
Producing Communities, published by Human Rights Watch in 1999117 extensively addresses 
the oil resource curse thesis from various socio-economic, political, cultural and human 
rights perspectives.  For example, the document focuses on the ways in which the oil business 
violates the human rights of the people from the Niger Delta.  These rights, which include 
social, economic, cultural, environmental and political rights,   form the basis of agitations 
and protest and eventual emergence of violent resistance of groups in the region.  The 
document remains one of the most comprehensive in addressing the issue of human rights 
violation in relation to the oil sector.  In fact, the document contains research report on how 
oil has shaped politics and policy in Nigeria.  For instance, oil is noted to have shaped the 
structure of federalism in Nigeria.  As it argues “conflict in the Niger Delta is directly related 
to the debates, ongoing since independence, about the structure of the Nigerian polity.”  So 
far, the problem with these and related arguments around the subject of oil and conflict in the 
Niger Delta is their tendency to be drawn into every analysis of conflict in the region.  As it 
stands, nearly all conflicts in the region are seen as oil and environment related.  This is a 
dangerous trend which promotes bias in research.   The truth is that oil has already assumed 
an important factor in explaining conflict in the region but caution is required to give room 
for a sustained and more systematic exploration of related variables such as the ones 
examined in this study.  This is also to enable us understand and draw the needed distinction 
between trigger factors and root causes of the conflict.  In fact, dwelling on oil and related 
issues in explaining the conflict points to questions of socio-economic factors raised in this 
                                               
117    See Human Rights Watch (1999). The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights 
Violation in Nigeria’s Oil Producing Communities, Washington DC: HRW, pp3-5. 
109 
 
study; in order to help our understanding of the dynamics of the conflict, these questions are 
not clearly interfaced with ones related to implementation of environmental policy by oil 
companies and the government.   Even when efforts made by scholars such as Omeje (2005: 
321); Omotola (2006:1-4) and Ibeanu (2002:1-6) come very close to these questions in fairly 
comprehensive ways, it remains to be seen what   efforts have been made by these scholars to 
explore scientifically how public environmental policy issues of implementation correlate 
with factors that generate conditions conducive to violent conflict in the Niger Delta.   Our 
study helps to fill this gap by exploring the issues comprehensively with the mind that 
sustainable development is a goal embedded in Nigeria’s national environmental policy with 
potential to either stem or encourage violent conflict in the region. 
 
 
To understand how oil shapes violence of the Nigerian state, Turner (1985:167) identified 
early enough in the history of the conflict in the Niger Delta, the nature of linkages between 
the interests of the Nigerian state and oil companies.  He situates this alliance between local 
political, business and military elite classes as dominant forces and the oil companies in the 
conflict.  Still, oil is the identified underlying factor of interests for this alliance.  While this is 
commendable, the effort is still predominantly formative and embryonic and yet to advance 
massively through good practice in social science research.  Besides, these questions of 
socio-economic interests in explaining the conflict require sustained creative probing, 
especially in understanding the dynamics of the conflict regarding underlying motivations on 
the part of the parties in conflict.   For instance, Turner118 utilises the ‘triple alliance’ 
theory119 associated with Andre Gunder Frank and Peter Evans (cited by Omeje, 2005:322) in 
                                               
118    SeeTurner, T. (1985). “Commercial Capitalism and the 1975 Coup” in Panter-Brick, K. (ed) 
Soldiers and Oil: The Political Transformation of Nigeria,  London: Frank Cass, pp.167-68. 
 
119   The ‘tripple alliance’ theory sees the state in the developing world as a ‘captured state’ without 
any choice other than to protect the interest of foreign capital or its captors.  In the Nigerian case, 
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her analysis of conflict over oil resources in Nigeria.  In the words of Omeje “state managers 
and politicians operate within a state that is primarily charged with promoting activities, 
policies and legislation essential to sustaining the profitability of transnational investments 
and markets.” (Omeje, 2005:322).   He further argues that in the process of satisfying or 
protecting international capital, local elites-managers of the state such as politicians and 
bureaucrats- are able to serve their own interests through massive corruption.  It is then very 
difficult for public welfare to come into the picture of development since their interest is 
sacrificed at the altar of international capital and those of local elite.  By inference, policy 
making and good governance are negatively affected by the pursuit of the alliance of 
international capital and local elite.  As a result, as Omeje puts it, “the populace becomes 
progressively impoverished and restive in the face of the callous contrivances of what Evans 
calls the ‘predatory’ state” (Omeje, 2003:327). 
 
 
By and large, according to Omeje, the contending issues in the conflict in the Niger Delta are 
basically institutional, ecological and social in character.   His principal point in connecting to 
the argument on oil and environment related conflict in the Niger Delta is that, “...although 
the TNOCs are clearly crucial to Nigeria’s oil politics, the Nigerian state primarily privileges 
itself in the making of oil legislation and oil policies.”  It would then appear that the Nigerian 
state and those of oil companies are integrated, forming some sort of alliance for the purpose 
of ensuring sustained income and profit from the oil.  In all, the idea of alliance of oil 
companies and the Nigerian state raised in the literature points to how the relationship 
between oil companies and the Nigerian state is understood.   This perception of the 
relationship (alliance) between the Nigerian state and oil companies deserves more attention 
in understanding the motivation for actions on the part of key actors in conflict in the Niger 
                                                                                                                                                  
investments in the oil sector and prescriptions of the global financial institutions are part of this 
international capital complex. 
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Delta.120  In fact, Omeje identifies three perspectives to this relationship (oil industry-state 
relations in Nigeria).  As he notes, “in the mind and reckoning of a large section of the local 
people, there is hardly any distinction between the oil industry and the state. The two are 
perceived as one and the same thing.” (Omeje, 2003:325).  Already this view has become 
controversial since there is hardly any agreement on any monolithic explanation to the 
conflict.  For example, coincidentalists and pacifists disagree over such notions of alliance of 
the Nigerian state and oil companies.  The two words were coined by Omeje to portray, first, 
an argument that opposes the idea of alliance of oil companies and the Nigerian state.  Rather, 
what exists is mere coincidence of business interests of the duo.  The relationship is therefore 
seen to be based on rational, mutual interest.  According to Omeje, the pacifist is a 
conglomeration of local elite -- chiefs, contractors, youth leaders and other opinion leaders -- 
who believe that oil companies are more dependable than the Nigerian state.  As such, what is 
required is not violence against them but some sort of constructive engagement with them in 
order to bring about regimes that allow for development with revenues from the oil resource 
(Omeje, 2005:329).  Omeje himself argues further that the response of the Nigerian state on 
the side of oil companies in the conflict should not necessarily amount to alliance with the oil 
companies.  What matters to him is the power dynamics.  Again, the historical and colonial 
root of violence of the state in response to domestic threat to its security should be understood 
in the context of Nigeria.  By contrast, Frynas’ (2001:54) earlier work discusses the “triple 
alliance” theory in conflict in the region.  She argues that oil producing village communities 
in Nigeria have less closer relationship than state officials do with oil companies in Nigeria.  
Part of the evidence is seen in the way government incorporates former staff of oil companies 
                                               
120    This study recognises that understanding how local environmental groups perceive this 
relationship between oil companies and the Nigerian state is important for also understanding conflict 
in the Niger Delta.   Accordingly, a key research question for the study is identifying and explaining 
the pattern of relationship among the actors in conflict.  This is a gap that is visible in the literature, 
especially in relation to the compliance level by oil companies to government environmental policy.   
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into government by extending political appointments to them.  For example, the former 
Group Managing Director of NNPC, Mr. Funsho Kupolokun worked briefly for SPDC 
previously and also served as Special Assistant on Petroleum Matters (1999-2003) to 
President Olusegun Obasanjo.  As Frynas argues, this could not have been a mere 
coincidence.  Instead, it portrays the underlying cordiality or alliance in relationship between 
oil companies and the Nigerian state.  Omeje’s (2005:331) subsequent submission is that the 
‘triple alliance’ theory requires further research for which this study attempts to make a 
contribution.  He argues that the issue of interest of the Nigerian state is secondary in the oil 
conflict in the Niger Delta but contradicts himself by saying that: 
 
Primarily preoccupied with how to maximise oil rents and patrimonial accumulation, 
the state is hardly concerned with any serious way by issues of sustainable 
development and environmental justice.  Indeed, the failure of the state in these areas 
has created a palpable gap, which local non-governmental organisations... aim to fill.  
In the face of protracted grievances of neglect and injustice, compounded by the 
inability of the rentier state to make significant sacrifices to uplift the Niger Delta 
region, the oil-bearing communities are compelled to resort increasingly to the use of 
violence (Omeje, 2005:332). 
 
 Being a key aspect of this study, it is imperative to probe further the relevance of 
assumptions of the “triple alliance” theory in the discourse of oil and conflict with the aim of 
understanding its role in engendering violence by local environmental groups in the Niger 
Delta.   
 
 
Omeje’s submission is contradictory.  Arguing that the issue of interest is secondary and at 
the same time acknowledging that oil politics is at the centre of conflict in the Niger Delta 
spells a need to interrogate some of the contending issues around the conflict.  This study 
attempts to fill the gap by exploring the pattern and socio-economic interests that define 
relationships between local environmental groups on the one hand and the oil companies and 





Apparently, much of the literature on conflict in the Niger Delta between local oil-producing 
communities on the one hand and oil companies and government on the other hand dwell 
extensively on the  environmental, political and human rights outcomes of oil exploration and 
production in Nigeria.  Clearly, these issues are so intertwined with respect to the Niger-Delta 
that they cannot be separated meaningfully in a study of this sort.     As identified in the 
literature and discussed here, it would appear that these issues are interspersed in the three 
thematic sections.  In essence, the issues are so interconnected so far as oil, the character of 
the Nigerian state, environment and development are key to understanding conflict in the 
region.  It is therefore apposite that the individual issues appear and reappear in different 
sections in the specific theme of discussion for this section of the work. 
 
 
The role of the character of the Nigerian state in explaining oil and environment related 
conflict in the Niger Delta is serious enough to continue to attract more scholarly works on 
the issue.  For example, Omeje (2004:425) argues that the central concern of the Nigerian 
state regarding the management of oil and environment-related conflicts in the Niger Delta is 
to maximise oil revenues.  Again, this leans on the notion of socio-economic interests and the 
patterns of relationship among key actors in the conflict over implementation of pertinent 
environmental policies in the Niger Delta.  It requires more research attention in this study.  
For Oyovbaire (2007:1-3), the Nigerian state faces the crisis of governance.  He concludes his 
research by saying that the Nigerian state is fragile and unable to deliver development to 
citizens.  On the matter of crisis in the Niger Delta, he notes:  
It is our view that the structures of political participation should be cultivated and 
enhanced in the Niger Delta. We have in mind, the establishment or creation of at 
least, one new state together with a number of local governments as units and 
platforms of political inclusiveness. The area deserves to have adequate units for 
meaningful participation in politics and governance. There is of course the need to 
review the critical contents of fiscal federalism so as to assuage the deep sense of 
injustice.  Ownership and control of natural resources and of public finance should be 
redefined and restructured. There has been heightened articulation of demands yet 
without appropriate response to eliminate existing laws and regulations which are 
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detrimental to the regulation of the oil and gas industry including such laws as the 
Land Use Act and Revenue Allocation Act.121 
 
 
In a similar vein, Bach (2004:1-6) describes Nigeria as a country without a state, for reasons 
related to failure of state structures to provide good governance.  He argues that the control of 
the state by the political elite from a single geo-ethnic group is detrimental to the unity of 
Nigeria.  In the context of the failed state122 argument (Huria, 2008: 2; Wyler, 2007:3),123 the 
Nigerian state is accused of being imperial in origin.  Consequently, analyses of the Nigerian 
state have been done by some scholars from the perspective of historical antecedents and 
their influences on the state-making process.  For example, Nwosu (2008:10)124 notes in his 
research that the state-making process in Nigeria is characterised by “primitive and central 
state power accumulation.”  According to him, the process involves expansion and 
consolidation of Nigeria’s territory, politics, economy, culture and social life under the 
influence of external forces driven first, by Britain and later in the post-colonial state, by a 
combination of external forces.  Nwosu is of the view that the state-making process in 
Nigeria is faulty, was externally masterminded and has put serious questions on nation-
building.  Therefore, to a large extent, crisis in the Niger Delta today represents in part, 
                                               
121   See Oyovbaire, S.E.  (2007). “The Crisis of Governance in Nigeria,” being a lecture delivered on 
the occasion of 23rd Convocation Ceremony of the University of Port Harcourt, Rivers State on the 
15th of March, pp.1-2. 
 
122 It has also been used by scholars to explain causes of conflict in the developing countries.  It is 
further explained later in this chapter. 
 
123     Several scholars have identified Nigeria as a fragile or failed state.  According to Huria there is 
no definite definition for a failing state but all countries so classified are characterised by risk of 
violent conflict with the result of collapse of state structures or their weakness and ineffectuality; 
legitimacy crisis and inability to provide basic services to citizens.  As Wyler notes, such countries “ 
can also be hampered by poor governance, corruption...and may lack effective control of their 
territory, military, or law enforcement...”123  See Wyler, L.S. (2007). “Weak and Failing States: 
Evolving Security Threats and US Policy,” CRS Report for Congress; Huria, S. (2008) “Failing and 
Failed States: The Global Discourse,” IPCS Issue Brief, No.75, July, pp.1-4. 
 
124   See Nwosu, S. (2008). “Civil Disobedience and Social Change: A Synopsis of Niger Delta 
Resistance,” paper presented at a workshop on Nonviolence and Social Change in Nigeria, organised 
by Social Action and Centre for Global Non-violence Nigeria, 3-4 December. 
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negative consequences of a state -making process that is both externally (global economic 




 Similarly, Omeje argues that one of the characteristics of the post-colonial state of Nigeria is 
“the structural coexistence and friction between the ‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ in the cultural, 
social, economic, legal and political frameworks of society.” (Omeje, 2004:425-440).  
According to him,  the post-colonial state’s many social, economic, political, cultural and 
political contradictions are far from being settled because of  the forces of ‘old’ (metropolitan 
forces)  and  ‘new’(post-colonial elites) in terms of their interests.  Nothing else attracts these 
forces for control of state power than the fact that oil feeds the state125 fat.  Clearly, this sends 
the message that the process of state-making or formation is not finished in Nigeria.  This is 
perhaps why some scholars have continued to describe Nigeria as a rentier state.   As Omeje 
notes, being a rentier state, Nigeria is  
largely dependent on oil mining rents, taxes and royalties paid by ‘transnational oil 
companies’ (TNOCs), and on profits from its equity stakes in the TNOCs’ 
investments.  With oil as the mainstay of the economy, oil interests, including, of 
course, control of the accruable revenues, have become part of the defining 
characteristics of the dominant elite forces in the state.  The state itself is ...dominated 
by an unstable coalition of some ethnic majority elites whose geographical homelands 
have little or no oil reserves.  Perceptibly, the dominance of the latter is largely to the 
disadvantage of the ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta area where the bulk of 
Nigeria’s oil resources are produced.  Terisa Turne... has used the concept of a 
‘commercial triangle’ to depict these dominant elite forces which she conceptualises 
as a nexus between the TNOCs and ‘compradors,’ and the state officials.  Both the 
compradors and the state officials rely heavily on the state’s oil revenues to ultimately 
fund and reproduce their societal dominance through highly unproductive 
contrivances, including spurious and inflated contracts and imports, barefaced looting, 
that impede both economic growth and political stability.126 
 
Omeje sees the Nigerian state as being unpopular and threatened domestically for its failure 
to deliver development to citizens, and for its parochial interest and practise of alienation of 
                                               
125    In the sense of a state that has been privatised. 
 
126  Omeje, K. (2004).  “The State, Conflict and Evolving Politics in the Niger Delta, Nigeria,” 
Review of African Political Economy, Vol.3l, No. 101, September, p.428. 
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citizens.  In short, he insists that the Nigerian state lacks autonomy from the influence of the 
political elite.  This corroborates Ukiwo’s argument that: 
 
It is difficult to separate the (Nigerian) government from the state, much less the 
personalities.  Thus the style of the leader robs off on the state.  The authoritarian 
governance of the present power brokers has led to the personification of the state.  
Soldiers sent on routine duties are described as an army of occupation and treated as 





 Some scholars have argued that because the Nigerian government does not seem able or 
willing to protect the environment in the region, community groups have resorted to 
confrontational strategies (See for example, Alapiki, 2004: 233).  They have also argued that 
environmental degradation in the region is basically man-made, with oil companies 
contributing the greatest amount. Consequently, oil companies and the oil-bearing 
communities have been entangled in intense and increasingly violent conflict (Omeje, 2006: 
477; Alapiki, 2004: 233).  There exists an obvious gap with regard to the systematic 
explanation of how environmental problems actually contribute to violent conflict in the case 
of the Niger Delta.   Some scholars have actually questioned this direct link between 
degradation of the environment and violent conflict.  Instead, they argue that128 the social and 
economic conditions that environmental degradation creates lead to violence (Homer-Dixon, 
2003: 89-96).   This model of analysis has received scant attention in the case of the Niger 
Delta.  This study seeks to fill that gap.  It seeks to examine how, and to what extent, 
environmental problems that the Nigerian government has failed to check or address through 
the implementation of pertinent oil related environmental policies, lead directly or indirectly 
to social and economic conditions that cause violence. 
 
 
Local environmental groups often articulate environmental protection in the Niger Delta with 
                                               
127 See Ukiwo, U. (2003). “Politics, Ethno-Religious Conflicts and Democratic Consolidation in 
Nigeria,’ Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.41, No. 1, pp.115-138. 
 
128     Refer to arguments of the Toronto School led by Homer-Dixon. 
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demands for development.  Indeed, as Van Der Heidjen (1997: 25) notes, this follows the 
trend in the Third World where environmental groups rarely campaign for protection of the 
environment alone.129 The implication for this study is that the hypothetical causal link 
between violence and the implementation of government environmental policy might require 
looking at how environmental damage caused by oil companies and the failure of the 
government to check it through effective implementation of pertinent policies combine to 
create social, economic, political and cultural problems for local communities, leading 
directly or indirectly to violence.  This also brings into focus in this study the issue of 
motivation for the violence in the Niger Delta.130  
 
 
The literature highlights failure of the government to effectively implement its environmental 
policies.  One aspect tends to link this failure to corruption and the nature of political 
institutions.  Geriagh and Pallegrini (2006: 332), for example, have argued that improvement 
in the quality of the environment is less probable in developing countries because of the 
palpable weakness of their governmental institutions and corruption-infested economies.  
Logically, weak and corrupt governmental institutions are less likely to enforce 
environmental policies.  This study examines the case of relevant oil related environmental 
policies and institutions and how they connect with conditions that lead to violence in the 
Niger Delta.  
 
                                               
129 Homer-Dixon (2003: 22) has argued that environmental problems always join with other 
economic, political and social factors to produce the effects that cause violence. 
 
130 The issue of motivation for violence has been framed with assumptions from the greed and 
grievance theory by some scholars.  One such assumption is that violence, war or rebellion may either 
be the result of greed or grievance such as inequality, injustice, environmental degradation and the 
like.  A systematic examination of the case of the Niger Delta is lacking especially since separation of 
criminal violence and legitimate grievance has become difficult with the rampant incidence of 
kidnapping of oil workers and children of rich Nigerians in the Niger Delta for ransom by members of 
armed groups who at the same time claim to have legitimate grievances against the government and 
oil companies in   the region. 
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Related to this argument is the inference that the emergence of resistance by groups in the oil-
rich region is partly the result of inadequate representation and faulty fiscal regimes of people 
from the Niger Delta.  The perceptions of groups in the region on prospects of representation 
of their interest by state institutions have been captured in the literature.  For example, 
Okeke-Uzodike and Allen’s (2005:1-43) study affords some clarification on how federalism 
in Nigeria has been undermined by under representation of ethnic minorities and unequal 
fiscal regimes.  Why is the Nigerian federal system characterised by under representation and 
fiscal imbalance?  To answer this question, Okeke-Uzodike and Allen explain that political 
under representation and fiscal imbalance do not only degrade federalism and democracy but 
serve the interests of the majority ethnic groups.  They argue that unequal fiscal regimes tend 
to generate ethnic minority resistance in federations with multi-ethnic groups. 
 
 
One striking feature of publications reviewed shows that analyses specific to the relationship 
between implementation of environmental policies meant to achieve sustainable 
development131 in the Niger Delta has been given limited attention by scholars.  Besides, such 
analyses have failed to adequately and systematically capture the dynamics of violence in the 
region within the context of predisposing factors to the choice of violent strategies on the part 
of both the government and the local environmental groups in the resolution of the conflict.  
This obvious lapse speaks volumes of the relative newness of the concept of sustainable 
development itself, and in explaining the implementation of environmental policy within the 
broad framework of sustainable development, and violence in the case of the Niger Delta.   It 
also goes a long way to explain the lack of systematic evaluation of the implementation of 
                                               
131   The terminology, sustainable development was popularised by what is today referred to as the 
Brundland Report of 1987. The United Nations General Assembly created the World Commission on 
Environment and Development in 1983 as a global institutional response to the growing concerns 
about degradation of the environment and economic crisis. Gro Harlem Brundland, then Prime 
Minister of Norway, chaired the commission and made wide consultations for four years. The 
Commission finally produced its report in 1987, Our Common Future, now commonly referred to as 
the Brundland Report. 
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sustainable development through pertinent oil related policies in the region.   
 
So far, violence in the Niger Delta has been explained variously by scholars using  socio-
economic and environmental factors and the inability of the state to respond properly to their 
negative effects on local populations (Ojakorotu and Okeke-Uzodike, 2006: 86-88; Alapiki, 
2004: 233-247; Omeje, 2004: 425-440; Bach, 2004: 1-6).132  However, no systematic study of 
the conflict has yet proven adequate.  As such, this study adds to the dominant themes in the 
literature an important dimension of how the failure of the government to implement or 
enforce its national environmental policies relates with social, political and economic 
conditions that lead to violence.  It also makes a modest contribution towards developing an 
explanation to the crisis in the region based on related issues emerging from questions posed 





This review of literature proceeded on three thematic areas of sustainable development, 
environmental policy implementation and conflict in the Niger Delta.  The effort yielded 
results of gaps, first, in the inadequate conceptualisation or understanding of sustainable 
development by key actors in the conflict.  Sustainable development is a key goal of oil-
related government environmental policy for which compliance by target groups such as the 
oil companies should help to achieve.  This (inadequate conceptualisation and understanding) 
has been the result of lack of sufficient academic attention to the subject just as most of the 
works reviewed focus on the role that oil companies play in the socio-economic, political and 
                                               
132  See Omeje, K. (2004) “The State, Conflict and Evolving Politics in the Niger Delta, Nigeria,” 
Review of African Political Economy, N0. 1,Vol. 101, pp424-440; Bach, D.C. (2004) “Nigeria: 
Towards a country without a state,” paper delivered at the conference on Nigeria : Maximizing Pro-
Poor Growth: Regenerating the Socio-Economic Database, organized by Overseas Development 
Institute in collaboration with Nigeria Economic Summit Group, London, 16-17 June 2004. 
120 
 
environmental conditions of the Niger Delta but fail to relate systematically these issues (in 
the context of either implementation/enforcement of government environmental policy or 
compliance by oil companies) to conflict in the region.   As can be seen from the discussions, 
the issue of sustainable development in this study is imperative given the central place it 
occupies as a key goal of government environmental policy in Nigeria.   Therefore, this study 
attempts to provide and, to some extent, widen the conceptual content of sustainable 
development as a basis for understanding whether or not violent conflict is the result of the 
failure of the government to implement/enforce effectively relevant oil-related environmental 
policies.  Also, it seeks to identify ways to achieve peace in the Niger Delta by focusing on 
the role that compliance by oil companies to pertinent government oil-related environmental 
policy might play in the process. 
 
 
Worse, the lack of adequate research interest in environmental policy implementation in the 
Niger Delta until 1988 made it difficult for the issue to be explored adequately and 
incorporated into analyses of conflict in the region.  Yet, the success of any government 
policy depends substantially on compliance by target groups at the level of 
implementation.133  This study helps to fill the gap in an attempt to explain the motivation for 
violence in the Niger Delta and the way out for ensuring peace in the region. 
 
 
Non-compliance with government environmental policy by organizations may constitute a 
serious factor of failure in the implementation process.  Acceptance of policy as beneficial 
and logical by target groups may enhance compliance.  Besides, implementing officials need 
to apply necessary sanctions or penalties in order to boost policy compliance.  The research 




As shown in the literature review, various issues of interest in the attempt to provide 
                                               




explanations to conflict in the Niger Delta have been highlighted. For example, degradation 
of the environment by oil companies, lack of access to environmental justice, character of the 
Nigerian state, lack of infrastructure, poor management of the environment, poor governance 
and perceived political marginalisation of the Niger Delta have been highlighted in the 
literature.  Nevertheless, questions touching on frustration over some of these issues in 
relation to implementation or enforcement of government environmental policy and violence 
in the region are yet to receive satisfactory attention.  Although many believe and argue that 
there already exists extensive literature on the Niger Delta, the subject of environmental 
policy implementation requires more scholarly engagement through research that aims to 
probe received explanations to the conflict in order to explore alternative or more integrative 
modes of explaining the conflict.  This is needed in order to find a lasting solution to the 
conflict.  This study helps to provide the basis for this alternative explanation. 
 
 
As can be deduced from the foregoing, the issues discussed by scholars on conflict in the 
Niger Delta are related in a lot of ways.  However, they differ in critical areas of questions 
addressed by these scholars in their work. The kind of question that captures issues of 
environmental policy failure in relation to conflict in the region is yet to receive adequate 
scholarly attention. In fact, while development, mode of extracting the crude oil and 
distribution of revenues generated from it remain key issues in explaining the conflict, effort 
at linking aspects of implementation of environmental policy by the government as well as 
compliance by oil companies is limited.  From the foregoing discussions, it is clear that 
adequate and systematic research is yet to be given to the subject and questions raised in this 




Niger Delta Violence in Perspective: Case Studies 
 
 
4.1. Introduction  
To reiterate, the main concern of this study is to examine how the failure (or delay) by 
government to implement environmental policy leads to violence in the Niger Delta.  In line 
with this goal -- as spelt out in the specific objectives of the study in Chapter 1 -- the content 
analytical mode of data collection and analysis was utilised.  The analysis involved 
identifying, specifying, and grouping words, phrases, statements and sentences (indicators of 
variables) mentioned most recurrently in the various methods of data collection into themes 
based on the stated relevant objectives of the study.  Taped interviews and discussions were 
transcribed into text formats, along with written library materials in journals, oil company 
annual reports, dailies, government official documents and field notes. Their contents were 
subsequently analysed.  The use of “triangular technique” (Bangura et. al, 2007: 128-129) 




4.2. Government and implementation of environmental policies 
In this section, the focus is on assessing the evidence concerning achievement of 
environmental policy goals such as: end to gas flaring; use of appropriate and adequate 
technology for the purpose of cleanup and prevention of pollution due to oil spill; 
improvements in the social, political and economic conditions of people from oil bearing 
communities in the Niger Delta; degree to which actions of implementing officials at the 
Ministry of the Environment, National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency 
                                               
134   Triangulation refers to the use of multiple methods of data collection to overcome a researcher’s 
bias and consequences of use of poor methods on the reliability and validity of outcome of research.  
See Bangura, A.K. et. al (2007).  “Synopses of  Peace and Conflict Studies Research Methodologies,” 
in   McCandless, E. (eds.) Peace Research For Africa: Critical Essays on Methodology, Ethiopia: 
University for Peace, p.209 
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(NOSDRIA) and Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) and oil companies conform to 
the goals embodied in environmental policy related to oil business in the Niger Delta;  
executive orders from the presidency and court decisions concerning operations of oil 
companies and protection of the environment; government and oil company implementation 
plans, structures and actions in response to national environmental policy related to the oil 
business in the Niger Delta; existence of mechanisms for gaining compliance from oil 
companies such as mutually held goals or shared values, coercion in the form of threat of 
sanctions for failing to comply, remuneration in the form of adequate incentives to make 
environmental rules compliance by oil companies an attractive option;  measures taken by 
government and oil companies to implement environment policies meant to protect the Niger 
Delta region; and the general execution and delivery of government environmental 
programmes and regulations related to the oil business.   
 
 
The Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) and the Federal Ministry of Environment 
(FME) are key institutional/statutory bodies with responsibilities for formulating and 
enforcing environmental standards in Nigeria.  The DPR and NOSDRIA specifically cover 
the activities of oil companies in the Niger Delta.  A key aspect of this role for the DPR is 
monitoring.  Popular perception among participants, both government officials and local 
environmental groups is that, generally, statutory framework and bodies for enforcing 
standards and ensuring corporate compliance to pertinent environmental and oil related laws 
is weak.  According to one participant at the focus group in Port Harcourt, “government 
officials mandated to monitor environmental compliance are weak. Corruption and lack of 
good governance are the main factors contributing to this weakness.”  
 
 
A common theme from interviews with 15 participants (7 from oil companies and 8 from 
local environmental groups) was the weakness of state institutions to address the problem of 
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enforcement of relevant laws.  The views of informants from local environmental groups -- a 
total of 8 -- need to be differentiated from those of the oil companies who believe that there 
are relevant environmental laws to protect the environment in the Niger Delta. Seventy 
percent of these informants from the oil sector expressed satisfaction with these laws.  
However, they also admitted that many of these laws have not been adequately enforced by 
the government.  This response is corroborated in the response of oil company staff to 
questions pertaining to adequacy of environmental laws for the protection of the environment 
(See Table 4.4). In contrast, 100 percent of the informants from local environmental groups 
admit that there are existing laws that may protect the environment in the region.  However, 
some of them (70 percent) hold the opinion that some aspects of these laws are no longer 
fashionable.  Besides, they have become inadequate to address many of the kinds of 
environmental damage that occur in the Niger Delta.  They recall that some of these laws also 
have defects such as the certain degree of discretionary powers vested in the office of the 
Minister in charge of petroleum resources to award waver to oil companies’ valid excuse to 
continue with flaring of gas in their areas of operations. The Land Use Decree was also 
criticised for allocating ownership of all land in Nigeria to the Federal Government. 
According to one key informant ‘there are existing guidelines for protection of the 
environment from the activities of oil exploration and production but the government is not 
willing to implement them.’135  This argument is buttressed by the apparent inability or 
unwillingness of government to take legal action against erring oil companies on 
environmental damage due to oil spill, oil well-blow out, gas flaring and discharge of 
associated water during oil drilling.  So far there are no records of legal action against oil 
companies that violate environmental principles contained in government policies and laws.   
Furthermore, some members of local environmental groups (40 percent of informants) 
                                               
135 Telephone interview with a member of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta on 
the 8th of July, 2008 (see recorded tape from phone recording device). 
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believe that some of these laws are inadequate for any meaningful impact on corporate 
behaviour towards protection of the environment in the region.136   
 
 
The position of the federal government is that oil companies should stop flaring gas.   Despite 
large utilization capacities of oil companies, the volume of gas flared in Nigeria compared to 
other oil producing countries, as shown in Graph 4.1, remains alarming. A substantial number 
of officials of oil companies believe government policy on protecting the environment in 
Nigeria is adequate.  At least 70% are of this view (See Table 4.1).  However   it appears that 
politics has affected negatively the compliance with the policy to stop the flaring of gas by 
projecting the interests of government and oil companies above the interest in the 
environment of the Niger Delta people. 
 
Graph 4. 1. Flaring and venting per barrel of oil reveals some large utilisation capacities 
 
                                               
136 For example, Nsirimovu Anyakwe (a human rights lawyer and Director of Centre for Human 
Rights and Humanitarian Law (CHRHL) Port Harcourt) spoke with the researcher in an interview on 
the 17th of April 2008. According to him, environmental laws are inadequate to address the problems 
of environmental damage due to oil exploration and production activities in the Niger Delta.  
Celestine Akpobari lamented the lack of implementation of some of the laws that are relevant and 
decried the absence of a legal framework to ensure corporate social responsibility in the area of 
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Table 4.2.Responses from officials of the government 
Officials of the 
government 
Code B (Positive) Code B (Negative) Total number of 
respondents 
Q6. Why is government 
not doing more to 
identify publicly 
specific oil company 
violations of 
environmental 
legislations and the 
compliance level of 
individual companies as 
well as the penalties 
imposed on each? 
3 (21.4%)  11 (78.5%) respondents 
affirmed that 
implementation of 
environmental policy is 
negative and gave four 
broad reasons:  
1. “Government 
dependence on oil,” 2. 
“government needs 
production of the oil for 
more revenue,”  
 3. Lack of human 
capacity 
4. Lack of data bank on 







Q7. What has 
government done to 
ensure global standards 
of environ mental 




All 14 respondents 
stated that government 
has created necessary 
agencies and formulated 
some laws and 
regulations although 




Questions Pattern of response 
Q8. What are the main factors which negate or slow 
down the implementation of government 
environmental policies related to the oil business in 
the Niger Delta? 
All 14 respondents gave pointed to the following 
factors: 
1. Criminal behaviour of youths from oil bearing 
communities. 
2. Outdated regulatory standards/limits 
3. Corruption on the part of government officials 
occasioned  by poor remuneration; 
4. Misunderstanding by the people about the intents 
of oil companies; 
5. Lack of confidence in the oil companies as a 




Because gas is still severely flared, oil spilled and water discharged into the deep onshore 
areas by oil companies drilling for oil, the question of implementation of government 
environmental policies/laws comes out clearly against the oil companies and the government.  
The perception of key stakeholders in the region over matters of development and 
environmental destruction is that the actions and activities of officials of government and oil 
companies do not meet  the goals of government concerning the environment in the Niger 
Delta (See Tables 4.1 and 4.2). 
 
 
In fact, more gas is flared in the Niger Delta than any other part of the world (See Graph 4.1).  
Reputedly, about 2.5 cubic feet of gas is flared in the region daily (see UNDP/World Report, 
2004:1-36).   The Associated Gas Reinjection Act was made in 1979, precisely to take effect 
from the 28th of September, 1979.  The aim of the Act is to compel all oil and gas companies 
in Nigeria to submit comprehensive plans of gas reinjection for the implementation of the 
Act.  Although the Act is seen as inadequate to protect the environment, it gives the 
responsibility to the Petroleum Resources Ministry to ensure compliance with the Act.  
Regrettably, successive regimes have undermined the relevance of this Act to protecting the 
environment from air pollution of the oil sector by not implementing (speak less of enforcing) 
the law.  Indeed, the office of the Minister of Petroleum Resources was usurped by the 
President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria for seven years under the Olusegun Obasanjo 
regime between 1999 and 2007.137  According to one respondent to our interviews, 
“government in Nigeria is joking with the gas reinjection matter.  They are slow at enforcing 
compliance because of economic interest of the government.”138  By the Act, flaring of gas in 
Nigeria became illegal from the 1st of January 1984 without the written permission from the 
                                               
137 As a result, Olusegun Obasanjo doubled as the Minister for Petroleum Resources and President of 
the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
138 See recorded tape of focus group discussion at Social Action, 33 Orominike Close, D-Line, Port Harcourt, 
Rivers State, Nigeria. 
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Minister.  Sections 1 and 2 provide that the purpose of the Act is to reduce indiscriminate 
flaring of gas in Nigeria.   Ojo and Gaskiya (2003:46) have argued that compliance with the 
Act by oil companies is doubtful given the reality of continuous flaring of gas by these 
companies irrespective of the Act.139  Responding to questions on the impact of gas flaring in 
the Niger Delta, Bassey140 argued that: 
 People are dying every day from impact of gas flaring.  Dillydallying in Aso Rock 
about gas flaring is sentencing more Niger Deltans to premature death.    We have 
diseases everywhere, and it is because the people in authority are not suffering from 
the impact.  That is why we can afford to be shifting the deadline as if we are playing 
chess game or draft. We are talking about human lives apart from the environmental 
impact and economic waste. $2.5billion is being wasted every year (Tell Magazine, 
2008:84). 
 
In effect, successive regimes in Nigeria have been shifting deadlines for ending gas flaring.  
It was altered twice to 1 April 1984 and 1 January 1985 respectively.  The January 2008 
deadline was again shifted to 2010.  When the Gas Reinjection Act came into effect in 1984, 
it provided for exemptions to the ban on gas flaring.  These exemptions have had effect on 
the rate of gas flaring.  For example, the implication of exempting 55141 out of 84 of SPDC’s 
oil fields, 10 out of 15 for Mobil, 4 out of 22 in the case of Agip and 4 out of Elf’s 6 is 
enormous in terms of their impact on the Niger Delta (Omorogbe, 2001:58-59).  Indeed, with 
over 70% rate of gas flare in Nigeria, researchers have identified huge health, environmental, 
economic and social cost of consistent gas flaring. Indeed, Environmental Rights Action 
continues to insist that flaring gas is a violation of human rights (ERA, 2005:27).142  
Undoubtedly, the reason for the seeming lack of seriousness on the part of the government to 
enforce compliance with gas flare free Niger Delta would point first to the fact that at the 
early stages, some of these laws were enacted without the benefit of pertinent infrastructure 
                                               
139 See Ojo, G.U. and Gaskiya, J. (2003). Environmental Laws of Nigeria, A Critical Review, Benin 
City: ERA/FoEN. 
140 Bassey, B. is executive director of Environmental Rights Action.  He spoke on pollution and gas 
flaring in the Niger Delta.  See Tell Magazine (2008) Special Edition, February 18, p.84. 
141 See Omorogbe, Y. (2001). Oil and Gas Law in Nigeria, Lagos: Malthouse Press Limited 
142 See Environmental Rights Action (2005) Gas Flaring in Nigeria, Amsterdam: ERA. 
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or adequate plans for gas utilisation.  Besides, there are funding difficulties, given the nature 
of joint venture arrangement between the government (through the NNPC) and the oil 
companies.  The cost of gas reinjection should be shared between the government and the oil 
companies.  In reality, government hardly provides its counterpart contribution.  However in 
1998 government initiated economic incentives (market approach) for ending gas flaring in 
the Niger Delta.  In this respect, oil companies enjoy duty and VAT free importation of 
needed machines and equipment for investors in the sector.  Again, the N10 cost of flaring 
gas per cubit ft was increased to N20 under the Olusegun Obasanjo administration from 29 
May, 1999.  Apparently, it benefits oil companies to part with N1 million payments for 
flaring associated gas than to spend the comparatively huge sum of N56 million naira for the 
procurement and installation of facilities for gas reinjection.    
 
Respite was anticipated following from the emergence of the Nigerian Liquified Natural Gas 
Company (NLNG).  There exists a substantial level of pessimism regarding the willingness of 
government to put an end to gas flaring in the Niger Delta.  Comments by participants at the 
focus groups discussions as well as interviews revealed frustrations among affected local 
communities over the issue of continuing failure to end gas flaring in the Niger Delta.  
Interestingly, the perception of 7 out of 8 (87 %) persons in one of our focus group 
discussions identified the constant lighting provided by gas flares and the consequent heat 
and release of dangerous chemicals into the atmosphere as worrisome and frustrating for the 
people who have had to live with it for many decades.  Gas flaring was mentioned not only as 
a principal grievance issue but also as an explanation for the violent resistance by affected 
communities.  According to one participant: 
In the night, we cannot differentiate it from the day.  The zinc roofs in our houses leak 
every year and one has to replace leaking ones every year.  The weather is constantly 
hot and to remember that the oil companies are earning so much from oil and the 
suffering it creates gets the youths angry.  In fact it is something that should cause any 





This concern expressed above is common across the Niger Delta at every location where the 
oil majors flare gas.  The researcher was able to understand that if at the beginning the 
government had insisted on best practice for oil mining activities the level of environmental 
devastation in the region would have been far less. 
 
However, it is interesting to note that the environment is not a grievance issue for some of 
those who claim environmental issues as part of the reasons for taking up arms against the oil 
companies and state officials.  Indeed, for many of these people, attacking oil company 
facilities is a way of cutting their profit from oil.  The companies are perceived to be in 
partnership with top government officials and individuals in society.  The motive for the 
attacks is thus to compel the government and the oil companies to come to the negotiation 
table.  One focus group participant argued that politicians and some members of the armed 
groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) speak the 
same language on the protection of the environment, but that each party may be motivated by 
selfish means for attracting oil money for themselves through violence.  
 
 
The researcher asked oil company officials in the questionnaire to say what factors negate or 
slow down the implementation of government environmental policies related to the oil 
business in the Niger Delta.  The researcher obtained the following result: criminal behaviour 
of youths from oil bearing communities; outdated regulatory standards/limits; corruption on 
the part of government officials occasioned by poor remuneration; misunderstanding by the 
people about the intentions of oil companies and lack of confidence in the oil companies as a 
result of previous disappointments (see Table 4.5). 
 
 
Following from responses of participants in this study, government is unable to implement 
effectively its oil related environmental policies in the Niger Delta for various reasons.  For 
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instance, political factors and interests often interfere.  Monitoring, which is an important 
aspect of enforcement of policy is done shabbily by government officials sent to the field.  
One focus group participant argued that this would appear to have been done intentionally in 
order to avert the wrath of senior government officials at the ministry who take orders from 
top politicians and work in tandem with oil companies.143 
 
4.3. Compliance of oil companies 
Data for the analyses of compliance of oil companies to pertinent environmental policies 
related to the oil business in Nigeria were generated from secondary sources and primary 
sources of interviews, discussions and a questionnaire.144  The compliance level of oil 
companies to environmental guidelines has remained very poor since the discovery of oil in 
commercial quantity at Oloibiri in 1956.  For instance, following the Petroleum Act of 1969, 
legal framework for prevention and remedial activities against oil spills was clearly laid out.  
The Act made it compulsory for oil companies to utilise best practice in their operations. 
                                               
143 Focus Group discussion held on the 28th of April, 2008 at Social Action, 33 Emenike Layout, D-
line Port Harcourt with support from Social Action.  It was attended by local opinion leaders of oil 
bearing communities, government officials, members of environmental groups (unarmed), officials of 
oil companies and members of youth groups of oil bearing communities in the Niger Delta.  A total of 
8 persons attended. 
144 It is worth noting that arriving at a correct statistical level of compliance by oil companies to environmental 
guidelines or legislations is extremely difficult (if not virtually impossible for an outsider researcher) on account 
of conflicting claims of government officials at the Ministry of Environment; Department of Petroleum 
Resources; Oil companies and members of justice and environmental movement groups in the Niger Delta. 
What is clear is increasing number of oil spill and gas flaring cases.  In any case, comments made by key 
informants and focus group discussants, especially by justice and environmental movement groups, may not tell 
the true picture in terms of level of compliance. Those of the oil companies that predominantly claim to be 
doing substantially well may not also give a true picture of the level of compliance.  Hence, to a large extent 
much of the outcome of environmental management processes of government and oil companies would really 
reveal the extent of compliance by oil companies.  In this regard, 73 percent of participants from the justice and 
environmental groups use words such as “poor”, “inadequate”, “very bad” and so forth to describe the 
performance of oil companies as regards their compliance to environmental policies. These words point 
seriously to an indictment of the oil companies. On the matter of specific policies that are implemented and 
those not implemented to reduce or eliminate oil related damage to the environment in the Niger Delta, The 
National Policy on Environment, Gas Reinjection Act, Environmental Impact Assessment Act and the 
Constitution of the Federal Constitution of Nigeria, 1999 with respect to the section on rights of individual to 
clean environment among others are, at least,  not being implemented to reduce or end gas flaring and oil spill in 
the Niger Delta.  The contrary view of government officials and oil company workers at the Health, Safety and 
Environment units clearly point to the fact that some attempts to implement these policies are being made.  The 
problem may border on the effectiveness of the implementation.   The fear is that the failure to implement at all 
or to do so partially might produce similar results of not checking environmental damage through the activities 
of oil companies. 
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Specifically, to prevent oil spill, section 25 of the Act provided that oil companies: 
shall adopt all practicable precautions including the provision of up-to-date equipment 
approved by the Head of Petroleum Inspectorate to prevent pollution of inland. 
Water… of Nigeria… and where such pollution occurs or has occurred shall take 
prompt steps to control and if possible to end it.  The implementation of this 
requirement would mean the use of blow-out preventers, borrow and saver pits, 
carthodic protection of pipelines and tanks and so on. Given that the greatest number 
of oil spills are caused by equipment failures, it is more than evident that this 
provision has not been strictly followed… there is no doubt that Nigeria has 
guidelines for oil exploration but fails to maintain effective compliance. (Ikein 1990: 
42) 
 
There is therefore no surprise that in 2004, Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC), 
Nigeria, admitted in clear terms that oil companies in the Niger Delta were violating 
guidelines and standards set by the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR) for the 
regulation of the oil sector in the areas of off-shore disposal of created water and gaseous 
emissions. As noted by the Annual Report of the SPDC on the environment in 2004, “we are 
not complying fully in some areas of regulations.”145   
 
Flaring of gas and oil spillage are dominant sources of contamination of the atmosphere and 
environment in the Niger Delta by oil companies and have remained key features of oil 
company activities in the Niger Delta. Termination of all gas flare and reduction of oil spills 
are key goals in government response to the environmental challenges associated with oil 
exploration in the region.  Government’s desire is to see that all oil companies utilise the gas 
for development purposes such as for export and energy needs of the domestic population.146 
It appears that this is still a far cry in Nigeria as the National Assembly is yet to unanimously 
pass existing bill on gas flare-out in Nigeria started since 2008.  
 
                                               
145 SPDC is the operator of NNPC/Shell/EPNL/Agip joint venture.  See Online Daily News: http://nm.
onlinenigeria.com/templates.  (Accessed on the 12th of April, 2008). 
146 In April 2009, Nigeria’s National Petroleum Corporation, NNPC, confirmed that the Federal Government 
had concluded plans on gas utilisation with key investors. The Upper house of the National Assembly has 
already passed the Bill on Gas Flare-out in Nigeria. Deadline for the termination of all gas flares in Nigeria is 31 
December, 2010.  The Lower house will go through a similar process. Thereafter, the President will have to sign 
a harmonised version of the Bill before it will become a law in Nigeria. These efforts could be seen as signs of 
seriousness by the Government. However, the real problem may be with enforcement of such law. 
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Two important government legislations meant to regulate oil exploration and production in 
Nigeria are: the Petroleum Act of 1969 (PA) and the Petroleum (Drilling and Production) 
Regulation (PDPR) also of 1969. The National Environmental Policy (NEP) also makes 
provision for ensuring that the atmosphere and environment are free of pollutants.  Although 
the PA does not address specifically issues of gas utilisation, the PDPR is yet to be fully 
enforced.  Continuous flaring of gas with the permission of the government clearly shows 
either the weakness of existing laws to compel oil companies to end gas flaring or points to 
the weakness of the government to enforce applicable laws. It should be noted that initially 
both Acts did not provide for sanctions against non-compliance. 
 
The Gas Reinjection Act of 1979 was meant to take care of the shortcomings of previous 
statutes   regarding utilisation of gas as a strategy for sustainable development in Nigeria.  It 
set October 19 to April  of 1980 as deadline for oil companies to submit detailed plans of 
their individual gas utilisation plans and to end all gas flaring by 1984 or pay fines.  It was 
amended in 1984 to make provision for flaring of gas in certain circumstances provided such 
flare is permitted in writing by the minister in charge at the Ministry of Petroleum Resources.  
The amendment provided for a fine of 2 kobo ($0.0009) for every 1000 cubit feet (scf) flared.  
By 1985, another amendment to the Act was made, this time making provision of 
considerable amount of money as fine for flaring of gas without written permission from the 
government.   The fine was raised to $11.  In 2004, there was another amendment which 
made it mandatory for oil producing companies in Nigeria to submit detailed plans of gas 
utilisation.  Besides, it banned flaring of gas without permission from the minister.  Clearly, 
these relatively low levels of fines along with the government’s continued neglect of its own 
policies may serve to explain why oil companies have not been deterred or compelled to put 
an end to their flaring activities in Nigeria. 
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Oil companies (SPDC, NAOC and Elf Totalfina) claim over 70 per cent compliance to 
environmental policies (laws and regulations) related to oil business in Nigeria.  They insist 
that they are committed to environmental practices that ensure sustainable development.  
They often claim substantial compliance and cite   security problems created by local armed 
groups in the Niger Delta as responsible for lapses.   For instance, SPDC reported for the year 
2006 that it is committed to reducing the impact of its operations and activities on the 
environment.  According to the report: 
As in previous years, we continued efforts aimed at improving our environment 
performance as part of our contribution to sustainable development.  We improved 
our environmental stewardship and programmes in spite of the challenging operating 
environment.  However, due to the lack of access to fields in our western area of 
operation, we were unable to access and clean up the spills in this area caused by 
militant group activities (Shell Nigeria Annual Report, 2006: 12-17). 
 
Regarding Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry (EGASPIN) it 
was in 2003 that the SPDC agreed to a compliance plan with the Department of Petroleum 
Resources (DPR).  Already, SPDC claims to have achieved 92 percent compliance to the 
guidelines by 2005.  In 2006, SPDC, ELF (TOTAL FINA), Nigerian Agip Oil Company 
along with other oil companies in the Niger Delta undertook scoping studies to establish 
workable standards and limits for the oil industry.  From this study, an Environmental 
Sensitivity Index (ESI) Protocol has been submitted to the DPR for approval.  Its approval is 
expected to provide a framework for enhanced management of crisis and preparation for 
response to oil spills. 
 
The oil industry also plans to undertake air quality analysis in order to control gaseous 
emissions (SPDC Annual Report, 2006: 5).  From the joint study by the oil companies, it was 
also identified that in the area of offshore disposal of produced water, oil companies were yet 
to be satisfactorily compliant.  In fact, an independent study of the EA Sea Eagle (a 
production and storage facility at EA field) Bonny terminals and Forcados revealed that 
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wastewater from oil exploration disposed at the sea does not constitute threat to aquatic life.  
Consequently, the DPR issued a 12-month waiver allowing the SPDC to dispose of such 
water.  Indeed, the SPDC claims that by 2004 it had completed a pilot Occupational Health 
and Safety Assessment (OHSAS) 18001 Certification programme for Bonny and Forcados 
terminals, implying international acceptance and recognition in occupational health and 
safety management systems.  SPDC recertified Bonny and Forcados terminal and had plans 
to extend the programme to six additional facilities in 2006. 
 
In 2006, SPDC claimed to have refurbished and upgraded key facilities such as pipelines, 
manifolds and flow stations, under the recommendations of the Asset Integrity Management.  
Indeed, SPDC claims to have achieved 83 per cent success regarding the recommendation of 
the asset integrity.  SPDC also claims to have a new liquefied natural gas project at Olokola 
and other independent power projects in many parts of Nigeria in order to serve the gas 
Reinjection programmes and plans of the company. 
 
 The researcher asked respondents from the Health, Safety and Environmental (HSE) units of 
the oil companies to assess the compliance level of their companies to government 
environmental policies.  First, the responses reveal the ignorance of key officials about key 
government environmental policies meant to regulate operations of the oil companies.  
Ironically and interestingly, all the oil companies under study have established HSE units in 
their companies.  One respondent from SPDC said: 
The compliance level of SPDC to the environmental policies is very good.  SPDC 
seeks stringent environmental standards than the federal and state governments or 
international standard and enforce compliance, monitor and assess compliance results 
to ensure non-compliances are quickly addressed. 
 
 
The above statement and similar ones from the rest of the respondents from oil companies 
were classified as “positive” with respect to their endorsement of the compliance level of oil 
companies and recorded 100 percent.  Data generated from secondary sources such as Annual 
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Reports of the oil companies reveal that on paper oil companies have become more 
committed to addressing environmental issues resulting from their activities in their host 
communities.  In its 2006 report, SPDC states that the company is committed to eliminating 
routine gas flaring in its operations.  At policy level, this is suggestive of the company’s 
attempt at ensuring sustainable development in the Niger Delta.  A key strategy identified for 
achieving this goal is the gas utilisation projects such as the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas 
Project and independent power projects in various parts of the country (see Shell Annual 
Report, 2006:1-38).  SPDC claims to have spent a total of $650,000 in 2006, and between 
2003 and 2008, a total of $3 billon on various projects of gas utilisation.  In 2001, it claimed 
to have completed gas gathering projects at Obigho, Odidi, Soku, Cawthorne Channel and 
Sapele.  This is said to have 50 percent gas gathering capacity for all oil fields operated by 
the SPDC.  It is projected that the capacity will be 85 per cent when all gas gathering projects 
are completed by the company.   
 
Despite claims by the oil companies regarding compliance levels to environmental laws such 
as the Gas Reinjection Act, the reality substantially contradicts those claims.  For instance, 
out of 139 oil fields in the Niger Delta, 117 (over 70 per cent) are currently flaring gas.  This 
is no surprise, given the impression that government lacks the political will to end all gas 
flare.  Currently, legislation banning   gas flaring without provisions for exceptions is lacking.  
It is for this reason that some local environmental non-governmental organisations147 on April 
20, 2008 signed and submitted a proposal to the Senate Committee on Gas calling for 
legislation to completely ban gas flaring by oil companies in Nigeria.  The groups jointly 
protested “the failure on the part of government and the oil companies operating in Nigeria to 
                                               
147 See National Point, (2008). Monday April, pp. 6-7.  The groups include: Institute of Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Law; Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth (ERA); Movement for the 
Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP); Kebetkache Women Development and Resource Centre; Ijaw 
Youth Council (IYC); United Action for Democracy (UAD); Ogoni Solidarity Forum (OSF); Niger 
Delta Women for Justice; Centre for Human Rights, Environment and Development; Federated Niger 
Delta Communities; Benin River Forum and Egi Forum. 
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bring about any commitment to end gas flaring in the country.”  Specifically, the 
environmental groups called on the National Assembly to enact a legislation to compel all oil 
companies to end gas flaring in 2008 in line with the proposition of the DPR. 
 
The researcher asked participants at the FGDs and interviews if the failure of the government 
to compel oil companies to end all gas flaring has any relationship with current violence in 
the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.  The responses were surprisingly mixed although 
predominantly positive for the local environmental groups;.  By contrast, government and oil 
company workers from outside the Niger Delta states played down on any direct relationship.  
However, they conceded that certain socio-economic development factors such as the 
absence of basic infrastructure -- roads, quality health care, education, electricity, poor living 
conditions of Niger Deltans, loss of livelihood -- are crucial to understanding the nature of 
violence in the Niger Delta.  
 
 The federal government was slow to come up with measures to regulate the activities of oil 
companies regarding the protection of the environment and livelihoods of oil bearing 
communities.  The few current existing laws have suffered severe problems of 
implementation.  In any case, grievance over simple factors of damage to the environment 
could hardly be a sole pathway to violence in the region.  Rather, violence results from 
various socio-economic and political factors combining with environmental problems that are 
crucial to issues of livelihood.  For instance, the effects of gas flaring include: regular noise; 
rise in temperature of communities close to flare sites; acid rain and retarded aquatic species 
reproduction; corroded roofing sheets; and various respiratory and skin diseases associated.  
To be sure, flaring of gas has resulted in the contamination of the air and contributed 
immensely to the destruction of environmental resources such as games upon which local 
economies heavily depended before the beginning of oil exploration and production activities 
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by oil companies.  Not surprisingly, the ensuing frustration has snowballed into aggressive 
behaviour towards oil companies in the region. 
 
The failure of the government to end all gas flaring and violence in the Delta region takes the 
form of a circle or cycle of violence.  Local justice and environmental groups react against 
the oil companies and state security while the state responds by deploying the military and 
police against the environmental groups.  On the part of the officials of the government, the 
rational way has been to ensure a threat free exploration and exploitation of the oil upon 
which the state depends for revenue and foreign exchange. 
 
Oil companies complain that compelling them to end gas flaring in the region will amount to 
great economic loss, due to the consequent closure of 117 out of 139 oil fields in which gas is 
still flared to date. In the perception of local environmental groups, this argument is frivolous 
and ridiculous and contradicts widely held views regarding the estimated $2.5 billion that will 
accrue annually to Nigeria by ending gas flaring through various gas utilisation projects 
(National Point, 2008:7). 
 
Oil companies are yet to update their facilities.   The Annual Report of SPDC 2006 indicates 
that the company has extensively updated its facilities and utilises modern technologies.  In 
reality, the company utilises crude methods to address problems of pollution resulting from 
oil spills.  The company simply burns or sinks spilled oil on the surface of water or forests 
(farmlands).  This practice falls far below oil industry international voluntary standards.  
Many cases of oil spills have been attributed to criminal pipeline vandalisation by youths 
involved in oil theft.  Still, the failure to replace these oil pipelines across the Niger Delta 
have contributed extensively to leakages and general oil spills. Their non-replacement renders 




Poverty has increased in oil-producing communities of the Niger Delta (Ibeanu, 2006:19; 
Rose, 2003: 1-6)148  With the loss of farmlands and aquatic resources due to pollution from 
exploration and production activities of the oil companies, human migration into the major 
cities of the Niger Delta has caused a decline in food production as peasant farmers leave the 
rural areas in search of jobs in the city.   In the city, securing jobs is difficult as access to such 
jobs is dependent on needed skills and education.  Even for the educated, securing jobs is 
difficult. This issue is well reflected and supported by statistics on the state of unemployment 
and underemployment shown in the table below (See Table 4.3).  
 





UNEMPLOYMENT % UNDEREMPLOYMENT % 
Composite Urban Rural Composite  Urban  Rural 
Nigeria 4.7 7.2 3.7 12.9 5.8 16.0 
Abia 2.9 8.7 2.4 7.7 NA 8.4 
Akwa Ibom 18.2 12.6 18.3 18.5 9.2 18.8 
Bayelsa 6.5 13.0 5.5 6.0 NA 6.9 
Cross River NA NA NA 16.6 7.3 18.3 
Delta 10.3 16.2 8.8 13.0 23.6 1.2 
Edo 1.5 7.3 NA 4.6 1.8 5.3 
Imo 6.8 2.7 7.2 15.5 21.1 25.0 
Ondo 4.1 4.7 3.6 12.9 9.3 15.5 
Rivers 19.1 18.2 19.3 14.1 2.7 15.9 
Source: Labour force sample survey December, 2000 FOS/ILO, Federal Office of Statistics. 
Statistical News No. 322, June 2001/UNDP Report on the Niger Delta  
 
 
                                               
148 See Ibeanu, O. and Lukham, R. (2006). Niger Delta, Political Violence, Governance and 
Corporate Responsibility in a Petro-State, Abuja: Centre for Democracy and Development; Rose, M. 
(2003). “Nigerians Oil Sector and the Poor,” Paper prepared for UK Department of International 
Development (DFID), Nigeria: Drivens Programme  pp. 1-10. 
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 Rural poverty has been aggravated by the politics of sharing oil revenues in complete neglect 
of compensation for land appropriated and damaged by oil exploration and production 
activities of oil companies.  As Table 4.3 shows, issues of livelihood matter greatly for rural 
communities.  The struggle for control of land resources for the purpose of oil exploration 
and production on the part of the state, has at the same time, meant a foreclosing of socio-
economic opportunities for rural oil bearing communities.  According to some analysts, “oil 
is from bringing prosperity to the Niger Delta oil exploration and production caused large 
scale environmental degradation, destroyed rural livelihoods and aggravated poverty” (Ibeanu 
and Lukham 2006: 43). 
 
4.4. Political opportunity structures 
The civil regime (democracy) established in Nigeria since 1999 does not seem to have 
provided a legitimate space for venting the oil and environment related grievances of the 
Niger Delta (Ojakorotu, 2006: 230).149  In fact, as Ibeanu and Lukham (2006: 45) note:  
In principle transition to democracy in 1999 should have opened the political arena to 
Niger Delta protest movements, facilitated negotiations with Federal and State 
governments and with oil firms and reversed the spread of violence.  The reality has 
been much more complex and problematical. 
 
 
Strangely, violent agitations for resource control and rights of various kinds related to the 
environment and economic development which began in the early 1990s have intensified 
during this period of democracy (1999 to date). The perception among people from the oil 
bearing communities is predominantly a lack of confidence in Nigeria’s political institutions 
regarding their capacity to address objectively critical issues of sustainable development in 
relation to oil company operations.  The reason bears much on the nature of federalism and 
governance as practised in the country. 
                                               
149 Ojakorutu, V. (2006). “Youth Militancy and Development Efforts in African Multiethnic Society,” 




Since 1954, federalism has remained a core principle of state structure in Nigeria. However, 
over the years since oil revenues expanded to become the key resource for national income 
and foreign exchange, fiscal relations and sharing of revenues have come to be skewed in 
favour of the federal government.  Land, by law, including mineral resources (oil) belongs to 
the state.  Law enforcement mechanisms are also centralised to the extent that there now 
exists a seeming institutionalised politics of unitary control (Omeje, 2004: 425-440).150  As 
noted by Ojakorotu: 
the skewed structure of the Nigerian state has precipitated fiscal centralisation in 
favour of the federal government and the ethnic majority.  The overbearing 
domination by the federal government has made it difficult for the oil-bearing 
communities to gain (self-defined) equitable access to wealth derived from their 
resources.  151 
 
It is therefore no surprise that the Niger Delta people have consistently called for what they 
refer to as ‘true federalism,’ which for them, among others, means more autonomy to control 
resources and take decisions on matters of protection of the environment from activities of oil 
companies.  In short, on December 11, 1998, Ijaw youths, numbering over 5,000 gathered in 
Kaiama, Bayelsa State to adopt what later became the Kaiama Declaration.152  Among the 
issues raised by the youths as reflected in that document were political questions about the 
relevance of federalism with respect to allocation of fiscal revenue and the centralisation of 
powers over resource control and the implication for resource endowed communities of the 
ethnic minorities of the south-south region of Nigeria (Ukeje, 2001: 343).  
 
The oil companies acknowledge the impact of political context in the choice of political 
                                               
150 Omeje, K. (2004). “The State, Conflict and Evolving Politics in the Niger Delta, Nigeria,” Review 
of African Political Economy, Vol.31, No.101, September, p.425.   
151 Ojakorotu, V. (2006), op.cit.p.231. 
152 Osuoka, one of the signatories to the Kaiama Declaration, spoke with the researcher in an 
interview in Port Harcourt.  He berates the Nigerian federal structure and argues for a redefinition of 
federalism in its classical sense where components (ethnic minorities) will also have local autonomy 
over resources in their environment. 
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actions by local environmental groups in the Niger Delta.  For instance, the SPDC pointed 
out that political, social and environmental concerns are core to the discontent and conflict in 
the region (Ukeje, 2001: 341).153  Political interpretation of the issues and response of the 
state and oil companies undeniably give conspicuous image of denial of legitimate access.  It 
seems that political and economic considerations have influenced decisions by the 
government about the enforcement of environmental policy such as putting an end to gas 
flaring in the Niger Delta.  Indeed, efforts to deal with the matter by government officials at 
the DPR and the presidency in the past have sometimes ended up with concessions to the oil 
companies who complain that the government has often failed to meet its own funding 
obligations towards ending gas flaring in Nigeria. 
 
Existing environmental and oil related policies/laws exclude oil-bearing communities from 
playing a role at the level of policy formulation and implementation.  This is attributed to the 
various political interests that shape the political system and its institutions.  Indeed, the 
experience is typical of the notion that at the national levels in many developing countries, 
human concerns do not seem to be at the centre of sustainable development.  Humans do not 
seem to be entitled to healthy and productive life in consonance with nature.  The problem is 
located within a political context that allows a combination of forces to exclude local 
environmental groups and reduces their power to play important role in protecting their 
environment (Aginam, 2002: 1).154 Access to political and legal institutions in cases of 
violation of environmental laws on the part of victims has been a defining factor in the choice 
of alternative strategies of expressing grievances.  For the oil bearing communities instances 
                                               
153 Telephone interviews with 15 key informants from SPDC, Agip, Elf and local environmental 
groups reveal the importance of political context in the choice of political actions among local groups 
against oil companies and the government over issues of environmental damage, socio-economic 
advancement in the Niger Delta. 
154 See Aginam,O. (2002).  “From Rio to Johannesburg: The Pessimism of Sustainable Development  
and the Optimism of Sustainable Livelihoods: Two Cases from Nigeria,” paper presented in a 
conference “After Johannesburg: New Strategies,” York   University, Toronto, 27-28, September. 
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of frustration with legal institutions abound.  For instance, in 2001, Ijaw youths and elders, 
under the leadership of Chief Pere Ajua petitioned SPDC to the National Assembly, 
specifying 107 ways in which the activities of oil companies have destroyed their 
environment.  They therefore demanded from the SPDC the sum of $1.5 billion as 
compensation to the community. Following from this, the National Assembly created a 
judicial committee (headed by former Chief Justice Mohammed Bello) to investigate the 
allegations.  The committee consulted widely and finally asked SPDC to pay the amount 
demanded by the community in compensation.  This did not go down well with SPDC as it 
appealed  to high court asking for the  nullification of  recommendations of the judicial 
committee (New Africa January, 2008: 18). 
 
 
At the Peremabiri community of present Bayelsa State, SPDC has disputed through appeal to 
the Supreme Court against a N7. Million (Naira) in damages awarded against it over oil 
spillage for reasons that the community could not prove any injury resulting from the 
spillage; and that the nature of injuries was vague and not specified.  SPDC opted for a 
damages award of a paltry N5, 500 (Naira).  According to Ojo and Gaskiya (2003: 30): “The 
above report indicates the kind of technical legal difficulties that usually confront litigants in 
environmental law cases on the issue of damages even where the polluter has admitted 
liability.” 
 
In a similar vein, of two suits instituted against SPDC, Total, Agip, Chevron and the 
Attorney-General of Nigeria by local oil bearing communities over gas flaring activities by 
the joint venture partners on grounds of violation of fundamental human rights of victims 
under the 1999 constitution and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights one was 
struck out by the Port Harcourt Division of the Federal High Court.  In the other suit, in spite 
of  denial of basic witness, testimonies and expert evidence, the court sitting in Benin ruled 
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(in 2005) asking the SPDC to pay compensation to victims of gas flare and oil spillage (see 
SPDC Annual Report, 2006:1-38).  SPDC appealed the judgement asking the court for a stay 
of execution which was granted. 
 
 Existing political structures have shaped political actions of local environmental groups in 
the Niger Delta.  According to El-Kenz (1996: 51-52): 
Almost everywhere, violence is the mode of response to the problems that inadequate 
political institutions and outdated codes of behaviour have proved incapable of 
solving.  In all of these countries, it is the young people who are in the forefront: 
youths enraged by the injustice and indignity of a situation they refuse to accept 
fatalistically.  They are using the only means left to them- violence. 
 
Although the federal government has created basic institutions such as the Federal Ministry 
of Environment and the Department of Petroleum Resources, these institutions lack adequate 
representation from the oil bearing communities whose interests and contribution to policy 
should be considered indispensable.  The distribution of socio-economic data of respondents 
from officials of government reveals 98 per cent dominance by persons from other ethnic 
groups such as Yoruba, Igbo and Hasusa/Fulani whom people from the oil bearing 
communities have accused of being in control of the political institutions in Nigeria.  The 
implication is enormous, regarding public policy making and implementation such as the 
environmental policies related to oil business in the region. Our discussions with members of 
environmental movement organisations support these arguments.  Indeed, the researcher 
asked them if they would be willing to use the political arena in lieu of violence if the 
political system becomes more democratic and the outcome was overwhelmingly positive 
(Table 4.4).  The data in Table 4.4 shows that a vast majority would be willing to favour 




Table 4.4. If the political system becomes more democratic (free and fair), would you be 













Par.1 Par. 2 Par.3 Par.4 Par.5 Par.6 Par.7 Par.8 
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On a number of occasions local environmental groups have taken legal actions against oil 
companies on allegations of pollution of the environment through oil spills and gas flaring 
without achieving justice.  In some cases, the courts rule that the oil companies should pay 
compensation but a culture of impunity and disrespect for court ruling by oil companies is 
difficult to explain outside the context of the joint venture interests that seem to translate into 
political alliance for the government and the oil companies.  According to Nwokerie (2009) 
“the Nigerian government is failing in its obligation concerning oil company activities and 
human rigthts of people in the Niger Delta.”155 The consequence is the existing impression 
among local environmental groups that the court in Nigeria might not be trusted to guarantee 
hope for victims of environmental damage occasioned by the failure of the government to 





                                               
155 Nwokerie, C.V. is Justice of the Federal High Court in Benin City that delivered judgement in favour of 
Jonal Gbere at Iwerkan community in a case of violation of human rights through pollution of the environment 
instituted against SPDC on the 14th of November 2005. A similar judgement was delivered in April, 2006, 
requiring all oil companies to end all gas flaring by 2007. Participants declined from commenting on why oil 
companies have not complied with these court judgements.  Government officials interviewed also failed to 
respond to this question. Nwokerie spoke on these issues on the 30th of October, 2009 at a seminar organised by 
Social Action on ending gas flaring in Nigeria in Abuja. 
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Table 4.5. Views of members of local justice and environmental groups in focus group 





























































The issue of lack of access to courts is a critical element in understanding the tension and 
conflict that characterise relationships between the local environmental groups and oil 
companies.  For these local groups, reliance on conventional strategies for justice has 
produced marginal results (see Table 4.5) on response of members of local environmental 
groups who were rather negative in their response to any possibility of access to political and 
legal institutions to seek redress for environmental destruction by oil companies).156 This is 
understandable given that government officials at the Federal Ministry of Environment and 
Department of Petroleum Resources lack effective mechanisms for monitoring compliance by 
oil companies.  Unfortunately, government seems to depend on the oil companies for needed 
resources in monitoring compliance.  Besides, government lacks required laboratories with 
qualified manpower to adequately assess damage from oil spillage and gas flaring.157  
It would then appear that what actually emerges from time to time is the quest on the part of 
local environmental groups to use violence in seeking sustainable development.  The result is 
the vicious circle of violence traded between the people and the state.  
 
                                               
156 The researcher asked participants (members of justice and environmental groups) in focus group discussions 
on access to political institutions, leaders, courts on cases of gas flaring and oil spillage and received responses 
categorised as negative in Table 4.5, meaning that access is limited or denied. 
157 These issues were revealed and discussed by informants (senior environmental officers) at Nigeria’s National 
Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency. A participant from the oil sector boasted of his company’s continued 
leadership in assessing damage caused by oil spillage since government does not have necessary laboratories 
and equipment.  See Field Notes on the interviews. 
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The available data supports arguments made by Frynas (2001: 397) regarding access to courts 
by oil bearing communities of the Niger Delta.  She identified lack of finance, education and 
information on the part of potential litigants in oil related cases as key constraints to access to 
courts in Nigeria.  These constraints can actually be seen from the point of view of the nature 
of existing political institutions.  Public policy is relevant for an efficient working economic 
system.  The failure of public policy is often reflected and measured in terms of micro 
governmental structures such as the education sector that might fail to produce needed human 
capital for national and individual advancement. Ignorance on rights, lack of needed financial 
resources and basic information are some of the reasons why sustaining litigation against oil 
companies, which have huge resources, is difficult for local environmental groups and 
individuals from oil bearing communities. 
 
A statement made by Isaac Adaka Boro in 1963 puts the issue of choice of violence and 
political opportunity structures as against use of conventional strategies for seeking redress in 
historical perspective: “We discovered that most of the youths were so frustrated with the 
general neglect that they were ready for any action led by an outstanding leader to gain 
liberty.”158 
 
In 1959, the Niger Delta Congress (NDC) was formed by Chief Harold Dappa Biriye, as a 
political party to pursue the cause of the Niger Delta through national politics (Tell Magazine, 
2008: 73).  The party had its first misfortune when it won only one seat in the 1959 general 
elections at the federal legislature, with Chief Melford Okilo, representing Brass Division of 
Yenagoa province.  A second misfortune bedevilled the NDC in the 1962 eastern regional 
elections and 1964 federal general elections in which it failed to secure any seat.  In any case, 
Igbos won all the seats in those elections, leading to a deep sense of frustration for the Ijaws, 
                                               
158 Boro made this statement in 1963.  See Tell Magazine Special Edition (2008) February 18. 
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who form a majority in the Niger Delta. 
 
In the early days of 1958, Chief Dappa Biriye led a delegation to the colonial office in 
London to protest political marginalisation of the Niger Delta.  The result, in part, was the 
creation of the Willinks Commission with the aim of addressing the fears of the people of the 
region.  It then made recommendations that included creation of special development status 
for the Niger Delta.  As a result, the Tafawa Balewa government established the Niger Delta 
Development Board (NDDB), to address the special needs of the region.  This effort failed to 
bring desired results in terms of development.  Part of the reason for this failure was the 
refusal of the eastern regional government to make its statutory contribution to the board.  
Ultimately, the youths and politicians from the Niger Delta began to sense that politics within 
the national political system was difficult to bring about expected development in the region.  
It was this sense of frustration that led Isaac Adaka Boro to begin a violent campaign to end 
political marginalisation of the region in 1966. 
 
 
Boro utilised non-violent methods in the early days of his campaign but was frustrated by 
inadequate support towards ending political marginalisation of the region;   for instance, the 
perceived lack of interest by the Eastern regional, Midwestern regional and federal 
governments to the Niger Delta.  Beginning from 1962, Boro turned to Ijaws in the West 
African countries of Togo, Ghana and Dahomey (Republic of Benin).  In a visit with 
colleagues to Ghana, he entered the Cuban embassy to seek support but was ordered to leave 
the premises within 60 minutes.  These experiences and frustrations led Boro to organise 
violent reaction against the state in 1966.  That event is often referred to as the 12-day 
revolution undertaken under the aegis of the Niger Delta Volunteer Service (NDVS) which 
was formed by Boro.  The exercise failed and Boro and his colleagues were arrested, 
prosecuted and sentenced to death by the Federal Government of Nigeria.  Before he was 
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executed Boro was freed by the then military government under General Yakubu Gowon.  
Almost simultaneously, the government created the state of Rivers and appointed then Rivers 
indigene, Commander Alfred P. Diete-Spiff to serve as the military governor of the state.  
When the civil war began, Boro convinced his team to enlist on the side of the Nigerian 
forces against secessionist Biafra.  It would appear that the refusal of the Eastern regional 
government to support the Niger Delta struggle, and the subsequent creation of Rivers State 
by Gowon justified the choice by Boro and his colleagues to enlist and fight on the side of 
Nigeria.  Unfortunately, Boro was killed in the war, near Port Harcourt in 1967.  There 
existed a near absence of violent agitation  in the region  between the time (1967) and the end 
of the 1980s when the Ogonis, under the leadership of late Ken Saro Wiwa, rose up to begin a 
process of challenging the state and oil companies over the problem of sustainable 
development in the Niger Delta.  To be precise, it was in 1990 that the Movement for the 
Survival of Ogonis (MOSOP) was formed by Saro-Wiwa, as an umbrella body for seeking 
justice from the Nigerian state over issues of sustainable development. 
 
Activities of MOSOP led to the re-emergence of Ijaw groups in struggles against the state 
and oil companies over issues of sustainable development. In the final analysis, the choice of 
violent methods by local environmental groups is related to political opportunity structures in 
Nigeria.  This is demonstrated in the way in which politics has been utilised by operators of 
the state in Nigeria.  This is also reflected in the delay or failure of the government to compel 
oil companies to implement environmental laws meant to protect the environment and 
livelihoods of local communities.  Incidentally, the environment, which though remained the 
basis of survival for the Niger Delta became damaged in favour of   oil production and its 
revenue.  Ibeanu (2008: 9) has argued that oil underdevelops the Niger Delta.  This makes 
more sense if situated within the context of failure by government to respond adequately to 
the enforcement of pertinent policies to make oil production serve the purpose of sustainable 
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development.  As aptly noted by Ibeanu, “all politics is about managing or reconciling 
affluence and affliction, principally though not exclusively, through the instrumentality of 
state power.”159 This argument underpins the position of this study, and undertakes to state 
that government’s failure to implement environmental policy is political.  It is the frustration 
on the part of local groups with the use of power to ensure sustainable development in the 
region that is in part an explanation for violence in the Niger Delta today. 
 
 
4.5. Oil companies and justice and environmental movement organisations 
This section provides data for addressing the question of pattern of relationship between oil 
companies and local justice and environmental groups in the Niger Delta.  A key question 
which the researcher asked participants in this study was: what is the relationship between oil 
companies and local justice and environmental groups in the implementation of 
environmental policy in the Niger Delta? (See Table 4.6 for responses)   
 
Table 4.6. Pattern of relationship between oil companies and local justice and 
environmental groups 
 
 Local justice and  
environmental groups 
Oil company workers Government officials 
 Violence 
 Protests 













 Occasionally conflictual 
 kidnapping 
 
A number of indicators as earlier delineated have been recorded in this table. Violence, 
protests, killings, confrontations, exploitation, kidnappings and conflicts were common 
responses from members of local justice and environmental groups.  For oil company 
                                               
159 Ibeanu, O. (2008). “Affluence and Affliction: The Niger Delta as a Critique of Political Science in 
Nigeria,” an Inaugural lecture of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, delivered on February 20. 
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workers, criminal disruption, conflict and kidnapping are words used in response to the 
question the researcher asked on the pattern of relationship between oil companies and local 
justice and environmental groups. Their responses do not differ from those of government 
officials.  There is a clear admittance of conflict in the relationship between government 
security, oil companies and local communities in the Niger Delta although the reasons for this 
relationship differ among the triad.  The data in Table 4.7 shows profile of some the local 
justice and environmental groups in the Niger Delta, with their objectives, grievances and 
mode of operations.   
 
Initially (in the early days of exploration and production of oil), the relationship between 
local justice and environmental groups and oil companies took the form of mere complaint 
through community leaders to the oil companies on cases of pollution resulting from oil spills 
and gas flaring. Oil spills and gas flaring are key forms of pollution visible to the eyes of the 
average local community member in the Niger Delta, and often lead to destruction of 
farmlands, aquatic resources and the atmosphere. Up to the 1970s, key oil companies in the 
region did not face any violent resistance from local oil bearing communities on protection of 
the environment by the government and oil companies. This is understandable given that 
general lack of awareness on the part of local communities was not sufficient for mass action 
against the government or oil companies.  Besides, the use of force on the part of the state 







Table 4.7. Profile of some local justice and environmental groups in the Niger Delta 

















Resource control; development; 
environmental justice; marginalisation; 
neglect; lack of access to the oil business; 
repression by the Nigerian state. 
 
Hostage taking; violent 
confrontation; press 
statements; conflict with 
state security; physical 
attacks on oil company 
facilities;  killing of state 
security personnel 
2. Ijaw Youth 
Council (IYC) 
Militarisation and repression by the state; 
destruction of the environment by oil 
exploration and production company 
activities   (gas flare and oil spillage); 
resource control; poverty and political 
marginalisation (faulty federal structure). 
Was responsible for 
Kaima Declaration; 
Confrontation with state 
security; press statements; 
wants oil companies to 








Neglect and marginalisation; 
underdevelopment; access to benefits from 
oil; militarisation. 
 
Attack and seizure of oil 
facilities; armed 
confrontation with state 













Environmental justice; marginalisation; 






Protests; youth militancy;  
press statements; ejection 







state  violence; militarisation; ecological 
damage 











militarisation; resource control; faulty 
federal structure; equity; ecological 
damage. 
Seizure of oil facilities; 
violent encounters with 
state security; demand for 







A key element in defining the relationship between oil companies and local environmental 
groups in the Niger Delta is the perception of the implication that the state is in joint-venture 
relationship with oil companies in oil exploration and production (See Tables 4.6).  The 
relationship between the state and oil companies in joint-venture agreements is determined by 
co-existing concession contracts which define relationships among the parties involved, and 
their interests. To be precise, the functional agreements spell out relationship between owners 
of licences and leases and ground rules for exploration and production of   oil and gas. The 
state’s participation in oil business through joint-venture agreement with the oil companies is 
grounded in the ownership structure of natural resources (oil and gas) in Nigeria.  The 
Petroleum Act of 1969 vests ownership of all oil and gas under or upon all land in Nigeria in 
the state.  The Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulation, embedded in that Act, among 
other issues of defining concessionary rights of oil companies also spells out the 
environmental obligations of the oil companies.  Indeed, oil companies are by that regulation 
to ensure that their operations do not pollute the environment, and if pollution occurs, should 
promptly respond in clean-up and remediation through appropriate use of technologies.  This 
aspect of the Act remains till date weakly enforced.  The reality is that the lack of or slowness 
in enforcing this and similar laws have contributed to further destruction of the environment 
in the Niger Delta (Omorogbe, 2001: 24-45). 
 
 
There are four types of legal relationship in the Nigerian oil industry that have implications 
for the relationship between oil companies and their host communities: the concession; the 
joint-venture; the production sharing contract and the service contract.160  Concession was oil 
mining lease granted oil companies under the Petroleum Act of 1969 before the participation 
of the state in the oil business.  It requires the company to fully bear the risk and the cost of 
                                               
160 See Omorogbe, Y.  (2001). pp. 46-50. 
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all exploration and production of oil and royalty and profit tax to the government. Entrance of 
the government in the oil business changed all that, such that today, only indigenous 
companies are granted concessions.  In the same vein, joint ventures refer to acquisition of 
participatory interest by the government in concessions held by oil companies (Shell, Mobil, 
Agip, Phillips, Elf, Chevron and Pan Ocean).  The joint-ventures are shaped by other 
agreements such as the Participation Agreement, Operating Agreement and Memorandum of 
Understanding.  The Production Sharing Contract (PSC) is criticised for being in favour of oil 
companies against the state.  Under the PSC, cost in form of oil, is allocated to oil companies 
for the recouping of operating and capital costs. Operating costs are recouped in the year of 
expenditure whereas that of capital cost is recovered over a period of five years or more. For 
each of the cases, the increasing price of oil per barrel is not built into the agreement. 
 
 
The service contract entails reimbursement of 50 per cent of all exploration cost to contract if 
exploration activities do not result in commercial discovery by the government through the 
NNPC.  On the other hand, if commercial discovery is made in the period of five years, the 
NNPC would meet with the contractor to assist to recover cost and how much remuneration 
or profit it deserves.  In this form of contract, the contractor (Oil Company) pays its usual 
company tax whereas the NNPC pays all petroleum profit tax. 
 
In the above four types of relationship in the oil industry, oil bearing communities are not 
legally considered in any of the relationships or interests defined in the agreements. This is 
said to create the impression that these communities are not stakeholders in the matters that 
pertain to exploration and production of the oil.  They are rather excluded from the structure 
of ownership of oil and relationships in its exploration and production as defined in the terms 
of the various joint-venture agreements between the state and the oil companies.  Support for 
the various legal relationships in the oil exploration and production business on the side of 
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local groups from the Niger Delta is severely hampered by their perception of exclusion from 
the deals.  The researcher asked participants at the FGDs on what they consider the motive 
for the identified nature of relationship between local justice and environmental groups and 
oil companies and got various responses that were coded into values of 1 and 0 (binary 
coding).  Responses include: Greed; damages to the environment; political marginalisation of 
the Niger Delta; failure of the government to monitor compliance with oil and environmental 
regulations; character of the Nigerian state; majority ethnic domination of minorities. (See 
Tables 4.7 and 4. 8)161 
 
 
Table 4.8.  Reasons for pattern of relationships between local justice and environmental 
groups and oil companies 
 
1. Greed  
2. Environmental grievance 
3. Poverty  
4. Political marginalisation of the Niger Delta 
5. Failure of the government to monitor compliance with oil policy and regulations 
6. Nature of the state 
 
Participants from the oil industry (SPDC, Agip and Elf) affirmed sour relationship between 
local environmental groups and the oil companies.  Some however stated that much of the 
cause of this conflictual relationship is due to criminal behaviour of youths in the oil bearing 
communities where oil companies operate.  They contend that it has nothing to do with either 
environmental grievance or failure of oil companies to implement their environmental 
policies as many of these companies now adopt best practices in their operations to prevent 
                                               
161 Also see taped video of youths from the oil bearing communities in the Niger Delta in Anti-
Imperialism Camp organised by Social Action 19-24th of August, 2008.  Allen presented a paper on 
“Is a Nonkilling Nigeria Possible.”  The youths were asked in a questionnaire to respond to the 
question “Is a Nonkilling Niger Delta Possible.”  Out of 29 youths that responded, 18 said yes, with 
conditions of improvement in the socio-economic and political development of the region.  
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large scale pollution of the environment through oil spills and gas flare.  According to 
Dadiowei162 “life has become difficult for my people because of the damage oil companies 
have done to the environment in my community. Many of these people do not have education 
and skills to secure alternative jobs. Oil spill, for example, is so devastating. Fishing and 
farming which used to be the main preoccupation of the people is now an old story.” Poverty 
is a critical element in the discourse of the consequences of losing such traditional means of 
livelihood for many of the communities in the oil bearing states of the Niger Delta.  In fact, as 
one participants asked, “what alternative source of income is there for these communities 
whose farms and rivers have been damaged by regular oil spill?”163 Certainly, oil companies 
have been blamed for the socio-economic conditions of the Niger Delta.  
 
Environmental issues remain a critical element among people from the Niger Delta in their 
relationship with oil companies.   Local environmental groups164 and scholars   who attempt 
to explain the crisis  have continued to cite complex  issues that border on  loss of means of  
livelihood and general  underdevelopment in consequence of oil company operations in the 
Niger Delta.   In fact, this link is about how government has failed to enforce standards in the 
oil sector in Nigeria.  Apparently, the oil industry has come to stay as a direct outcome of 




                                               
162 Participant at the focus group held in Yenegoa, Bayelsa State.  See recorded tape. 
163  Celestine Akpobari is the coordinator of Ogoni Solidarity Forum who participated in the focus group 
discussion in Port Harcourt. 
164 Justice and environmental groups range from those involved in mobilising and sensitising oil 
bearing communities towards environmental, economic, political, social and cultural rights against 
negative consequences of oil company activities to those who by virtue of their awareness and 
experience with oil companies resort to violence to force out sustainable development from the state 
and oil companies.   
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Graph 4.2 Community disruptions, production deferment 
 
Source: Report of the Niger Delta Stakeholder Workshop, held April 15-17, 2004 
  
 
4.6. Government and justice and environmental movement organisations 
The relationship between government and  local justice and environmental groups is currently 
characterised by: killing of state security operatives by local armed justice and environmental  
groups; killing of members of local justice and environmental groups by state security 
operatives; physical attacks on oil company facilities by local armed groups; making of  
government policies perceived to be injurious to the development of the Niger Delta;  protests 
and disruption of oil production activities by local armed justice and environmental  groups; 
hostage taking of local and foreign oil workers by local armed justice and environmental  
groups; funding of government security operatives by oil companies; and lack of support for 
environmental policy. 





Table 4.9. JEMO165attacks on the Nigerian oil industry between January 10, 2006 and 
September 15, 2008.  
 
                                               
165 Justice and Environmental Movement Organisations.  Some refer to them as Niger Delta  militant groups. 
S/N DATE  ATTACK 
1. January 10, 2006 Kidnap of 4 expatriate workers at SPDC’s offshore EA 
oilfield. They also bombed crude oil pipelines, cutting 
supplies by 100,000 bpd by armed group. SPDC shut 
production by 115,000 bpd. 
2. February 18, 2006 Barge operated by Wilbros was attacked and 9 oil workers 
abducted. They also bombed SPDC’s crude oil pipeline 
operated by NNPC and blew up SPDC Forcados tanker 
loading platform, compelling the company to suspend exports, 
cutting production by 100,000 bpd.  
3. March 18, 2006 Blew up pipeline operated by Agip, cutting supply by 75,000 
bpd. 
4. May 10,2006 An executive of an oil company, Baker Hughes was killed by 
gunmen. 
5. May 11, 2006 3 oil workers for Saipem were kidnapped. 
6. June 2, 2006 1 Canadian, 6 Britons were kidnapped by armed men from 
Bulford Dolphine oil. 
7. June 7, 2006 Attack of SPDC operated natural gas facility, killing  of 6 and 
kidnapping of 5 South  Koreans. 
8. June 20, 2006 2 Filipinos working for Beaufort  
International were kidnapped. 
9. July 6, 2006 Michael Los, an oil expatriate worker was kidnapped. 
10. July 25, 2006 A mob from the Niger Delta invaded Agip Ogbainbiri flow 
station, taking 24 hostage. 
11. August 3, 2006 Expatriate oil worker for German company, Bilfinger and 
Berger, was kidnapped by armed men dressed in Nigeria army 
uniform. 
12. August  4, 2006 3 Filipino oil workers in  a bus conveying them to work were 
kidnapped by armed men in Port Harcourt. 
13 August 15, 2006 2 Norwegian and 2 Ukrainian oil workers were kidnapped. 
14. August 10, 2006 A Moroccan and Belgian were kidnapped in Port Harcourt. 
15. August 13, 2006 5 expatriate oil workers were kidnapped in a nightclub in Port 
Harcourt. 
16. August 16, 2006 1 Lebanese kidnapped. 
17. August 24, 2006 Italian oil worker employed by Saipem was kidnapped. 




19. October 3, 2007 7 expatriate oil workers working for an Exxon Mobil 
contractor were kidnapped. 
20. October 21, 2006 7 oil workers were kidnapped.  
21. November 2. 2006 2 expatriate workers for Petroleum Geoservices and an 
American oil worker were kidnapped. 
22. November 22, 2006 One British oil worker killed as Nigerian soldiers’ attempted 
to free hostages abducted earlier same day. 
23. December 7, 2007 Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) 
kidnapped 3 Italians and 1 Lebanese at a residential facility. 
24. December 14, 2007 5 SPDC expatriate workers were taken hostages at the River 
Nun SPDC logistics base. 
25. December 18, 2007 Explosion or 2 car bombs--one in Agip and the other in SPDC 
residential area of Port Harcourt. 
26 December 21, 2007 JEMO attacked Obagi field operated by Total and killed 3. 
27 January 5, 2007 Armed men kidnapped 5 Chinese and planted a bomb at 
SPDC residential quarters in Port Harcourt. 
28 January 10, 2007 9 South Korean oil workers kidnapped in Bayelsa. 
29 January 16, 2007 3 expatriate oil workers were killed when their boat was 
attacked by gun men. 
 30 January 20, 2007 Gun men attacked and seized German shipping line, Baco-
Liner cargo ship and took 24 Filipinos on board hostage. 
31 January 23, 2007 Gun men kidnapped 2 expatriate oil workers (an American 
and Briton in Port Harcourt on their way to work). 
32 January 25, 2007 9 Chinese expatriates were kidnapped. 
33. February 4, 2007 9 oil workers kidnapped. 
34. February 6, 2007 A Filipino kidnapped on Port Harcourt-Owerri Road 
35. February 7, 2007 A Filipino woman kidnapped in Port Harcourt. 
36. February 18, 2007 3 expatriate oil workers of Croatia national were kidnapped. 
37. June 1, 2007 4 expatriates (from Britain, France, Netherland and Pakistan) 
staff of Shlumberger were kidnapped in Port Harcourt 
38. July 4, 2007 5 expatriate (from Australia, New Zealand, and Venezuela) 
workers for SPDC were kidnapped during attack on its facility 
at Soku River State. 
39. July 8, 2007 2 expatriate oil workers were kidnapped from a barge near 
Calabar in Cross Rivers State. 
40. August 10, 2007 British manager of oil services firm, Hydrodive was 
kidnapped in Port Harcourt. 
41 August 12, 2007 John Hana-Daher died in the hands of his captors as 
announced by the the government in Bayelsa State. 
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42. October 10, 2007 1 expatriate (Columbian) oil worker died from the attack 
undertaken by MEND. 
43 October 26, 2007 6 oil workers were kidnapped by unknown gun men. 
 
44. October 30, 2007 Naval war ship (NNS Obula) deployed to secure the EA 
SPDC’s oil field was attacked in Rivers State. 1 Naval officer 
died and 5 injured. 
 
 




46. November 12, 2007 35 militants attacked naval officers at Exxon Mobile 
Terminal, Ibeno, and Akwa Ibom State. 25 persons were 
injured while 1 pregnant woman died. 








49. January 11, 2008 MEND attacked tanker ship of petrol at the Nigerian Ports 
Authority in Port Harcourt. 2 persons were injured. 
 
 
50. February 3, 2008 MEND attacked military house boat kept to secure SPDC 
facility at Tara manifold. 
51. February 11, 2008 A supply vessel belonging to Total Oil Nigeria Limited was 
attacked by gunmen at Kalaibama Channel, Bonny Island.  2 
soldiers were killed. 
 
 
 52. February 11, 2008 A naval gunboat belonging to the Pathfinder Naval Command 
of the Nigerian navy escorting NLNG boat from Port Harcourt 
to Bonny was attacked by members of JEMOs.  4 people died. 
 
 
53. March 19, 2008 Exchange of gun fire between armed men and soldiers 
securing oil company vessel in Rivers State. 





55. April 2, 2008 2 oil flow stations at offshore Forcadoes were blown off by 
armed JEMOs.  1t was reported that 11 soldiers died. 
 
 
56. April 13, 2008 Members of JEMOs bombed Agip vessel in Forcados, Delta 
State.  10 naval officers died.  Undisclosed number of 




April 15, 2008 
 
April 19, 2008 
Several attacks on oil pipelines on the Warri-Benin-Rivers 
State axis belonging to NNPC was attacked and vandalised. 
MEND destroyed the Adamakiri flow station belonging to 
SPDC, in Delta/Edo.  6 security personnels and 2 civilians 
were killed. 
 
59. April 21, 2008 2 major oil pipelines in Soku-Buguma and Buguma Alakiri 
were attacked .10 soldiers were killed. 
 
60. April 24, 2008 MEND attacked oil pipeline operated by SPDC in Kula, 




61. May 2, 2008 SPDC oil facility in Soku/Alakiri, Rivers State was destroyed 
by MEND. 5 expatriate oil workers were kidnapped. 
62. May 13, 2008 Oil vessel belonging to Chevron was hijacked by armed 
members of JEMOs in Kula, Rivers State. 
 
 
63. June 9-10, 2008 Clashes between militants and security personnels in Delta 
State. 
64 June 11, 2008 9 navy personnel and 4 civilians killed during attack by militants on 
Addax Petroleum oil fields near High Island rig. 
65. June 19, 2008 Bonga oil facility (deep offshore) belonging to SPDC was struck by 
MEND fighters. 
66. June 20, 2008 Chevron oil facility was attacked in Rivers State. 
 
 
67. June 28, 2008 Soldiers and militants clashed in Delta State. 
 
 
68. July 16, 2008 Clashes between militants and soldiers in Rivers and Bayelsa States. 
 
 
69. July 24, 2008 Expatriate oil company workers were kidnapped in Rivers State 
 





   
Sources:  Today August/September 2007; Niger Delta Wednesday June 11 2008; Newswatch 
May 4, 2009 
 
 
From the responses of study informants to questions about the relationship between 
government and local justice and environmental groups in the Niger Delta, it would appear 
that violent protests, killings and kidnapping of oil workers on the part of the people, and the 
use of force on the part of government characterise relationships (see Table 4.9).  On 
questions of specific grievances and causes of the violence  respondents pointed to socio-
economic conditions of poverty, loss of livelihood and marginalisation including  destruction 
of the environment by oil companies.  With regard to Table 4.9 which shows cases of armed 
justice and environmental movement group attacks, it should be noted that member groups of 
the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) are believed to be 
responsible for most of the attacks.  Often, members of the different groups that constitute 
MEND hide under the umbrella provided by MEND.  It must be noted that these attacks are 
not directly linked to the issues of implementation of environmental policies. Instead, 
statements issued by MEND spokesman after most of the attacks would always point to 
issues of damage to the environment by activities of oil companies and development of the 
Niger Delta. Following from the pattern of these attacks and statements by MEND 
71. August 8,  2008 Attack of Ondo State Oil Producing Development Commission by 
members of JEMOs. 
 




73. August 19, 2008 Members of JEMOs destroyed oil pipeline in Delta State. 
 
 
74. August 24, 2008 Members of JEMOs hijacked oil vessel on Bonny River. 
 
75. August 30, 2008 Soldiers (JTF) clashed with armed men in Rivers State. 
 
 
76. September 13, 2008 Oil platforms in Kula and Alakri flow stations belonging to Chevron 
were attacked by JEMOs. 
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spokesman, it is clear the state of the environment in the region would have probably been 
different if oil companies fully complied with relevant oil related environmental legislations.  
This failure of oil companies to operate with minimal impact on the environment points 
directly to the failure of the government to implement/enforce its environmental policy. This 
link goes to define consequences of the conflict between local oil producing communities on 
the one hand and government and oil companies on the other.  It is difficult to demonstrate 
statistically the extent of compliance by oil companies to environmental legislations because 
of conflicting claims made by government officials at the Ministry of Environment and the 
Department of Petroleum Resources; Justice and Environmental Movement Organisations; 
and Oil companies. In any case, with the huge revenue generated from oil, members of the 
justice and environmental movement groups expect more than they get from the government 
in its provision of basic amenities of life and opportunities.  Against the background that the 
Niger Delta is the region on which Nigeria’s economy is currently dependent for much of its 
foreign exchange earnings, the anger and frustrations arising from this economic neglect have 
fuelled the conflict.  To a large extent, facts on the ground support the central thesis around 
the environment since the idea of sustainable development is broad, encompassing social, 
environmental, economic and political dimensions.  Environmental policy is one way of 
dealing with social, economic and political problems associated with the environment.  
Although, the facts do not support notions of direct relationship between the environment and 
conflict in this case, the relationship can be seen to be rather indirect and complex as many 
interrelated issues of lack of economic and social progress come into play. 
 
Government is in joint venture with the oil companies and depends on them for funding the 
apparatus of the state.  The moral obligation of protecting oil facilities and workers has 
resulted in a strained relationship between government forces and local groups.  In fact, the 
relationship between oil companies and the government has been well noted as collaborative. 
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This relationship was described as that of power by Orssato and Clegg (1999: 266), such that 
government seems to lack, or is unwilling to enforce, certain environmental laws embedded 
in various components of sustainable development.  Indeed, the joint venture arrangement 
with the oil majors for exploration and production of oil and gas has to a large extent reduced 
the willingness of government officials to ensure compliance of oil companies with 
environmental standards.  This also explains why Orssato and Clegg used a political ecology 
framework to analyse the relationship between business organisations and environmental 
policy. Government is a co-investor with the oil companies by the nature of the joint venture 
relationship; therefore government is constrained to be slow over matters of environmental 
policy legislation and implementation.   
 
Consequently, local environment groups perceive government and the oil companies as the 
same and therefore subject to the same violent expression of grievance.  As Agbonifo (2004: 
3) notes: “I argue that frustration and grievance, born out of socio-political realities, and the 
sense of insecurity they give rise to better explain why peasants take to anti-state action”.  In 
the same vein, Cynthia Whyte166 also notes: “We maintain that the only solution to dealing 
with the lack of development in the Niger Delta today is through strategic and systematic 
deployment of armed struggle across the length and breadth of the Niger Delta.  We will 
succeed because we must” (Izon Link, 9 March 2008: 12).  Responses of interview 
participants reinforce that view as shown in Table 4.10)167 The researcher notes that the 
nature of the relationship between the government and oil companies in the exploration and 
production of oil influences the nature of relationship between local justice and 
                                               
166 Cynthia Whyte is a spokesperson for the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta and 
spoke to Izon Link reporter on the 8th of March, 2008.  She stated that non-violent agitation for rights 
undertaken by local environmental groups did not win the minds of those who control state power in 
Nigeria.  According to her, “the quest of the people of the Niger Delta can only be achieved through 
armed struggle.”  




environmental groups and the government.   
 
  Table 4.10. Grievances 
 
What are the 
specific 
grievances 












 Pollution of the environment168 8 
 Marginalisation of the Niger Delta from the oil business 8 
 Neglect of the Niger Delta  
8 
 Loss of livelihood   
8 
 Exploitative oil policies of government  8 
 Lack of development 8 
 Total  8 
 
In direct contrast, government officials at the DPR169 observed that the supposed 
environmental and other grievances are not genuine as many of the justice and environmental 
movement groups now involved in violent confrontations against the state and oil company 
facilities in the Niger Delta are also involved in criminal activities.  At the Technical Services 
unit of the DPR,170 responses on the issue of grievances were acknowledged but seen to be 
                                               
168 One of the militants in MEND who embraced amnesty offered by the Federal Government of 
Nigeria in the month of September 2009, simply known as Commander Ebi, spoke in a focus group 
discussion arranged by Thomas Hansen for his field data collection pursuant to completing his 
doctoral thesis.  He reiterated these issues.  As well, seven others out of a total of nine participants in 
that focus group held the same opinions about the role of oil companies and the government in the 
crisis in the Niger Delta. 
169 Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR). 
170 On the 5th of February, 2008, the researcher had a face to face interview with a management staff 
of Health, Safety and Environmental unit of the technical services department of the DPR in Port 
Harcourt while distributing copies of a questionnaire to staff there.  Reacting to the problem of 
implementation of the Environmental Impact Assessment decree, she said the obstacle rests with the 
attitude of the so called local justice and environmental groups. For instance, oil companies are 
expected to conduct EIA and display reports for 21 days for the public to scrutinize.  In most cases, 
according to her, people from the oil bearing host communities are only interested in the financial 
benefits from the oil companies that come with new projects.  They are not genuinely interested in the 
environment.  She described local environmental groups as criminals involved in illegal bunkering 
and similar activities in order to control the market. 
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insufficient for explaining motivation for the identified pattern of relationships. This is 
understandable given that some of the members of the local justice and environmental groups 
in the Niger Delta are nowadays involved in hostage taking of oil and government workers 
for ransom.  It appears that hostage taking has become some sort of business with ransom 
being the strongest motivation. 
 
 
Local justice and environmental groups seek relationship of equity in the distribution of 
revenues generated from the exploration and production of oil and gas as well as the 
management of the environment.  Strangely, these groups seem to basically hold the same 
ideas about the issues raised from the discourse (See Table 4.9). Nevertheless, the political 
class, as well as some local contractors to oil companies would prefer a slightly different 
view on these issues that help to balance their private interests. This is borne out clearly by 
the language of participants and in the documents surveyed in the study.  For instance, The 
Ogoni Bill of Rights spells out the travails of the Ogoni people in Nigeria and goes  further to 
outline their demands from the Nigerian state and oil companies as follows: local autonomy 
to enable the Ogonis control certain aspects of the life of the people such as management of 
the environment, natural resources of oil, and culture.  To the oil companies, the document 
demands the payment of USD4 billion as reparation in compensation for environmental 
damage caused by the oil companies in Ogoni land and USD6 billion as share of royalties due 
Ogoni for the over three decades of oil exploration and production in Ogoni.  These demands 
were perceived by the state (under military government of General Sani Abacha) as threat to 
its interest and that of the oil companies.  As Ojakorotu has noted: 
The Niger Delta crisis assumed horrendous dimensions in the early 1990s with the 
emergence of social movements and militant youth groups that began to challenge not 
only the Nigerian state but also the policies, attitudes, and activities of the 
multinational oil companies (MNOCs) in the region. This activism can be attributed 
to frustration (on the part of the people of the region) arising from both state and oil 
companies’ negligence and destruction of the Niger Delta’s ecology, which is the 
basic structure that supports life in the region, as elsewhere. It may be said that the 
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struggle by the people of the region have been predicated on certain fundamental 
issues, namely: their exclusion or marginalization in terms of access to oil revenue; 
their struggle for greater access to resource sharing (known in Nigerian parlance as 
resource control); environmental degradation; and egregious human rights violations. 
Within this milieu (of the struggle), the crisis in the region has become not just a 
domestic affair but an issue on the front burner of international environmental 
discourse and advocacy (Ojakorotu 2008: 96) 
 
In the same vein, Orubu, Odusola and Ewharieme (2004:203-204) have noted that: 
 
 In 1998, youths from the oil-producing states of the Niger Delta area had threatened 
to declare an independent Republic, for the inability of the Federal Government to 
resolve the environmental question and adequately compensate the people for 
depriving them of their rights to land and other sources of livelihood due to oil 
exploration and production activities!  
 
Indeed, social movements against the state and oil companies in the Niger Delta became 
prominent in the early 1990s when the Ogonis,171 under the aegis of the Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni people (MOSOP), began several protests against damage done to their 
environment by the activities of SPDC.  Many years after initial attempts by Isaac Adaka 
Boro and his colleagues to redress the power imbalance172 in Nigeria, the Ogonis rose to 
challenge the state and oil companies in Nigeria over basic issues of development and 
ecological destruction in the area due to oil company activities. The Ogonis focused on the 
Nigerian state’s denial of the people a level of political autonomy within the framework of a 
united Nigeria.  They needed to control both the natural resources of oil and management of 
the environment.  The emergence of MOSOP and its activities between 1990 and 1993 
marked a new phase in the relationship between the government and local oil-producing 
communities in the region. 
 
                                               
171 The Ogonis are a minority ethnic group of about 500,000 in population in the “south-south” of 
eastern Niger Delta.  Their homeland spreads across the local government areas of Gokana, Khana, 
Tai and Eleme in Rivers State. There are six clans in Ogoni, with each headed by a Gbenemene or 




Leaders of the Ogoni people alleged that the state and oil companies had done very little 
towards the development of Ogoniland, irrespective of the fact that the area is the 5th single 
largest oil bearing community in Nigeria.  Instead, as the late spokesman of MOSOP, Ken 
Saro Wiwa, once noted: 
If you take away all the resources of the (Ogoni) people, you take away their land, 
you pollute their air, you pollute their streams, you make it impossible for them to 
farm or fish, which is their main source of livelihood, and then what comes out of 
their soil you take entirely away . . . if more people in Ogoni are dying than are being 
born, if Ogoni boys and girls are not going to school . . . if those who manage to scale 
through cannot find jobs . .. then surely you are leading the tribe to extinction.(cited 
by  Osaghae, 1995: 330). 
 
Based strictly on composite issues of economic and political conditions perceived to have 
been intensified by the presence of oil, the Ogonis became resistant to state power.   The 
protest against environmental destruction in the Ogoni area was an attempt by the Ogonis to 
secure a system of organisation of production of oil  that would guarantee substantial 
legitimate power over management of both the oil resource and the environment since the 
government, after decades of alliance with the oil companies, could not effectively manage 
the oil resource and the environment in ways that would mean increased income, food on the 
table and general welfare for the people of Ogoni land.  Activities of SPDC in Ogoni land 
were a strong motivation for the protests that MOSOP began to undertake.  For instance, in 
July 1970, there was an oil blow-out from SPDC’s facility at Bomu (Dere) that lasted for   
two months.   Farmlands and general ecological resources were destroyed.    It was expected 
that the government would   intervene to ask SPDC to pay adequate compensation to the 
natives but SPDC rejected the idea of compensation with impunity.  Similarly, Wilbros, an 
American  company working for SPDC in 1993, began dualisation of the Trans-Niger 
pipeline  meant to transport oil through Ogoniland to Bonny export terminal,  Villagers  near 
Biara protested the destruction of their crops by the company.  Karalole Kogbara, a mother of 
five and owner of crops destroyed, was beaten up by the soldiers guarding Wilbros staff on 
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duty.  Following this, early in the morning villagers came out in large numbers unarmed to 
protest the beating.  The outcome was the opening of fire on the crowd by the soldiers.  One 
Agbartor was killed and 20 persons injured, including Kogbara whose hand had to be 
amputated because of bullet wounds.  It is noteworthy that Wilbros and SPDC undertook the 
project without any environmental impact assessment.   These events and similar ones 
characterised Ogoni land until 1995 when the military government under General Sani 
Abacha hanged Ken Saro-Wiwa along with eight other Ogoni leaders allegedly for murdering 
four other Ogoni leaders.  This resulted in further protests and anger that eventually stopped 
SPDC from further exploration of oil in Ogoni land.  
 
 In January 1993, more than 400,000 Ogonis under the aegis of MOSOP staged a protest 
against the government and the oil companies over economic and political rights and 
ecological rehabilitation.  This was to be the beginning of a troubled relationship between the 
government of the time and MOSOP.  The government from then onwards consistently 
responded to protests by MOSOP with force (deployment of soldiers).  Eventually, Ogoni 
land became highly militarised.  The point is that it was not mere damage caused by SPDC to 
the environment in Ogoni land that motivated protests and subsequent violence. That would 
be too simplistic.  It was the inaction of the government and lack of implementation plans on 
the part of the oil companies that led to deplorable economic, social and political conditions 
that motivated the protests and violence.  In 1966 in Britain, when there was challenge of 
environmental destruction by a business organisation the government took a decision that 
required the company to pay three million pounds. The Nigerian state seems unable to take 
similar steps by implementing its environmental laws and compelling oil companies to 








Before the discovery of oil in Nigeria, protection of the environment in the Niger Delta 
occupied an insignificant position on the country’s national political agenda. Indeed, globally 
environmental issues occupied a lowly position on national political agendas of governments 
and societies.  Not surprisingly, environmental concerns were not seriously considered a 
potential source of violent conflict or mutual suspicion between either both the government 
and oil companies on the one hand and local oil producing communities of the Niger Delta on 
the other.  Certainly, it was not a feature of relational concern between the three majority 
ethnic groups (Hausa/Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba) on the one hand and the ethnic minorities of 
the Niger Delta on the other hand. Today, however, the environment in the Niger Delta is one 
of the most challenging subjects in politics at both the domestic and international levels.   To 
be sure, since the discovery of oil in Nigeria, local oil bearing communities have been the 
driving force in the politics of the environment.  Environmental issues have now been placed 
firmly on the political agenda of the country with the Nigerian state and oil companies as core 
actors in the process. Attempts to keep the issues out of the political agenda by dominant 
forces in the political system could not be sustained for long due to the growing awareness of 
rights on the part of groups.  The researcher notes that the environment now looms large on 
the political agenda of Nigeria because of this awareness caused by environmental 
destruction created by oil company activities in the Niger Delta. Indeed, the tardiness of the 
government in responding adequately to environmental problems associated with the oil 
business in Nigeria seems self-explanatory.   This section of the study assesses the nature and 
role of environmental politics in Nigeria by analysing relevant power relations and how they 
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manifest among key actors in the political processes over sustainable development goals 
embedded in environmental policy.  From the discussions, it is pertinent to note that violence 
in the Niger Delta is a reflection of deep-seated contradictions in environmental governance 
and oil politics in Nigeria (Ojakorotu, 2008: 92).  Successive regimes -- colonial, military and 
civilian -- have failed either to address the fears of the people of the region or to understand 
their underlying political and socio-economic interests, especially in the context of a multi-
ethnic state characterised by inequitable power relations.   This chapter assesses the character 
of environmental politics173 based on three sets of databases174 drawn from content analyses 
and presented in the following sub-headings: The political process and the environment; Oil 
companies and environmental politics; environmental practices in the Niger Delta; Oil 
companies and implementation of environmental policy; and justice and environmental 
movement organisations. 
 
5.2. The Political Process and the Environment  
A key area of response of participants on the nature of the political process in Nigeria in 
relation to the crisis in the Niger Delta is in respect of the extent of legitimate opportunities it 
provides for the pursuit of group environmental, socio-economic and political interests.  The 
underlying feature of the politics is exclusion in oil and environmental governance.  
                                               
173    Politics implies public activity that brings together competing interests.  The political system or 
what is seen as political are in three constitutive components of politics, institutions and the state. Of 
the three, politics has the most imprints on behaviours, institutions and the state and in fact is a 
determinant factor for all. This is because such competing interests imply that society and  politics are  
seen as competition for interest ‘over property, resources, values, goods, services and political power 
in the context of society. WHERE IS THE CLOSE OF QUOTE MARK? Institutions refer to the 
arrangements meant to reflect the interests and facilitate the competition over social products (oil 
resource and its benefits in the case of the Niger Delta) exercise of political power. “The state is a set 
of relationship among social groups or classes that is organised and regulated by political power.”  For 
details see,  Sangmpam, S.N. (2007).  “Politics Rules: The False Primacy of Institutions in the 
Developing Countries,” Political Studies, Vol. 55, pp.201-224. 
174  Data generated from key informant interviews, focus group discussions, journals, books, 
magazines, dailies, oil company reports and government documents. 
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Recurrent words175 in the statements of people from the oil bearing communities are 
marginalisation, resource control, environmental degradation and development. The 
argument is made that the political system and process fails to adequately address these issues 
satisfactorily.  As Ojakorotu notes, “Successive governments and oil companies have failed 
to take appropriate steps to address these fundamental issues.”  The use  of ethnic sentiments 
for mobilising  groups in the politics of the environment and oil is now common among many 
justice and environmental movement organizations such as the Egbesu Boys, MOSOP, 
MEND, NDPVF,  to mention but a few.  
 
 The overriding goal of the post-colonial state in Nigeria has been the pursuit of economic 
growth.  Initially, this goal defined the content of the political system and its processes with 
little or no consideration for the environment.  Until the late 1980s, concern for the 
environment was therefore not a priority either for the colonial or post-colonial state. 
  
 
From the pre-independence era, the Niger Delta people had expressed distrust in the ability of 
the political process to protect their socio-economic and political interests.  This fear 
informed their representation to the Secretary of States in London in 1958 as independence 
approached. The main ground for this fear was its ethnic minority status in relation to the 
major ethnic groups of Hausa/Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba.  The emergence of oil as a strategic 
commodity for the funding of the state and ensuring development in Nigeria intensified this 
suspicion.  Several local environmental groups in the region point to the character of the 
political system as marginalising the people of the region in key decisions of development.  
None of the dominant regionally ethnic political parties before and immediately after 
independence proposed plans for addressing the environmental impact of oil exploration and 
production activities in the Niger Delta in its manifesto, although a section of oil laws made 
                                               




provisions for protection of the environment.   This scenario, in the face of increasing wealth 
from the oil found in the Niger Delta, has served to fuel the anger and frustration of many 
people from the area against the oil companies and the government. 
 
 
On October 1st 2004, the then President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, held talks with 
Alhaji Asari Dokubo, leader of the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF)  in an 
attempt to forestall the proposed “Operation Locust Feast”176 by the force.  Asari asked for 
resource control from the president as a condition for abandoning the war against oil 
companies.  He expressed lack of confidence in the political system to bring benefits from the 
oil wealth to those who suffer direct environmental impact from oil exploration in Nigeria.  




Since the 1990s, local armed groups have regularly attacked state security operatives and oil 
facilities.  In turn, state security operatives have similarly responded with their own attacks 
on the armed groups.  Given the resultant tensions and in the absence of compelling political 
initiatives, the political process has remained suspect as far as many Niger Delta people are 
concerned.  According to one of the Egbesu Boys: 
The Nigerian political system is exclusionary, demeaning and exploitative of the 
‘goose that lays the golden egg.’  Until the political system becomes fair, democratic 
in every sphere, including economic and protection of the environment and 
distribution of revenues from the exploitation of oil from the Niger Delta, there will 
not be peace in this country.178 
 
In a similar vein, Boyloaf, a militant and a member of MEND states, “I believe that freedom 
is not free; you must fight for it and there must be bloodshed” (NewsWatch September 1, 
                                               
176  Military offensive against oil companies. 
177   For example, Celestine Akpobari (of Ogoni Solidarity Forum)  Isaac Osuoka (former executive of 
Ijaw Youth Council) and  Mike Orike (of oil bearing Ogba-Egbema community in Rivers State)  
expressed these views in the focus group meeting in Port Harcourt.  All key informants from the 
extraction of local environmental groups expressed similar views.  See field data collection note. 




2008:12).179  Horsfall also notes: “I got involved in the struggle when I noticed that 
successive governments in Nigeria have always enslaved the Niger Delta people by the use of 
the Land Use Decree.  For example, in Bille where I come from, there is no cottage hospital; 
government presence is not felt at all.”180    
 
There is substantial evidence of linkage between perception of the political system and choice 
of political action of local environmental groups. This link is made based on comments from 
the interviews and content analysis of documentary resources.  However, the criminal 
activities  of  some of the members of these groups regarding  issues of kidnapping, inter-cult 
fighting, bunkering and other vices sometimes  put serious questions over the  sincerity and 
genuineness  of  claimed   grievances around the  issues of socio-economic, political and 
environmental  destruction  of the oil bearing communities of the Niger Delta.   In any case, 
the researcher does not argue that all militants and their groups are focused on the single 
factor of failure of the political system to deal with issues of environmental problems in the 
Niger Delta as the major explanatory factor for their violent confrontation with the state and 
oil companies.  The point being made, however, is that the character of the political system 
plays a significant role in determining decisions of local environmental groups regarding the 
aforesaid issues (socio-economic, political and environmental despoliation) in the region. 
 
                                               
179   Boyloaf is a University graduate and is said to have joined the  militant struggle because he felt 
frustrated by the injustices of the political system against the Niger Delta.  See Newswatch, September 
1, 2008.  He controls three armed camps in the Niger Delta.  The environment is a key point 
mentioned for his motivation in the fight against the oil companies and the government. 
 
180   Horsfall is a militant and feels strongly about the need for Niger Delta people to control resources  
in  their environment.  Sometimes resource control also means increased  revenue allocation to the 
Niger Delta states and Local Governments. 
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Table 5. 1. JEMO leaders and their claimed grievances towards Nigerian political 
processes and system*  







Controls 5 camps including 













3. Victor Ben Ebikaborwei 
(alias Boyloaf) 
Controls 3 camps-Ezetu, 






4. Africa Owei (Egbesu 
Boys) 
Controls 1 camp in 
Osiapermo (has 400 trained 
heavily armed fighters). 
Bayelsa State Socio-economic, 
political and 
environment 
5. Joshua Machiver 
(Egbesu Boys) 
Controls 1 camp at 
Olugbobiri community.  
Bayelsa State Socio-economic, 
political and 
environment 
6. Asari Dokubo (NDPVF) Controls massive followers 
(camp not known). 
Rivers State Socio-economic, 
political and 
environment 
7. Alali Horsfall (current 
chairman of IYC, 
Eastern zone) 
Controls 1 camp in Port 
Harcourt area. 
River State Socio-economic, 
political and 
environment 
8. Tom Ateke (Niger Delta 
Vigilante) 
Controls 1 camp at Okochiri 
before the JTF attacked the 
camp. 
Rivers State Socio-economic, 
political and 
environment 
9. Soboma George 
(Outlaws) 
- Rivers State  Socio-economic, 
political and 
environment 
10. Farah Dagogo (Leader 
of the Niger Delta Strike 
- Rivers State Socio-economic, 
political and 
environment 
11. Sunny Opuambe 
(leader of the Bush 
Boys of Okrika 
- River State Security 
12. Henry Okah (Leader 
of MEND) 
Large followership-










*(The data is a sample of justice and environmental movement organisation leaders, their 
camps, geographical location or areas of operations in the Niger Delta) 
 
The issue is worsened by corruption of the local political elite who hardly have anything to 
show for the development of their communities after many years of collecting improved 
revenues from the Federation Account statutorily meant for the development of the region. 
Indeed, since 1999, huge revenues have accrued to the states and local governments in the 
region, but are believed to have been stolen by local politicians.  For example, Orike181 and 
Edward are highly sceptical of the capacity of the political system in Nigeria to objectively 
address key political issues related to the Niger Delta. 
 
 
There is substantial evidence of how oil and environment-related conflicts depend on political 
opportunity structures (Omotola, 2006: 2; Frynas, 2001: 45; Robert, 2001: 43-51; Ikelegbe, 
2001: 437)182.   For example, it has become fashionable to create and re-create ethnic 
identities for confronting the Nigerian state and oil companies. The Ogoni as well as other 
groups in the Niger Delta have done so.  It would appear that these revolving identity patterns 
are used to form or claim common ancestral and cultural features on the basis of the political 
economy and the instrumental use of political opportunity structures to engage with the state.  
The formation of MOSOP was in line with this thinking.  The Ogoni people were mobilised 
by the late Ken Saro Wiwa.   As Naanen notes: 
                                               
181 Dr Orike was part of the focus group discussions in July 2008. 
 
182  Omotola, S. (2006). “The Next Gulf: Oil Politics, Environmental Apocalyse and Rising Tension in 
the Niger Delta,” ACCORD Occasional Paper Series, Vol. 1, Number 3, p. 29; Ikelegbe, A. (2001).  
“Civil Society, Oil and Conflict in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria: Ramifications for a Regional 
Resource Struggle,” Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 38 No. 3, pp. 437; Robert, F.O.N. 
(2001). “The State, Accumulation and Violence: The Politics of Environmental Security in Nigeria’s 
Oil Producing Areas,” Nigerian Institute of Social and Economic Research (NISER) Monograph 
Series, No. 17, pp. 43-51; Frynas, F.G. (2001). “Corporate and State Responses to Anti-Oil Protests in 




Perhaps the greatest proponents of radical restructuring in the oil producing areas are 
the Ogoni people in the present Rivers State.  Frustrated by what they call decades of 
neglect and exploitation by the Nigerian state and environmental terrorism, by oil 
companies, the Ogoni have decided to pursue more radically than any other groups 
what they perceive as their rights and the case for restructuring (Naanen, 1995: 56-
62).183 
 
 Informal groups created on the basis of ethnic identity have helped to bring these 
environmental issues onto the political agenda of Nigeria over the years.  At least, such is the 
case of the Ogoni people who also have mobilised international attention to the Nigerian state 
and oil companies.  To a large extent, the lack of trust in the ability of the political process to 
resolve key oil and environment related issues in the Niger Delta has determined the choice 
by local justice and environmental groups of political actions or mode of expressing their 
grievances against the oil companies and government (See Tables 4.5. and  4.8). 184 
 
When the civilian government under Olusegun Obasanjo was inaugurated on May 29 1999, 
the people of the Niger Delta expected massive change in the region.   They hoped that after 
the murder of Ken Saro Wiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders as well as repressive policies of 
the departing military oligarchy the incoming democratic government would provide 
legitimate space for engagement of groups in dialogue needed for change.  This was in spite 
of the frustrations by a section of the people who had been discouraged by difficulty in 
seeking redress through the electoral system because of the fraud that attended the 1999 
electoral process Naanen 1995: 58).  The elections were massively rigged, making it difficult 
for the process to produce credible leaders of choice (WWICS, 2008: 4; Omotsho 2007: 4).  It 
appears that the failure to secure rights over the control of resources through conventional 
political processes partly explains the resort to political action by the environmental groups.  
                                               
183  Naanen, B. (1995). “Oil-Producing Minorities and the Restructuring of Nigerian Federalism:  The 
Case of the Ogoni People,” Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics  33(1)  pp. 56-62 
184     This is based on telephone interviews with members of local justice and environmental groups 
in the Niger Delta in August 2008. 
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The challenge of democracy and political governance provides grounds or explanation for 
these groups.  Although democracy is believed (See for example, Nsirimovu, 2009:36) to 
have the capacity to address the development needs of the people of the Niger Delta, much 
would depend on the nature and character of the democracy in place.  Certainly, a 
participatory and inclusive system of governance rather than one that exhibits elite politics 
and domination would better serve the needs of Niger Deltans.  In reality, many believe that 
the struggle for power by many politicians is often motivated by greed.  Some see political 
processes and manoeuvring in Nigeria as an attempt to privatise the Nigerian state.  Not 
surprisingly, oil is an important factor in the political calculations of actors in the Nigerian 
political system.  This fact is hardly disputed (See for example, Nsirimovu, 2009: 5; Osuoka, 
2007: 30). 
 
Initially, the discovery of oil in commercial quantity in Nigeria was expected to be an 
immense source of economic growth.  At least, this was the view of early economists 
involved in the reconstruction of the country’s post-colonial state.  As the fifth largest 
exporting country in the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),   oil 
generates about 95 percent (Olarinmoye, 2008: 25) of government foreign exchange earnings 
for the federal government in Nigeria.  In this way, oil is a key determinant of the content of 
the country’s annual budget.  Therefore, as a crucial anchor of Nigeria’s national financial 
security and health, oil is an issue that calls for appropriate government policy to ensure not 
only its financial and economic vigour but also its political stability.  In fact, it is for such 
reasons that oil has emerged as the basis for demands by members of oil-producing 
communities of the Niger Delta for resource control or, at least, a greater share of the 
proceeds from the oil resources.  The current sharing formula is perceived to be unjust by 
local communities of the region. By the current sharing formula, 13 percent goes to the oil 
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producing states while the balance of 87 percent is distributed among the federal, state and 
local governments (Olarinmoye, 2008: 29-30).  
 
The character of oil politics185 is responsible for the resurgence of various groups, providing 
political opportunity platforms for articulating their grievances and engaging the state and oil 
companies.  For instance, MOSOP and IYC, and several other groups existing on the basis of 
ethnic identity/consciousness are united against the government and the oil companies who 
they perceive as the common enemy responsible for the lack of sustainable development in 
the midst of oil wealth.186  For example, a participatory democratic process in the governance 
of the oil and the environment would have involved oil-producing communities in the 
framing of laws governing the oil industry and the environment.187  However, from the 
colonial times, genuine attempts to involve affected groups have not been made.  The 
granting of licences to oil companies without consultation with villagers where the oil is 
mined has significance for corporate behaviour regarding sustainable development of the 
area.  This is especially so in the context of dispossession of villagers of their traditional land 
ownership rights (system) through various oil-related laws that transfer such ownership to the 
government. It makes sense, therefore, to say that concerns of villagers about the protection 
of their resources should inform the licensing process.  It is for this reason that the Ogoni 
people insist that no oil company will start mining oil in Ogoni land without the involvement 
                                               
185 Oil politics is directly related to environmental politics and both compare or interrelate  in their 
motivation for conflict among key actors in the Niger Delta. 
 
186 Based on arguments of participants at the focus group discussions, key informant interviews and 
questionnaire. 
187 It is for this reason also that Kimse Okoko, President of the Ijaw National Congress, has repeatedly 
called for repeal of these laws because of the belief that the laws support injustice, oppress the people 




of the Ogoni people.188 In fact, the Ogoni argue that having forced SPDC out of Ogoni land 
since the hanging of their leaders, Ken Saro Wiwa and company, the people would be active 
in the oil business by forming their oil company to engage in the business.  They argue that 




Entry of local environmental groups from the oil bearing communities of the Niger Delta into 
the politics of the environment and oil in Nigeria is significant for various reasons.  First, the 
dialectics of change in their choice of political action over the years suggests some level of 
frustration with the inability or unwillingness of those who dominate the political process to 
make substantial concession over issues of sustainable development of the region.  Our 
finding is that these groups articulate development issues with environment issues.  Often, 
they do not campaign on the greenness of the environment alone but do so in relation to the 
social, political and economic issues they face.  This also buttresses the perceived link 
between the environment and economic progress such that the threat to the environment by 
way of denial of access to the resources of the environment is considered grave injustice.  
They have therefore succeeded in bringing firmly the environment in the Niger Delta into the 
political agenda of Nigeria such that since 1960 successive governments in Nigeria have had 
to respond (though in a piece-meal and wholly unsatisfactorily manner) to the issues.  For 
example, at inception in May 2007, the government of Musa Yar’Adua placed on its seven-
point-agenda the problem of the Niger Delta (Tell Magazine, 2008: 48-50).189 
                                               
188    Based on comments by participants.  This point was strengthened by the former  Secretary 
General of MOSOP, Professor Naanen  in a lecture he presented on the 22nd of August, 2008,  at a 
political education seminar in Aluu, organised by Social Action. 




The people of the region feel marginalised and therefore see substantial common self-identity 
as a tool for overcoming this marginalisation.  According to Ikpesu:190 
Oloibiri is supposed to have been compensated very well for all the areas Shell 
devastated.  There was environmental degradation, our forests were devastated, and 
rivers and ponds were polluted.  There is nothing to show for 20 years of oil drilling 
here.   We should have hospitals, schools and water without asking, but nothing has 
been done.  Since they built a hospital, it has not been commissioned.  Both the 
federal and state governments forgot Oloibiri.  We are suffering because of the 
hospital.  They finished the hospital but refused to commission it.  Today, the 
buildings are falling down.  A planned river embankment has remained a pipe dream.  
Our town is prone to river erosion and flooding.  We don’t have drinking water. They 
built the tank and abandoned it.  We have no water.  Only one man here sunk a 
borehole and gives water to everybody to drink.  It’s only now that the local 
government has started sinking its own borehole.  The road here is the only one in the 
town.  It was done half-way and abandoned.  We look back in regret and anger.191 
 
It is such expression of anger and frustration by people against oil exploration activities by 
SPDC (previously Shell D’Archy) and the political system that helps to explain the choice of 
political action by groups and individuals from the Niger Delta.  Incidentally, Isaac Boro was 
born in this village and also witnessed the advent of Shell D’Archy to Oloibiri. 
 
This study finds that the failure of successive governments to address adequately the problem 
of environmental justice and development in the Niger Delta gradually created the conditions 
that have led to current violence in the region. The data in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show the 
perceptions of oil company officials and members of local justice and environmental 
movement groups on issues of accessibility of the political and legal systems in determining 
the choice of mode of settling disputes between members of these groups on the one hand and 
the government and oil companies on the other.  From the aforesaid tables (5.2 and 5.3), 
violence would be last choice if political space and legal system were more accessible to 
members of justice and environmental movement organisations in the Niger Delta.   
                                               
190   Sunday Foster Ikpesu is current chief and clan head of Oloibiri where oil was first discovered in 
commercial quantity in Nigeria.  He talks about the discovery of oil in his community and the neglect 
of the community by government. 
 




Table 5. 2. Perceptions of oil company officials on issues of democratic means of 
addressing grievances in the Niger Delta 
 




Q4 How would you assess chances in attempting to use 
democratic or electoral processes as a means for trying to 










If the political system was more democratic (free and fair), 
do you believe that the militants would be more willing to 
work through the political arena in lieu of violence? 









How would you assess their chances for success in 
attempting to use judicial processes as the means for trying 
to address their grievances? 
7   46% 8  53% 





If the judicial system was more transparent and accountable 
to the law (less corruptible), do you believe that the 
militants would be willing to work through the courts in 
lieu of violence? 
12    80% 4   26% 





How would you assess government’s efforts in using 
violence rather than persuasion techniques to address the 
grievances of the people of the Niger Delta? 
6   40% 9   60% 





Has government done reasonably well, in your view, in 
addressing the grievances of the Niger Delta people? 
13  86% 2   13% 




Since government environmental policy aims at achieving sustainable development, its 
failure at the level of implementation has logically meant lack of improvement in the social, 
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economic, political and environmental conditions of the region in the context oil-dependent 
economy.   It is noted that although crucial, this failure is not a single cause explanation for 
the conflict in the region, which is clearly affected and shaped by a combination of social, 
political, economic and environmental factors that interact simultaneously to create 
conditions that are conducive to violent conflict.   
 
Table 5.3. Perceptions of members of local justice and environmental movement 
organisations on issues of democratic means of addressing grievances in the Niger Delta  
 
  Positive (1) Negative (2) 
Q.
6 
If the political system becomes more democratic 
(free and fair), would you be willing to use the 










If the legal system becomes more transparent and 
accountable to the law (less corruptible), would 
you be willing to use the courts in lieu of 
violence? 









 An important question regarding the nature of the political system is whether or not it is 
democratic in governance. The case of Nigeria defies any direct response.    This was clearly 
articulated by participants who stated that Nigeria lacks democratic credentials in terms of 
freedom of voters to participate in the political process, but is more characterised by 
exclusion of citizens in daily governance by the government, especially in respect of the 
environment and its resources. This perception appears to be shared by most people in the 
Niger Delta who demand resource control, and believe that much has not changed from the 
style of governance during colonialism.   Since the time of political independence Nigeria has 
not seen democracy consolidated as the democratisation process itself has been slow, having 
been aborted on many occasions by the military or ex-military officers in civilian 
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government.  The process has rather shifted away from the part of consolidation of 
democracy (see Table 5.1).  
 
There are three ways in which the environment is linked to the political system.  First, 
decisions about the extraction of the oil in the Delta Niger Delta are influenced by the interest 
of actors in the political system, resulting in the popular notion among local populations that 
they have lost their right to control the resources of their environment.  This is the high point 
in their consequent call for resource control.   The effective management of the environment 
is considered critical for their survival.    In any case, existing and past political leaders at the 
various levels of government -- whether military or civilian -- seem to have failed to 
adequately convince people of the Niger Delta of any genuine desire to develop the region.  
They perceive that the political system lacks this transparency and is characterised by 
political practices that exclude people from the Niger Delta region from aspiring to the 
highest office of the country (presidency) or other key decision-making positions that could 
influence policy on the environment.  It is for this reason that many people justify the use of 
violence in the region and express hope that it would help change the status quo.192 
 
However, violence now constitutes a threat to the security of residents in cities and villages of 
the region. Politicians have played an important role in creating this scenario, especially in 
the way they take advantage of the social and economic conditions of life of the youth in the 
region.  The event of the 1999, 2003 and 2007 elections in Nigeria support this assertion.  
Youths were recruited to effect election malpractice and eliminate political opponents.   Some 
of the militants in the Niger Delta claim to have been recruited by local politicians to rig 
those elections and kill and maim opponents.  For example, at the Okrika area of Rivers 
State, a powerful politician (name withheld), a former secretary to the Rivers State 
                                               
192  The few militants interviewed in this study justify the violence but had hoped that years ago a 
political solution to the crisis might have been found if the process was transparent. 
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government and ex-minister in the federal government was accused by Asari Dokubo and 
reported in the newspapers193 that he sponsored and armed the Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV) 
led by Tom Ateke during the 1999 and 2003 elections to eliminate opposition to the Peoples 
Democratic Party in Okrika.   
 
To say the least, the aggressive and violent nature of electoral politics in Nigeria is predicated 
upon the amount of financial benefits an office is expected to accord the aspirant to the 
office.  Government is funded from the revenues from the production of oil. Access to 
political office is seen as access to state resources.  Therefore, those who are unable to secure 
such access are less likely to benefit from the political system.  This is a basic logic for the 
reactions of the local environmental groups to the political system in Nigeria.  At least this is 
contained in the statements made by participants from local environmental groups from oil 
bearing communities of the Niger Delta.  Resource control, environment, development, and 
marginalisation are words they employ frequently to explain or justify the violent resistance 
against the state and oil companies in the region. 
 
It is all about politics of the environment, defined partly in terms of the nature of political 
practice or structures that determine decisions and interests in the exploration, production and 
use of the oil resource in Nigeria.  Oil is a key determinant of economic growth for Nigeria 
and has shaped the politics of the nation tremendously.  Regrettably, the government has not 
demonstrated commitment to the implementation of policies to the benefit of the Niger Delta 
people where consensus worldwide is that the area has suffered severe economic neglect in 
the midst of plenty.  Not even the surge in oil revenues has changed the tide (Frynas, 2001: 
28). 
  
                                               




This state of affairs, attributed to the nature of the political system and processes, seems to 
confirm  the  notion (for example McLennan and Ngoma, 2004: 279) since  1994 that the 
weakness of political systems in developing countries to respond to basic needs will become 
a source of international insecurity.  Such weakness is seen in the inability of political 
systems to address key development imperatives of groups, like the Ogonis and Ijaws of the 
Niger Delta.  This perceived lack of political space in the political process to obtain 
development or express legitimate grievance contributes tremendously to the choice of 
political action of these groups in the Niger Delta.   
 
Although ethnicity is seen by many (see for example, Ukiwo, 2005; Obi, 2001: 86)194 as a 
negative factor in Nigeria’s national politics, the liberal political space is perceived as a 
closed system that  promotes the use of non-conventional platforms such as ethnic 
associations as instruments of politics for the minorities of the Niger Delta.  The Ogoni 
people emerged as a monolithic cultural group responding to their perceived exclusion from 
the benefits of oil mined from their environment in spite of grave environmental 
consequences which they bear.  The Ijaws have similarly employed the ethnic platform as an 
avenue for engaging in politics.  As Obi notes: 
Ethnic identity is thus transformed into a mobilising element not only for contesting 
access to state and oil power within the context of competing and conflicting 
ethnicity, but also [a] modality for organizing social forces to resist alienation, 
extraction and exclusion by the hegemonic coalitions of the ethnic elite (Obi, 2001: 
87)195 
 
                                               
194 Ukiwo gives an instrumentalist interpretation to ethnicity being a tool in the hands of political 
elites in Nigeria. See Ukiwo, U. (2005). “On the Study of Ethnicity in Nigeria” CRISE Working Paper 
No. 12, p.1-4. 
195  Obi, C.I. (2001). “The Changing Forms of Identity Politics in Nigeria Under Economic 
Adjustment:  The Case of the Oil Minorities Movement of the Niger Delta,” Research Report, 




In a similar vein, Mitee196 argues that the youths in the Niger Delta are getting angrier 
because they have “left school and there are no jobs, no alternatives for them.  One is not 
making excuses for the criminal things they are doing.  But, clearly, the government itself has 
created the environment in which we are seeing what we are seeing today.” (Tell Magazine 
February 18, 2008: 57).   
 
Indeed, it would appear that addressing the development needs of the people of the region 
was to be a condition for independence in order to allay their fears of marginalisation.  The 
Federal Government, at independence, failed to deliver sustainable development through the 
Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) established by an Act of parliament in April, 1961.  
It starved the body of funds.   Lack of political will on the part of the government reflected in 
the limited powers of the agency provided in the Act establishing it.  It only had advisory 
powers in the physical development of the Niger Delta.  Azaiki (2007:116) notes that “failure 
of the NDDB also marked the beginning of federal government policy and programme failure 
in the Niger Delta.” 
 
The people of the Niger Delta initiated nonviolent political actions in defense of the security 
of their environment and to support sustainable development in the region in the years 
immediately following the discovery of oil at Oloibiri.  However Ijaw leaders who sought 
change in Ijaw land through the instrument of party and electoral politics were often 
disappointed as securing any seats, let alone of any substantial number, in the regional and 
federal legislative houses was near impossible because politics was controlled by majority 
ethnic groups of Hausa/Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba.   The environment in the Niger Delta, as 
was common to other parts of the world, was not a political issue for existing political parties 
either at the regional or federal legislatures at the time.   It was Isaac Boro who began to 
                                               
196 Mittee  has served as the president of MOSOP since the death of Kenule Saro-Wiwa in 1995. 
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make bold statements regarding the role that oil exploitation might play in the 
underdevelopment of the region.  Boro sought to mobilise support and followership to resist 
the Nigerian state.  Clearly, given the then rather low negative impact of oil production on the 
environment in the Niger Delta and its equally lowly status on the Nigerian national budget, it 
would appear that Boro was either a highly visionary leader well before his time or an 
individual who was driven by other motivations.  Either way, his work stands out today -- at 
least, for the opportunity it gave past Nigerian governments to take corrective steps in support 
of environmental initiatives and sustainable development.   
 
At the end of the Nigerian civil war which lasted between 1967 and 1970, the Federal 
Government created the Niger Delta Basin Development Authority (NDBDA), as a 
development agency for the development of the region. Contrary to the idea of it being a 
special development agency for the region, the Act establishing the body was defective.   At 
this time, the impact of oil exploration and production activities on the environment had 
assumed more alarming proportions (Azaiki, 2007: 117).  Therefore, the role of providing 
water for irrigation, removal of excess water (drainage), prevention of waste/loss of farmland 
by flooding, and the provision of potable water and ensuring effective management of water, 
statutorily assigned to the NDBDA, would probably have made more sense with full 
implementation for sustainable development of the region.  In contrast, the agency was faced 
with excessive politicisation that rendered it weak and unable to deliver development (Azaiki 
2007:117).  Eventually, 10 more Basin Development authorities were created for the entire 
country, contrary to the original idea of developing the Niger Delta as contained in the 
Willinks Commission Report.  The same fate of starvation of funds and lack of political will 




With expanding pressure for development from local populations and complaints of 
destruction of the environment, political and economic marginalisation in the distribution of 
revenues accruing from exploration and production of oil, the Federal Government 
established the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) in 
1992.  Besides the broad aim of developing the oil mineral producing communities of the 
Niger Delta, OMPADEC, was commissioned to rehabilitate and develop oil-producing areas, 
tackle ecological problems arising from exploration and production of oil, and liaise with oil 
companies on matters of pollution control. Despite the obvious objectives the agency was 
meant to serve towards sustainable development of the Niger Delta, it failed essentially due 
to corruption and undue political influence from the presidency. As one participant notes: 
OMPADEC was created in order to politically compensate some collaborating elite 
from the Niger Delta.  The common men like you and me from this region gained 
nothing.  Look at all the projects OMPADEC claimed to have concluded.  Are any of 
them working? Do you go to your villages? Tell me which one is working.  Even the 
so called roads, how many were completed and are in good condition?  It is an arm of 
the presidency where control and management flows from the presidency.  In fact, 
corruption defined activities of OMPADEC.197 
 
OMPADEC failed eventually to satisfy the sustainable development needs of the region.  As 
Ibaba notes: “In Nigeria, politics directs public resources to the promotion of individual and 
sectional interests, rather than the common interest.”198  The political process resulting in 
decisions that are either meant to prevent further damage to the environment or control 
resources of the environment in the region does not seem to have clearly focused on the 
realisation of sustainable development.  By the Act establishing OMPADEC, and provisions 
thereof, utilisation of revenues from oil exploration and production resources ought to focus 
                                               
197 The statement was made by a focus groups discussions participant on the 28 of April, 2008 at 
Social Action, Port Harcourt. 
 
198 Ibaba, I.S. (2008). “State Intervention in the Niger Delta: A Critical Appraisal of the Ideology of 
Development Commissions,” Proceedings of International Conference on the Nigerian State, Oil 
Industry and the Niger Delta, March 11-13 held at the Niger Delta University, pp. 530-540. 
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on the provision of basic measurable infrastructure such as schools, roads, hospitals, 
investment opportunities, and scholarships for oil bearing communities in the region.   
 
Nigeria returned to civil democracy in 1999 after many years of military dictatorship.   In the 
context of rising level of violence and general restiveness in the Niger Delta in the 1990s, the 
Obasanjo government sent a bill to the National Assembly for the establishment of the Niger 
Delta Development Commission (NDDC) on the 29th of May, 1999.  According to Azaiki 
(2007: 128), this bill “represented the response of the Obasanjo administration to the many 
struggles, battles and agitations in the heart of the area.  It was a response to the restiveness of 
the youths and the disenchantment of the old.”  The bill’s key objective was to design 
programmes or policies for the development of the Niger Delta.  It is a more comprehensive 
development agency for addressing the environmentally devalued region in areas such as 
education, transportation, health, industrialisation, agriculture, electricity, telecommunication, 
and water supply.  The bill generated problems of interpretation of the true meaning of the 
Niger Delta.  Eventually, benchmark of oil deposit in states was adopted in defining the 
region (Azaiki 2007: 128).  
 
Various stakeholders such as the Federal Ministry of Environment, Federal Ministry of 
Finance, and the oil companies were represented on the board of the NDDC. During the 
inauguration of the Commission, President Obasanjo reiterated his belief in the ability of the 
NDDC to drive socio-economic development in the region.  The Act establishing NDDC 
made several provisions including compensation for ecological and land acquisition, social 
amenities and infrastructure, and the award of scholarship to students in tertiary institutions. 
The basic organising principle of the state in Nigeria is federalism.  This implies a 
level of decentralisation of political power to lower levels of government-states and 
local governments.  In reality, such powers do not extend to critical areas of control or 
management of the environment and its resources.  The importance attached to oil 
resulted in a change of policy from earlier landownership systems in parts of Nigeria 
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where citizens or local people were guaranteed access to the resources of their 
environment and were responsible to nature for the consequences of their interaction.  
The Land Use Act of 1978 has been criticised (Ikelegbe, 2008: 107-137; Nafziger, 
2008: 147-156; Ibaba, 2008: 193-207; Thomas, 2008: 275-283)199 as an instrument 
for denying local populations access to land and resources in their environment.  It is 
supposed to represent the means by the Nigerian state to position the country 
effectively for economic progress through exploration and the production of oil for 
efficient service delivery and nation building.  Participants from the oil bearing 
communities concede that the Land Use Act is critical for the stance of violent 
resistance against the government and oil companies.  The Act limits the political 
space for resolving conflicts arising from the structure of politics in the country.200   In 
fact, the Act and some of the laws already discussed are seen as part of the structural 
violence from the federal government against the people from the oil bearing 
communities over structural difficulties that have hindered development.201 The 
nature of federalism as a factor in shaping political processes in the country has 
already been made.  Federalism in Nigeria seems to have been exploited and 
redefined in direct response to the emergence of oil as a major economic resource for 
the country.  The practice has been criticised by the Niger Delta people for  its present 
form of over centralisation (Anam-Ndu, 2003: 51; Ihonvbere, 2003: 187;  Ojo, 2002: 
1)202 a practice that is shaped by the influence of oil revenues.  
 
                                               
199   See Ikelegbe, A. (2008).  “Integrating a Crisis of Corporate Governance and the Interface with 
Conflict: The Case of Multinational Oil Companies and the Conflict in the Niger Delta,” Proceedings 
of International Conference on The Nigerian State, Oil Industry and the Niger Delta,held at the Niger 
Delta University, Wilberforce Island, 11-13 of march, pp.107-135; Nafziger, E.W. (2008).  “Nigeria’s 
Economic Development and Niger Delta Grievances,” Proceedings of International Conference on 
The Nigerian State, Oil Industry and the Niger Delta, held at the Niger Delta University, Wilberforce 
Island  11-13 March, pp.147-156; Ibaba, I.S. (2008). “Promoting Peace in the Niger Delta: Some 
Critical Issues,” proceedings of international conference on The Nigerian State, Oil Industry and the 
Niger Delta, held at the Niger Delta University, Wilberforce Island  11-13 March, pp. 193-207; 
Thomas, A.N. (2008). “State Failure and Insecurity in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria,” 
proceedings of international conference on The Nigerian State, Oil Industry and the Niger Delta, held 
at the Niger Delta University, Wilberforce Island  11-13 March, pp. 275-283. 
 
200   See transcript of focus group discussions.  Among participants from the Niger Delta, consensus is 
that the region is grossly marginalised.  This has been facilitated by the structures of federalism which 
they believe are in favour of majority ethnic groups against the interest of minorities of the Niger 
Delta who bear the environmental consequences of the oil business. 
 
201 See Ibeanu, O. (2008) “Affluence and Affliction: The Niger Delta as a Critique of Political 
Science in Nigeria,” an Inaugural lecture of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, delivered on 
February 20, pp. 3-4; Ibaba, S.I. (2008). “Alienation and Militancy in the Niger Delta: 
Hostage Taking and the Dilema of the Nigerian State” African Journal on Conflict 
Resolution, Volume 8, Number 2. pp. 1-24 
  
202  Anam-Ndu, E.A. (2003).  “Renewing the Federal Paradigm in Nigeria: Contending Issues and 
Perspectives,” in Gana, A.T. and Egwu, S.G. (eds.) Federalism in Africa, The Imperative of 




In the same vein, Ihonvbere notes that:  
without doubt, the emergence of several NGOs and the experiences of the minority 
communities especially the Ogonis and the Ijaws have contributed significantly to 
introducing the critical themes of minorities, resource control, the environment, and 
gender into political discourses in Nigeria. Environmental questions are now directly 
tied to contradictions and conflicts over questions of revenue generating and 
allocation and refederalisation.203 
 
The Nigerian state as presently constituted is an obstacle to true federalism in Nigeria.204  It   
has consistently shown lack of capacity to promote democracy that is needed for a true 
federal system.  This is understandable in the context of military dictatorship.   Instead, it 
interferes with possibilities for advancement in democratic rule, electoral malpractice and 
privatisation of the state.  Elsewhere, Okeke-Uzodike and Allen (2005: 166) argue that fixing 
deficits of democracy is required for a working federal system since the two are historically 
and conceptually linked.205    In fact, political restructuring is directly related to attempts to 
contain threats to the state dominated by majority ethnic groups and for the effective sharing 
of revenues from oil.  Naanen (1995: 5) refers to the functional role of federalism in Nigeria 
as internal colonialism.  In fact, according to him, “internal colonialism” encompasses the 
incidence and ways in which the majority ethnic groups exercise political control of natural 
resources in the environment of ethnic minority areas.  At least, 80% of FGD participants 
from the Niger Delta are of this view (See notes on focus group discussions). 
 
 
Distribution of revenues from oil exports is done on the basis of a number of components of 
the federal system -- states and local governments.  There are currently 36 states and 774 
local governments.  The north alone has 419 local government councils while southern 
                                               
203 See Ihonvbere. J.O. (2003).“The Nigerian State as an  Obstacle to Federalism: Towards A New 
Constitutional Compact for Democractic Politics,” in  A.T. Gana and S.G. Egwu (eds.) Federalism in 
Africa, The Imperative of Democratic Development, Volume 2, Trenton,NJ: The African Centre for  
Democratic Governance, p.187. 
204 Based on contributions from focus group discussions in Yenagoa and Port Harcourt in 2008 in 
course of field data collection for this work. 
205Okeke Uzodike, U. And Allen, F. (2005). “Making Nigerian Federalism Work: Fixing the 
Democracy Deficit,” in W.O. Alli (ed.) Political Reform Conference: Federalism and National 
Question in Nigeria, Abuja: Nigerian Political Science Association, p.167. 
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Nigeria has 357 councils.  Given the distributional arrangements of national finances – the 
sharing formula awards the federal government 52.68%t, state governments 26.72%, and 
local governments 20.60% of 87% of national revenues (the other 13% is awarded to oil-
producing areas) -- the allotment of state and local governments are understandably the stuff 
of high politics in Nigeria.  Basically, the more states and local governments you have, the 
more financial resources you are eligible to receive from the national accounts.  Not 
surprisingly, there are wide perceptions in the Niger Delta that the current distribution not 
only favours northern Nigeria but also the majority ethnic clusters.   
  
 There is a feeling among some participants from oil producing communities in the Niger 
Delta in the focus group discussions, conducted by the researcher in Port Harcourt on 24 
April, 2008, that the political process leading to the present federal structure was insensitive 
to the special conditions of the Niger Delta environment.  Nigeria transited from region-based 
federalism to state structured federalism.  The new arrangement has been marked by 
increasing centralisation of powers at the central government level.  Generally, successive 
military regimes after 1980 have continued to increase the powers of the federal government 
in fiscal matters over those of the other tiers of government.   Access and control of revenues 
from exploration and production of the oil has been a strong explanatory variable.  
Federalism has eventually taken the shape of unitarism in matters of extraction of the oil and 
distribution of benefits accruing thereof.   Only 774 LGs are recognised by the constitution of 
Nigeria and have access to monthly distribution of money from the Federation Account.  This 
situation seems to contradict the principle of federalism.  States have constitutional 
responsibility to create and ensure democratically constituted local government system in 
Nigeria. However, the creation of local governments by state houses of assemblies as a good 
governance mechanism has failed to produce expected results. First, the effort is frustrated by 
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the refusal of the Federal Government to recognise such LGs for legitimate access to the 
Federation Account.  The Bayelsa State experience with creation of 8 more LGs is often 
cited.  The point of anger on the part of some participants from the Niger Delta is that the 
Federation Account is funded by revenues from the sale of crude oil.  However, it must be 
recalled that substantial amounts of money have been allocated to the region since 1999 when 
the distribution of crude oil revenues changed markedly in favour of states and LGs in the 
Niger Delta.  Misgovernance and corruption are key contributory factors in explaining 
limited development in the region. 
 
An important component in the discussion of the political process and the environment is the 
role of the constitution and nature or legitimacy of its enactment.  The process of designing a 
constitution is critical to the practice of a democratic federal system.  Nigeria has had 13 
constitutions, starting from the 1922 constitution.  The first national constitution after the 
civil war (1967-70) was the 1979 constitution.   It was followed by the 1989, 1995 (although 
this – the 1995 constitution -- was no more than a draft as it was not used for any national 
purpose) and 1999 constitutions.  These constitutions progressively centralised powers in the 
federal government against traditional notions of federalism held by nationalists before 
political independence (reflected in the 1954 constitution).  Furthermore, they failed to 
capture the interest of nation-building; rather, they focused on unitary state-building 
strategies in order to overcome threats to the Nigerian state from within.  Besides, none of 
these constitutions has either had the benefit of true federalism or been characterised by 
democracy that promotes the inclusion of citizens in the political process.  The process has 
been defined more by exclusion of citizens and groups than by an open and inclusive space 
(See for example, Obianyo, 2005: 175; Jega, 2007: 64).206  Yet, democracy and federalism 
                                               
206   Obianyo, N.E. (2005). “Federalism, Constitutionalism and Local Government System in Nigeria: 
The Need for Constitutional Amendment,” W.O. Alli ed. Political Reform Conference: Federalism 
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derive their significance as institutions of representation and development from the value 
attached to popular involvement in the process of making a constitution.  Popular 
participation in constitution making confers legitimacy on the constitution and provides a 
framework for peace and harmony due to its popular acceptance by citizens and groups.  The 
process of making a constitution should be inclusive and not exclusive.  It must be 
characterised by broad representation, receptive to various shades of opinions and interests.  
It should be consultative and consensus building as much as open for civil society 
engagement.  FGD participants berated the Nigerian experience, citing the 1999 constitution.   
According to one participant: 
The fate of an ethnic group in a country is known from the space it occupies in the 
process of designing the constitution of that country.  In the case of the 1999 
constitution, the military government under the grip of northern politicians can only 
be so regarded, a document reflecting both the political and economic interest of the 
majority ethnic groups.  The environment and development of the ethnic minorities of 
the delta of Nigeria are secondary considerations without constitutional definitions.207 
 
Similar comments from key informant interviews lead directly to a conclusion of how 
faithless people of the Niger Delta are regarding issues that pertain to development of the 
region and access to decision-making structures on key grievance issues. The colonial 
experience of constitution making in Nigeria was understandably exclusionary given the 
mission of colonialism, being that of exploitation of economic resources of the country. 
Given that scenario, inclusion of all segments of the society in the political process could be 
dangerous for the politics of the era and not in the interest of the colonial government.  
Subsequent regimes, till date, have not departed radically from that tradition. The 1999 
constitution making process was characterised by lack of popular participation as only 
                                                                                                                                                  
and National Question in Nigeria, Abuja; Nigerian Political Science Association, pp. 175-194; Jega, 
A.M. (2007).  Democracy, Good Governance and Development in Nigeria, Ibadan: Spectrum Books 
Limited, p. 64. 
207  Participants (member of local justice and environmental movement organisation) at the focus 
group discussion held at Social Action, 33 Orominike Close, D-Line, Port Harcourt, and Rivers State 
on the 24th of April, 2008.   
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government-selected representatives were involved in the process.  This trend spells danger 
for minorities whose relative power position by conventional or democratic means in the 
constitution making process have remained weak such as ones in the oil producing 
communities in the Niger Delta.  These minorities use expressions that depict frustration to 
describe the entire process.  Following from comments of participants and from written 
documents by scholars on the subject, environmental politics in Nigeria interconnects or 
intermingles with the politics of revenue sharing as well as that of oil exploration and 
production.  This creates problems of describing the process from a purely environmental 
concern outside of issues of sustainable development, security of the state and interest of oil 
sector operators. The political process of course is naturally unable to compel certain 
behaviours outside of what the constitution or law permits regarding the protection of the 




So far, discussion of the political process and the environment in Nigeria draws essentially 
from the need to understand the wider political contours  such as the nature of environmental 
politics as it relates to key actors of oil companies, oil bearing communities of the Niger 
Delta and the government in relation to the sustainable development goals of the government.  
Such goals are understandably not connected with regimes that preceded the era of increasing 
importance attached to oil exploration and production in the country. 
 
 
Environmental politics is now characterised by violence.  Issues such as demand for resource 
control and development and protection of the environment underlie comments from 
members of local environmental groups.   According to Edward Alex Hart: 
The Nigerian political system is responsible for the state of things in the Niger Delta.  
Things have gradually got to this level because the successive regimes of the system 
failed to respond adequately to meet the needs of the people.  Without plan, the 
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situation has escalated to violent struggle for survival, although genuine grievance is 
now being undermined by uncoordinated greed of those who must take advantage of 
the situation.208 
 
Despite opinion held by local environmental groups in the Niger Delta, it is clear that 
federalism remains crucial for keeping Nigeria in unity as a country.   In any case, the task of 
nation-building in Nigeria requires a political system that is capable of assuaging the forces 
of disintegration in the disguise of legitimate demand for control of resources.  It appears that 
federalism has played an important role in this direction.  The issue of leadership seems to be 
equally critical in explaining the failure of federalism (political system) to properly address 
concerns of the Niger Delta people.  Providing the kind of leadership that promotes 
development of oil producing communities in the Niger Delta with revenues from the 
production of the oil is needed at the local and state government as much as at the federal 
government level.    
 
5.3. Oil companies and environmental politics 
Oil companies are accused of being responsible for the alienation of traditional oil bearing 
communities from their land, poverty, degradation of the environment and general dislocation 
of the peasant agricultural, social and political systems of the peoples of the Niger Delta.  As 
one participant notes: “they are worse than the government.”209  This notion about these oil 
companies operating in Nigeria dates back to the 1940s and 1950s.  Indeed, during those 
years, women in the Owerri and Okigwe area protested against Shell-BP, preventing the 
                                               
208    Edward Alex Hart is current youth leader of Bonny Island (the island houses a number of oil 
wells and is host to huge oil and gas investments as well as terminals for oil and gas exports) who 
spoke in an interview with the researcher on the 15th of August, 2008.  See notes of interview. The 
area is also known for much of militant activities.  At the time of the interview Edward was actively 
working with the state security on identifying 18 dead militants with whom the naval force in Bonny 
had engaged fire on 14 August, 2008 over attempts to destroy a naval war boat docked in Bonny. 




company from operating in the area for fear of damage to their environment.  Unfortunately, 
by 1958 oil companies had gained a foothold in other parts of the Niger Delta.    
 
 
It is worth noting that the development of the oil industry in Nigeria dates back to 1906 when 
the colonial government gave concessionary rights or licenses to British companies.  In 1907, 
the Nigerian Bitumen Corporation was granted license to prospect for oil.  The company 
drilled extensively for oil around the Lekki lagoon area of present Lagos State.  
 
 
The Mineral Oil Ordinance number 17 of 1914 gave monopoly over oil exploration in 
Nigeria to British oil companies.  Subsequently, Shell D’Arcy and Whitehall Petroleum 
drilled for oil extensively between 1919 and 1922 before suspending operations because of 
the Second World War.  Shell B-P became sole holder of concessionary rights for exploration 
of oil in Nigeria after the Second World War.  It held this position until 1951 when other oil 
companies gained access into the oil sector.  That reduced coverage of licence for Shell B-P 
to 64,400 km by 1956.  It reduced further as more oil companies entered the market.  For 




Nigeria’s oil production stood at 20,000 barrels per day in 1960.  Ironically, for both 
economic and political reasons, it rose astronomically in the years after independence.  In 
fact, by 1966, production was already at 420,000 barrels per day.  By 1967, when the civil 
war broke out, both the government of Biafra and the Federal Government had begun to flex 
muscles over payment of royalties and rents from the oil companies.  The Biafran 
government demanded royalties from the oil companies.  At the same time, the Federal 
Government was demanding such payments from the oil companies, threatening to withdraw 
licenses from them if they refused to comply with its directives (Steyn, 2003: 203).   
Ultimately Shell BP paid some sum to the eastern regional government of Biafra and then 
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incurred the wrath of the Federal Government.  Before 1966, the government of Nigeria was 
merely collecting rents, royalties and taxes from the oil companies.  She was not an active 
participant in the oil industry.  Beginning from 1966 the Federal Government, through 
various policies, became an active player in the oil sector. With the indigenisation policy of 
the Federal Government through the 1968 Companies Decree, oil companies were compelled 
to register as Nigerian businesses.  The posture of the government was determined first by 
suspicion by the federal government towards the oil companies in the period before the civil 
war, and second, a desire to reduce domination of the oil sector by foreign oil companies.  By 
1969, the Federal Government vested ownership and control of oil in the state, through the 
Petroleum Decree of 1969.  The government had early on acquired equity holdings in the key 
oil majors at the time and established joint venture arrangements for exploration and 
production of oil. 
 
The point has been made that the relationship between oil companies and local oil bearing 
communities has been marked by antagonism from the beginning.  However, from the 1950s, 
local oil bearing communities in the Niger Delta explored legal routes of resistance against 
the oil companies.  As Styne notes: “the legal route remained the preferred course of action to 
address oil related grievances until the 1980s when widespread civil discontent with the 
political incompetence of successive Nigerian governments and worsening economic 
conditions spurred the oil producing  communities into action.”210  Specifically, in 1984 
women in Ogharefe took to the streets demanding water, electricity, land, and compensation 
for environmental degradation from Pan Ocean Oil Company.211  In March 1986, a protest 
                                               
210   Steyn, M.S. (2003). “Oil Politics in Ecuador and Nigeria: A Perspective from Environmental 
History on the Struggles Between Ethnic Minority Groups, Multinational Oil Companies and National 
Governments,” PhD Dissertation submitted to the University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South 
Africa, p. 203 
211   An American oil firm 
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against Shell was undertaken by indigenes of Bonny, leading to the shutting down of the 
company’s operations for two days (Styne, 2003: 203).  On April 2, 1986, a group of native 
men and women held 40 staff of Shell hostage in Egbema in protest against the company’s 
neglect of the community.  In August 1986, over 10,000 women in Ekpan led a protest 
against the NNPC over issues of neglect as well. 
 
In the course of the 1990s, protests against oil companies began to take violent forms.   All 
FGD participants, including officials of the government, believe that these protests are 
products of political, economic and environmental neglect.  From statements made by FGD 
participants, political, economic and environmental factors have presented politics of the 
environment as politics of resource control.  Oil companies have occupied an important 
position because of their contribution in the generation of the wealth for which local oil 
bearing communities and other ethnic groups have been in struggle to control. 
 
Our finding is that the relationship forged, beginning from the colonial era, between oil 
companies and the government defines their relationship with the oil bearing communities of 
the Niger Delta.  For example, this relationship takes three different forms at different phases 
in the development of the oil industry; namely, the hegemony phase (1901-57); direct 
response phase (1960); and, tacit response phase (1966-79).212 The first phase was marked by 
full control of the oil business by oil companies.  Oil companies had full concessionary 
powers while the government played an insignificant role. This phase ended with colonialism 
in 1960 and also set the stage for negotiations that resulted in a new form of relationship. 
 
In the direct response phase, the government increased its participation through joint venture 
and profit sharing agreements, although control of the industry was still largely with the oil 
                                               





companies.  From 1966, (tacit response phase) the government emerged as full participant in 
the oil industry seeking complete control of the oil industry, at all stages -exploration, 
production and marketing-in the development of the oil business.  This era marked the 
reduction of oil powers of the oil companies and resulted in the growing benefits of the oil 
business to the government.  These developments had little or no consideration for the local 
oil bearing communities beyond a new awareness of the benefits of the oil and its impact on 
the local environment.  In this era laws that transferred ownership of the oil resource to the 
government were made. 
 
In spite of these developments in the relationship and attempts by the government to achieve 
full participation and control of the oil business, a distinction between ownership and 
management of the oil business appears to define relationship between the government and 
oil companies.  Management of the oil industry lies with the oil companies.  This has 
implication for environmental practices of the oil companies.  For instance, government fails 
to enforce compliance with environmental regulations because of the nature of relationship 
forged between it and the oil companies.  One participant described the relationship as “joint-
venture”213 suggesting commonality of economic interest.  This perception of interest by 
local oil bearing communities and their environmental groups often results in protests against 
the government and oil companies for the environmental impact of oil company activities in 




The point has been made that oil companies are the major contributors of environmental 
destruction in the Niger Delta.   Our visits to oil facilities belonging to SPDC, Agip, and Elf 
respectively in Joinkrama, Ogba Egbema, Ekeremor, Oshi, Odi, Agbere and Ogoni reveal 
                                               
213   Edward Hart was part of the focus group discussion.  He is youth leader in Bonny where, SPDC, 




how local oil bearing communities face various social and economic hardships caused by oil 
spillages.   Our interview with a senior government official at the Department of Petroleum 
Resources and a senior environmental scientist at NOSDRIA reveal that oil companies 
sometimes employ politics to evade remediation of oil polluted sites.   This is most prominent 
in the implementation of the post environmental impact assessment reports.  The reports are 
often manipulated by the oil companies through monetary inducements made to youth and 
traditional leaders in affected communities.  In Bonny, where SPDC, Agip, Chevron, Mobil 
and Elf have undertaken extensive development projects in response to protests by youths 
over environmental matters and development of the community, SPDC gave five million 
naira (N5, 000,000) to the community as part of its corporate social responsibility.  Charging 
that the fund was mismanaged, the youths carried out massive violent attacks on residents of 
the island, leading to the evacuation of some people, especially non-locals. 
 
 
There is substantial evidence that environmental politics in the era of military regimes and 
democracy have not produced results that are satisfactory to the people of the Niger Delta.  
This explains the sustained (in fact, the intensification) of attacks against oil companies by 
armed groups in the region.  Our study reveals a complex web of interaction of political, 
economic and environmental factors as the reason for this state of affairs.  One FGD 
participant from the Egbesu Boys states that “violence or killing is the only language they 
understand.”  This refers to the oil companies and the government.  Some participants 
however doubt the sincerity of members of armed groups who believe that violence is an 




5.4. Environmental practices in the Niger Delta 
 
 
The World Bank214 defines the environment as “the natural and social conditions, 
surrounding all mankind, and including future generations” (cited by Okotoni, 2004: 13). 
This suggests a mixed bag of issues, such as social, economic land and correlate resources 
that require consideration in the effective practice of the environmental management by the 
government, companies and citizens generally. The researcher found little evidence of 
effective practice of environmental management in the Niger Delta, whether by the 
government, oil companies or the local populations in the context of the oil economy.   
 
 
FGD Participants from oil companies, government and local environmental groups have 
tended to trade blame on the way the environment in the Niger Delta is managed.215  Indeed, 
planning, organising, supervising, monitoring and controlling of the environment, which are 
required for ensuring that the environment is conducive for both human habitation and 
business productivity remain inadequate.216  The government delayed instituting regulatory 
mechanisms for the problem of pollution of the environment by oil companies in the Niger 
Delta.  For their part, oil companies themselves have also failed to be regulated by voluntary 
standards of best practice.  As one participant notes: 
The oil companies and government do not handle the environment in the Niger Delta 
with care.  As I am talking to you there are people in my village who do not have 
farmlands any more because of the way that oil companies grab these lands for oil 
exploration and production.  The oil companies neglect what happens to the land as 
long as they are mining oil.  Oil mining results in death, gradual death, for the 
dispossessed local people.  Government is slow to respond to the effects of oil 
mining.217 
                                               
214Cited by Okotoni, O. (2004).  “Awareness and Environmental Management in Oil Companies in 
Nigeria,” Journal of Human Ecology, Volume 15, Number 1, pp. 13-17. 
215 This is based on comments by participants at the focus group meetings and key informant 
interviews. 
216 Dr. Orike, an environmental scientist and staff of one of the oil companies operating in the Niger Delta, who 
also participated in the focus group discussion in Port Harcourt on 24 April, 2008, emphasised this issue based 
on his personal experience with government officials from the  DPR on monitoring exercise with the company 
he works for. 




In a similar vein, Alagoa (2000: 7) notes: “the degradation of the environment from the 
activities of the multi-nationals prospecting for oil ensure that local resources are depleted.” 
218 Apparently, the nature of environmental practice of key stakeholders is at the centre of 
their economic survival.   It was observed in 2004 by stakeholders in the Niger Delta that: 
 
governments sign international treaties and protocols and do not implement at home. For 
example, gas flaring: due to the ozone layer depletion, gas flaring should have been 
stopped. What we have today is constant dilly-dallying and shifts, not guarantees. 
Government corporations should show the way. As we say no flares, our refineries should 
show the way by complying first.219  
 
 
Environmental practices by government, oil companies and local oil bearing communities in 
the Niger Delta vary depending on available technology, existing social, economic and 
political character of the oil business in the Niger Delta.  There is substantial evidence of how 
socio-economic and political factors help to explain the link between the nature of 
environmental practice and the attainment of sustainable development goals of environmental 
policy.   
 
 
Data obtained from interviews, library materials, reports, focus group sessions and 
questionnaires show that environmental practices promote conditions that favour violence 
between the state and local environmental groups.  Our finding is that officials of the 
government at the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), Federal Ministry of 
Environment (FME) and National Oil Spill Detection Agency (NOSDRIA) are faced with 
situations that hinder best practice in their statutory obligations to environmental problems 
created by operators.  Even the state security is unable to stop the illegal puncture of oil 
pipelines and stealing of oil products by some armed groups in the Niger Delta.  For example, 
NOSDRIA is the lead agency in oil spill matters created out of the Oil and Gas Department 
                                               
218    See  Alagoa, E.J. (2000).  The Ijaw Nation in the New Millennium, Port Harcourt:  Onyoma 
Research Publications  
219    Report of Niger Delta Youth Workshop 15-17th April, 2004. 
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of the Federal Ministry of Environment.  Presently, the agency merely estimates volumes of 
oil spilled by oil companies from simple geometrical interpretation based on reported oil spill 
cases.  This is more or less guess work.  Ideally, the agency ought to be equipped with all 
necessary tools and not depend on guesses and laboratories belonging to oil companies.220  
Also, as an agency, FEPA did not achieve much in many respects such as monitoring of 
operator compliance with standards.  As an official of the government notes: 
As an agency FEPA was not doing much.  I am not giving operators a clean bill of 
health because they have also contributed to socio-economic decadence in oil bearing 
communities.  The government failed in governance of the environment between 1956 
to 1988 when the government held a workshop to address the problem of the 
environment.221 
 
Government lacks facilities such as laboratories for its supervisory and monitoring 
responsibilities.  Even in matters of environmental impact assessment and post-impact 
assessment which key government agencies of NOSDRIA, DPR, FME and moribund FEPA 
statutorily addressed with oil companies, the practice of depending on the oil companies for 
the assessment often renders the outcome determinable by the oil companies in alliance with 
some corrupt officers of the government.  Of course, beyond the non-existent laboratories, the 
government also lacks the skills necessary to adequately undertake these responsibilities.  
 
The overall effects of environmental practice of government, oil companies and local 
environmental groups is seen not only in the socio-economic conditions of oil bearing 
communities of the Niger Delta but also in the  present volume of gas flaring and oil spill as 
well as the state of the environment generally in the region.  These conditions result in 
violence either on the part of the government222 that seeks to protect the oil installations of oil 
companies in order to guarantee security of oil production or violence perpetrated by the 
                                               
220    This is based on visits and discussions with environmental scientists of the agency. 
221    Interview with Senior Environmental Scientist at NOSDRIA on the 6th of August, 2008 at its 
Port Harcourt Zonal Field Office. 
222    Government has consistently used military or repressive approach to address the crisis in the 
Niger Delta.  In most cases, military personnel, members of the police force and civilians have lost 
their lives.  Properties have been destroyed.   
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armed groups who use the language of grievance against environmental destruction and 
poverty as bases for their activities against oil companies and the government.  According to 
one official of the government in his response to the question of whether or not government 
failure to implement environmental policy contributes to violence in the Niger Delta: “for 
sure failure of the government has affected the violence in the Niger Delta.  As long as oil is 
discharged into the environment it has a lot of consequences.”223 
 
Participants from government environmental agencies and relevant ministries were asked 
about the extent of compliance on the part of oil companies and government officials with the 
National Environment Policy. Some of them expressed commitment on the part of the 
government.   For example, Aror notes: 
I cannot tell you that implementation is at 100 percent level.  But I can say that 
government is committed to the protection of the environment although there are 
existing teething problems hindering the process.  You can see that government 
agencies and extra ministerial bodies are already emerging to oversee implementation 
of the policy. Take for instance, the Federal Inland Waterways, on effluent discharge 
of pollutants of more than 1 miligram per litre of iron.  The problem is that there are 
no government bodies to assess and evaluate the volume of this type of discharge 
scientifically.  There is no body to ensure that this aspect of the policy as outlined on 
the effluent guideline is complied with by oil companies.  The level of logistics and 
equipment for carrying out this role is also inadequate.  Even the Federal Ministry of 
Environment that has been doing this job is not thorough, especially in cases of 
multiple oil spill or discharge of pollutants.  Besides, human capacity is lacking.224 
   
Table 5.4 below captures responses of government officials at the Federal Ministry of 
Environment and the National Oil Spill Detection and Response Agency.   Their responses 
are interpreted to mean insignificant level of implementation of government environmental 
policy in the Niger Delta.  Participants were negative on key variables of implementation of 
environmental policy.  Responses to the key variables were coded into 1 and 2 (binary 
fashion).  A relational analysis provided the basis for groups of words, statements and phrases 
                                               
223    See field note on interview with government officials. 
224    See field note of interview with Aror, Senior Environmental Scientist at the Port Harcourt Zonal 
Field office of NOSDRIA conducted by the researcher on  12th of August, 2008. 
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into the codes.  On issues of continued gas flaring to mechanisms for gaining compliance, 
responses were negative.  Also, there are numerous problems that either combine or 
individually contribute towards the failure of government programmes and policies to 
achieve their set environmental goals.   
 
Table 5. 4. Implementation of NPE and Sustainable Development 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NPE   
 Positive Negative  





1 (7%)  14(93%) 






Extent to which actions of implementing official at FME, NOSDRIA, 





Executive orders from the presidency and court decisions concerning 




Government and oil companies implementation plans, structures and 
actions  
13(86%) 2(13%) 






Responses to questions relating to implementation of the NPE were coded in “positive” (1) 
and “negative” (2) (See Table 5.4).  From the responses of FGD participants as well as 
observations from visits to the oil-producing communities in the Niger Delta, gas is still 
flared rampantly in the Niger Delta.   Although the government has made significant efforts 
to establish agencies and extra-ministerial institutions for the purpose of addressing specific 
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areas of environmental pollution, the institutions have remained essentially too weak to 
implement meaningful policies that can result in real change for the well-being of people 
from the local communities. 
 
Oil is the defining feature of environmental practice of the government in the Niger Delta.  
The federal government’s gradual acquisition of monopoly power over matters of oil mining 
and the distribution of its benefits is also important for understanding the delay by the 
government in addressing environmental problems.  Extraction of the oil is key to economic 
advancement and planning.  This explains why threat to production of oil is perceived by 
government officials at the federal levels as threat to national security. 
 
5.5. The Government and implementation of its policy on the environment  
When oil companies began exploration for oil in Nigeria, the colonial government’s concern 
for the environment was limited to mere issues of public health and safety.  As Aroh notes, 
“national environmental policy was not in view of government until 1988 when an Italian 
company dumped toxic waste at Koko village in former Bendel State of Nigeria.”225  As 
such, specific social, economic and political problems that later emerged in the years 
following the discovery of oil at Oloibiri (in present Bayelsa State of Nigeria) and 
dependence of the post-colonial state of Nigeria on oil for national development were not 
envisaged.  Consequently, the government at the time -- early post-colonial era in Nigeria -- 
did not envision the potential impacts of oil business and their implications for conflict 
among oil companies, government and local oil bearing communities. 
 
 
Strict environmental regulation (in the form of law) was unavailable.  Government 
institutions with mandate to deal with issues of the environment were also non-existent.  This 
                                               
225    See field note on interview with Kenneth Aror of NOSDRIA on the 12th of August, 2008. 
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situation lasted until the 1980s when the environmental consequences of oil exploration and 
production began to pose serious threats: first to the economic interests of oil companies and 
the government as well as to the political stability of Nigeria; and second, to the survival of 
affected local oil bearing communities.  It would appear that the government and oil 
companies were lukewarm towards environmental security of the oil bearing communities 
until these communities began to protest the effect of oil exploration and production on their 
environments.  Environmental practice of the government generally entails priorities given to 
issues of environment by the government and its concern for the prevention of pollution of 
the environment by individuals and corporate bodies. For instance, for the oil industry, the 
priority of maintaining and replacing oil equipment such as corroded pipelines in order to 
avoid leakages is paramount.  Such priorities are seen in the enforcement of regulations that 
are meant to prevent pollution or provide remediation in the event of pollution.  For the Niger 
Delta, the government often steps in with regulations only after oil companies have damaged 
the environment.  For example, Oloibiri, where oil was first discovered, is now in ruins, and 
the government has failed to recover the land devastated by oil and gas pollution. 
 
The economic problems consequent to oil company activities for which government attention 
has been needed are many, including issues such as the destruction of wildlife, farmlands, 
forests, aquifers and human lives.  Largely the result of spills, flares and pipeline leakages, 
the devastating impacts have fuelled the crisis and the associated conflict in the Niger 
Delta.226  Currently, there is a severe scarcity of arable land in most of the oil bearing 
communities -- villages and towns.  Not surprisingly, scholars and FGD participants 
interviewed by this researcher agree on the negative impact of environmental practice of 
                                               
226    See recorded focus group discussions. Also see taped video of participants at an “Anti-
Imperialism Camp,” organised by Social Action and the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation 19-24th 
August, 2008.  Various groups from the Niger Delta were represented in that meeting. 
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government and oil companies on the socio-economic survival of the peoples of the Niger 
Delta.   
 
The government -- at federal, state and local levels -- has not adequately responded to the 
issues.  Given the current structure of the oil business and laws guiding the process, the 
federal government has the greatest responsibility towards addressing the issues.  
Unfortunately, and in spite of various political, legal and administrative steps already 
orchestrated, the important issue of poverty, loss of means of livelihood and resource control 
have not been sufficiently addressed by the federal government. 
 
 
In the 1960s when an Ijaw group -- under the platform of the Niger Delta Volunteer Force, 
led by late Isaac Boro -- confronted the federal government over issues of development and 
political marginalisation of the Niger Delta in an emerging era of oil exploration and 
production from the Niger Delta, the federal government successfully crushed the resistance 
with the use of military might. 
 
In October 1990, MOSOP issued an Ogoni Bill of Rights (OBR), which among others, 
demanded the right to protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further destruction; 
political autonomy and resource control.  The government, up to that time (1994), focused on 
the strategies of state power (coercion) in dealing with environmental, political and economic 
problems associated with the oil business in the Niger Delta. 
 
 
For many people in the region, the government should be responsible for, and active in, 
dealing with the prevention and management of the economic, social and political effects of 
oil exploration and production activities on local populations in the Niger Delta through 
various legal, political and administrative institutions it has itself created.  Against the 
background of efforts of government in formulating policies, rules, guidelines and general 
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regulations as well as designing goals and putting into action these policies, the federal 




Following licence granted by the colonial government, Shell D’Archy had monopoly of 
exploration for oil.  The 1914 Petroleum Ordinance cautioned against pollution of the 
environment without creating mechanisms for sanctions or enforcement of sanctions against 
exploration activities of Shell D’Archy.  This situation continued until the seminal discovery 
of oil in 1956 at Oloibiri and up to 1969 when other oil companies such as Mobil (1955), 
Chevron (1961) and Texaco (1963) joined the oil industry in Nigeria.  Between 1914 and 
1969, the Nigerian government remained essentially non-participatory in the oil industry, 
leaving the oil companies to operate as concessions.  The role of the government in the oil 
industry and the environment was limited to making laws for regulating the activities of these 
companies.  Unfortunately, for the most part, various provisions of these laws like the 
aforementioned laws (Petroleum Ordinance of 1914, Petroleum Act of 1959 and that of 1969, 
etc.) lack enforcement mechanisms.  Ukiwo (2008: 76) argues that these laws serve the 
colonial and post-colonial state, manifested in the avoidance of enforcement or practices that 
are injurious to the short-term economic interests of the state. 
 
 
By 1971, Nigeria had acquired equity share in the oil industry through joint venture 
agreements between the Nigerian National Oil Company (NNOC) and, later, the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) and the oil majors.  This raised the stakes for the 
government and further increased its responsibilities towards ensuring practices that protect 
the environment.  However, a national environmental policy and institutional engineering by 
the Nigerian government remained elusive until the late 1980s.  Public protests against 
dumping by an Italian company of toxic waste substances at Koko village in the old Bendel 
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State forced the government to consider crafting a national environmental policy and other 
relevant laws and institutions to address the problem of the environment. Indeed, by contrast, 
an assessment of the government’s environmental practice in relation to the oil companies 
reveals that the Nigerian state is both weak and slow.  
 
 
FGD participants from the oil bearing communities of the Niger Delta insist that government 
and the oil companies operating in the region are irresponsible on matters of   the 
environment.  The practice on the part of the government borders essentially on lack of 
enforcement of relevant environmental policies.  This manifests as lack of interest in ensuring 
sustainable development of the Niger Delta.  However, formal government policy recognises 
the importance of achieving sustainable development via proper management of the 
environment stated as a key goal in Nigeria’s National Environmental Policy.  There is a 
wide formalism gap, however, between environmental principle and environmental practice. 
The major argument of this dissertation is that the failure by the government to effectively 
and efficiently implement the country’s environmental policy is partly responsible for the 
violence in the Niger Delta.    
 
The federal government established the NOSDRIA in 2006.  Section 5 of the Act stipulates 
the key objectives of coordinating and implementing the National Oil Spill Contingency Plan.  
The specific objectives of the agency are: 
 To establish a viable national operational organization that ensures a safe, 
timely, effective and appropriate response to major or disastrous oil pollution; 
 Identify high-risk as well as priority areas for protection and clean up; 
 Establish mechanism to monitor and assist or, where expedient, direct the 
response, including the capability to mobilise the necessary resources to save 
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lives, protect threatened environment, and clean up to the best practical extent 
of the impacted site; 
 Maximise the effective use of the available facilities and resources of 
corporate bodies, their international connections and oil spill co-operatives, 
that is Clean Nigeria Associates (CNA) in implementing an appropriate spill 
response; 
 Ensure funding and appropriate and sufficient pre-positioned pollution 
combating equipment and materials as well as functional communication 
network system required for effective response to major oil pollution; 
 Provide a programme of activities, training and drill exercises to ensure 
readiness of oil pollution preparedness, response, management and operational 
personnel  
 Co-operate and provide advisory services, technical support and equipment for 
purposes of responding to major oil pollution incident in the West African 
sub-region upon request by any neighbouring country, particularly where a 
part of the Nigerian territory may be threatened; 
 Provide support for research and development in the local development of 
methods, materials and equipment for oil spill detection and response; 
 Co-operate with the International Maritime Organisation and other national, 
regional and international organisations in the promotion and exchange of 
results of research and development programmes relating to the enhancement 
of the state of the art of the oil pollution preparedness and response, including 
technologies, techniques for surveillance, containment, recovery, disposal and 
clean up to the best practical extent; 
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 Establish agreements with neighbouring countries regarding rapid movement 
of equipment, personnel and supplies into and out of the country for 
emergency oil spill response activities; 
 Determine and preposition combat equipment at most strategic areas for rapid 
response; 
 Establish procedures by which the Nigerian Customs Service and the Nigerian 
Immigration Service shall ensure rapid importation of extra support response 
equipment and personnel; 
 Develop and implement an appropriate audit system for the entire plan; and, 
 Carry out such other activities as are necessary or expedient for the full 
discharge of its functions and the execution of the Plan under this Act. 
 
Section 6 (1) of the Act states that the agency shall: 
 Be responsible for surveillance and ensure compliance with all existing 
environmental legislation and the detection of oil spills in the petroleum 
sector;  
 Receive reports of oil spillages and coordinate oil spill response activities 
throughout Nigeria; 
 Coordinate the implementation of the Plan as may be formulated, from time to 
time by the Federal Government; 
 Coordinate the implementation of the Plan for the removal of hazardous 
substances as may be issued by the Federal Government; 
 Perform such other functions as may be required to achieve the aims and 
objectives of the Agency under this Act or any plan as may be formulated by 




NOSDRIA was introduced to address the important issue of sustainable development or 
livelihood, for the first time in the history of the country. This was the result of the creation of 
the Forum for Cleaning up of the Niger Delta by the Minister of State for the Environment.  
As Okpopido notes: 
the National Plan represents a national system for responding promptly and 
effectively to all oil spill pollution incidents occurring in Nigeria.  But better still, it is 
desired that the industry will adopt proactive strategies for preventing oil spills as a 
cost-effective means of reaching the national goal of eradicating poverty and 
enthroning grassroot based sustainable livelihood in Nigeria...through the 
establishment of the first ever Federal Ministry of Environment, has set up an 
institutional role model in Africa for enthroning sustainable livelihood and for the 
eradication of poverty, hunger and diseases on the continent.227 
 
NOSCP defines the role of the government in Nigeria regarding its responsibility as the 
environmental conscience of the country in matters of oil spillages irrespective of mode of 
spill (accidental or deliberate), volume and source, which threaten the environment in 
Nigeria.  The government, through this plan, recognises the impact of oil pollution resulting 
from the activities in the petroleum industry at the levels of exploration, production, refining 
and transportation.  It includes the movement of marine vessels and pipelines as well as the 
manner of handling facilities at the nation’s ports, pump stations, depots and jetties.228   
 
There are three levels of oil contingency plans that the government recognises for cushioning 
the effect of oil spillages and ensuring sustainable livelihood for people in affected 
communities. They are, company plans (Tier One); Cooperative Plan (Tier Two) and 
Government plan for key or catastrophic oil spills (Tier Three). 
 
                                               
227 Okopido, I.T. (2000).  “Foreword,” National Oil Spill Contigency Plan for Nigeria, Abuja: Federal 
Ministry of Environment, p.i. 
228  FME (2003).  National Oil Spill Contingency Plan for Nigeria pp.2-4.  
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The first two (company and cooperative plans) are said to be already existing and functioning 
as claimed by the government and the oil companies. This data was obtained from oil 
company staff and government officials who participated in the study.  Company plan is 
compulsory by law.  Cooperative plan is seen in the already existing Clean Nigeria 
Associates (CNA), created by companies in order to assist in handling pollution cases which 
individual companies fail to or are unable to handle alone.  The Government’s plan provides 
for a response in cases of severe oil spillages which are beyond the capacity of both the 
company and cooperative efforts. 
 
As a matter of policy, the NOSCP integrates all three tiers of plans and in a way provides the 
institutional or structural framework that was lacking in the past for intervention in oil related 
pollution in Nigeria.   
 
The objectives of the NOSCP are to: 
 Establish a viable operational organisation to ensure safe, timely, effective and 
appropriate response to major or disastrous oil pollution, namely:  Competent 
national authority, the NOSDRIA, with responsibility for preparedness, detection 
and response to all oil spillages; 
 Identify high-risk areas as well as priority areas for protection and cleanup; 
 Establish the mechanism to either monitor and assist or if necessary to direct the 
actual response, including the capability to swiftly mobilize the necessary 
resources to save lives, protect threatened environment, and cleanup to the best 
practical extent of the polluted site; 
 Maximise the effective use of the available facilities and resources of individual 
companies, their international connections and oil spill cooperatives in implementing 
appropriate spill response; 
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 Provide funding, and appropriate, sufficient, pre-positioned pollution combating 
equipment and materials, as well as functional communication network system 
required for an effective response to major oil pollution; 
 Provide programme of activation, training and drill exercises to ensure readiness to oil 
pollution preparedness and response and also the management and operational 
personnel; 
 Cooperate and/or provide advisory services, technical support and equipment for 
purpose of responding to major oil pollution incident in the West African sub-region 
upon request by the neighbouring country, particularly where part of the Nigerian 
territory may itself be threatened; 
 Cooperate with other National, Regional, IMO and other international organisations in 
the promotion and exchange of results of research and development programme 
relating to the enhancement of the state-of-the art of the oil pollution preparedness 
and response, including technologies, techniques for surveillance, containment, 
recovery, disposal and clean up to the best practical extent; 
 Establish agreements with neighbouring countries regarding the rapid movement of 
equipment, personnel and supplies into and out of the countries for emergency spill 
response activities; 
 Determine and pre-position some vital combat equipment at most strategic areas for 
rapid response; 
 Establish procedures by which Nigerian Customs and Immigration Services will 
enable rapid importation of extra support response equipment and personnel; 
 Develop and implement an appropriate audit system for the entire organisation. 
 
The legal authority for establishing NOSCP derives essentially from: Petroleum Decree No. 
51 of 1969, Section 8 (1)(b)(iii), Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations, 1969, 
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Sections 25; Government Administrative Directive (1981) for the Establishment of Three 
levels of Oil Spill Contingency Plans to effectively address the problem of various forms of 
pollution); Federal Executive Council Approval  at its 17th Council Meeting of 6th October, 
1988, of a National Committee comprising relevant ministries, departments and organisations 
for the formulation of the NOSCP.  Local communities of the Niger Delta were however not 
represented and the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) decree 58, 1988, 
Sections 22 and 23, and the National Policy on Environment which provides for the 
establishment of a National Oil Spill Contingency Plan.  It is interesting to note that the plan 
assigns roles to all key government departments and organisations during cases of oil 
spillages.  For example, the Federal Ministry of Environment; Federal Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources; NNPC; Federal Ministry of Works; Nigerian Institute for Oceanography and 
Marine Research (NIOMR); Federal Ministry of Health; Nigerian Ports Authority; National 
Maritime Authority; Federal Ministry of Information; Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Water 
Resources and Rural Development; The Army; The Navy; The Air force; The Police; States 
and Local Governments; Nongovernmental Organisations and the Federal Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). 
 
It is also worth noting that the membership of the National Oil Spill Response Advisory 
Committee excludes oil bearing communities. Selection of members into NOSRA Advisory 
Committee is the responsibility of the presidency.  This is important for understanding the 
lack of access by oil bearing communities to key environment decision-making institutions in 
Nigeria.  In light of the contestations around the environment degradation, it would seem that 
due care will be taken by government leaders to ensure that all stakeholders are adequately 
represented on important environmental bodies such as NOSRA.  The lack of adequate 
sensitivity to such matters not only serve to betray persistent government neglect of the 
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region but also to highlight the basis of the attendant resentment and conflict which has 
exacerbated the problems of the Niger Delta 
 
 
5.6. Oil Companies and implementation of environmental policy 
Oil companies in the Niger Delta remain widely condemned by scholars and environmental 
groups for various practices that contribute to the destruction of the environment.  For 
example, poor environmental practices such as unsafe disposal of toxic drilling wastes, gas 
flaring and oil spills are common areas of complaint from local justice and environmental 
groups against the oil companies.  According to one informant: 
These oil companies in the Niger Delta are looking for trouble.  Shell, Agip Chevron, 
Elf and others are killing our people with spillage and gas flare. They do not do this in 
their countries, but they have seen a country where laws do not work so they do it 
with impunity. But God will not allow it any more. They will pack and leave the 
Niger Delta by force or by fire.229 
  
Best practice,230 meant to avoid severe destruction of the environment in the oil industry, is 
measured against standards set by industry organisations, non-governmental organisations, 
multilateral organisations and national governments.   One internationally accepted area of 
best practice in the oil industry is the use of environmental management procedures and 
systems such as: Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (EIA/SIA); Environmental 
Performance Evaluation (EPE); Environmental Monitoring and Auditing (EMA); 
Environmental Reporting (ER); and Environmental Management Systems (EMS).  These are 
various forms of environmental ‘good practice’, at least ideally, expected to engender 
sustainable development, voluntarily adopted in response (implementation) to government 
environmental regulation.   
 
                                               
229 An interview with a member (name withheld) of the Movement for Emancipation of the Niger 
Delta (MEND) on the 16th of May 2008. 
230What is seen as ‘best practice’ is measured against accepted national and international 
environmental regimes meant to ensure sustainable development.  Often, such best practices have 
emerged from industry voluntary codes as a response to threats to sustained mining of resources such 
as oil by environmental groups. 
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EIA231 is a procedure that entails the assessment of relevant environmental impacts of 
proposed development projects.  Proponents claim that the practice has the potential of being 
an instrument for achieving sustainable development as well as a strong advantage of 
involving affected communities in commenting on the environmental impact statement.  
Nigeria promulgated Decree No.86 of 1992, essentially in pursuit of this objective -- the 
compulsory conduct of environmental impact assessment by organisations as a requirement 
for the approval of development projects.  This policy has been integrated into the 
environmental policies of SPDC, Agip and Elf (TotafinaElf) in the Niger Delta.  As part of 
this study, environmental officers were asked at the Health, Safety and Environmental 
departments of the oil companies on the extent of their compliance with Nigeria’s Decree No. 
86 regarding EIA.  A positive response of 70% was received.  However, in reality, EIAs are 
variously improperly done by these organisations whenever they undertake major 
development projects such as the acquisition of land for oil installations, the laying of 
pipelines and seismic operations in the Niger Delta.  This owes much to the weakness of 
government regulatory bodies such as the Department of Petroleum Resources and the 
Federal Ministry of Environment.  Indeed, members of local justice and environmental 
groups in the region disagree over claims that EIAs are conducted properly by the oil 
companies.  According to one of them during an interview: 
EIA is a strange concept for most of the people in the oil bearing communities.  They 
do not know how it works because it is never practiced according to the law.  When 
the oil companies attempt to do it, it is merely window-dressing, without substance, 
because the people are never involved or allowed to do so as the law requires.  In 
some cases, projects are carried out before some form of assessment of environmental 
and social impact of such projects.232 
 
                                               
231 The practice is also contained in Principle 17 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development; Article 14 (1) (a) of 1992 U.N Convention on Biological Diversity.  See Convention on 
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (ESPOO) adopted 25 February 1991. 
 
232 Key informant interview with a member of Ogoni Solidarity Forum (OSF) on the 20th of May, 






According to Orike233 and Tari Dadiowei, ‘oil companies always want to dilute reports of 
EIA to be in their favour irrespective of the facts on ground.’234 This position is similar to 
baseline data of works done by scholars on the Niger Delta crisis regarding oil companies and 
degradation of the environment (Idemudia and Ite, 2006: 391-406; Jike, 2004: 686-701; 
Orubu, Odusola and Ehwarieme, 2004: 203-214; Aginam,235 2002: 1-18).236  This has also 
come to form the general impression that the EIA is ineffectively practiced by the oil 
companies and adduced as one of the triggers of violent behaviours among groups in the 
region. 
 
The EIA Decree No. 86 of 1992 was expected to be a tool for sustainable development.  
Unfortunately, the Nigerian government, for more than three decades, did not address the 
problem of environmental and social consequences of various economic and infrastructural 
projects that were envisaged from various national development plans (Anayo, 2002: 1-13).   
Anayo argues that the provision of the EIA Act has suffered severe problems of 
implementation.  As he notes: 
                                               
233  Participant at the FGD held at Social Action, 33 Orominike Close, D-Line, Port Harcourt, and 
Rivers State on the 24th of April, 2008.   Dr. Orike, a participant, works for one of the oil majors.  He 
is an environmentalist with many years of experience in the oil sector.  He spoke as a public opinion 
leader from Ogba-Egbema (an oil bearing community in Rivers State) and as an oil company insider. 
234Tari Dadiowei, opinion leader and activist from oil bearing community of Bayelsa State, 
participated in the focus group discussion in Yenegoa. 
 
235 Aginam is an environmental lawyer and was one time legal officer of Kainji Lake National Park, 
New Busa, Nigeria. 
 
236 Orubu, C.O. (2004). “The Nigerian Oil Industry: Environmental Diseconomies, Management 
Strategies and the Need for Community Involvement,” Journal of Human Ecology, 16(3), 203-214;  
Idemudia, U. and Ite, U.E. (2006)  “Demystifying the Niger Delta Conflict: Towards an Integrated 
Explanation,” Review of African Political Economy, Volume 33, Issue 109,  September, pp. 391 – 
406;  Jike, V.T. (2004). “Environmental Degradation, Social Disequilibrium, and the Dilemma of 
Sustainable Development in the Niger Delta of Nigeria,” Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 34. No. 5, 
May, pp. 86-701; Aginam, O. (2002). “From Rio to Johannesburg: The Pessimism of Sustainable 
Development and the Optimism of Sustainable Livelihoods: Two Cases from Nigeria,” paper 




Experience, especially in respect of infrastructure projects, has shown that 
environmental impact assessment is hardly undertaken prior to the approval of any 
project  The key defaulters in this exercise are the various levels of government; 
federal, state and local. These various levels of government routinely approve projects 
within the mandatory study list, before any kind of impact assessment is made.237 
 
Environmental Management Systems (EMS),238 a voluntary option of environmental 
management practice, is claimed to be operational in the three oil companies under study.  
The SPDC, Agip and Elf are ISO 14000 certificated. 
 
Our research reveals that oil companies in the Niger Delta have created EMS. Indeed, ELF, 
Agip and the SPDC have ISO certification and have functional Health, Safety and 
Environment units in their respective companies.  The companies also report on 
the239environment in relation to their activities annually.  They also have environmental 
statements.  Indeed, the companies have established environmental policies, plans, 
implementation mechanisms, procedures for monitoring and regular management reviews.  
According to a senior management staff of SPDC: 
SPDC has created necessary internal mechanisms for protecting the environment in 
the areas we operate.  We are ISO 140001 certificated and employ modern 
technologies to ensure sustainability of the environment in our fields. My company 
operates international environmental standards.240 
 
                                               
237 Anayo, I. (2002).  “Environmental Impact Assessment as a Tool for Sustainable Development:  
The Nigerian Experience,” TSTO.3 Sustainability, p. 2. 
 
238 EMS refers to procedural rules in an organisation that help executives in preventing and diagnosing 
wrong environmental practice.  Indeed, they facilitate compliance of company executives with extant 
legal requirements or laws and to outline processes that management should follow in order to avoid 
or control destructive impact of company activities on the environment. A widely known form of 
EMS is ISO 14001.  It has core elements of environmental policy, planning, implementation and 
operation, checking and corrective action, and management review.  See Wagner, J. (1998)”Oil and 
Gas Operations and Environmental Law in latin America,” 16 JERL 153;  Zharen, V.W. (1996). “ISO 
14000: Understanding the Environmental Standards,” Government Institute Inc. Rockview, Maryland. 
239    Key informant interview with a senior staff of SPDC at his residence on the 15th of April, 2008. 
where? 




Table 5.5. Elements of ISO 140001241 








Corporate public statement concerning company’s intention 
regarding the environment 
 
2. Planning  Establishing procedures for identifying and maintaining access to all 
environmental law/policy requirements; Setting environmental 
objectives and targets; Creating environmental management 
programmes which outline strategies or procedures for attainment of 





Identifying and formal assessment of responsibilities to personnel; 
Training programmes and awareness; 
Regular review of implementation of operational procedures to 
ensure compliance with environmental policies, objectives and 
targets. 
4. Checking and 
corrective action 
Creating procedures for monitoring of the implementation process; 
Internal and external audits of the EMS; 
Investigation of compliance was identified by  audit of EMS; 
Creating mechanism for environmental record keeping. 




Regular management review of the entire EMS with the aim of 




Source: adopted from Wawryks, unpublished paper on “International Environmental Standards in the oil 
industry: improving the Operation of Transnational oil companies in emerging economies,” modifications into 





                                               
241 ISO certificate is international standard of measuring corporate record in the management of the 
environment.  It entails external examination of environmental practice of organisations. The 
procedure also involves assessment of organisations’ compliance with national environmental 




Similar claims are made by Agip and ELF. Implementation of the EMS is however expected 
to contribute extensively towards sustainable development of societies.  Specifically, an EMS 
provides: 
a framework for integration of environmental management into the company’s 
operations; helps the company to identify and reduce environmental impacts; helps 
the company comply with regulatory requirements; helps the company to set and meet 
its own environmental targets; and manage their impacts on the environment, EMS 




The reality however is that oil companies are still carrying out their oil exploration and 
production activities in severe environmentally unfriendly ways.  This is understandable 
given that the ISO14001 model of EMS, as with several others existing today, is a voluntary 
code for companies.  It lacks legal enforcement.  Besides, required third party verification in 




Genuine Environmental Performance Evaluation (EPE) by oil companies is not properly 
practiced in the Niger Delta.  What is important about EPE is the identification or choice as 
indicators.  There are three areas in which these indicators can be chosen or identified, 
namely: Environmental Management Systems (EMS); Operational Systems (also known as 
Environmental Performance Indicators -- EPIs); and State of the Environment Indicators 
(EIs). Management systems indicators refer to what management (staff) do in respect of the 
environment in an organisation.  Operational Systems point to indicators of responsibilities 
assigned to personnel and the extent to which such responsibilities are carried out regarding 
protection of the environment in the activities of the organisation.  Evaluation in the area of 
                                               
242EPE is a management tool or process meant to ensure on-going improvement of environmental 
performance  
 
of organisations.  See Kuhre, W. (1998).  ISO 14031: Environmental Performance Evaluation (EPE), 
New Jersey: Prentice Hall PTR. 
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state of the environment actually means assessment of impact of company activities on the 
environment.  
 
These three aspects of EPE are practically rare for oil companies in the Niger Delta.  At least, 
it was so for more than three decades since the beginning of oil exploration and production in 
the Niger Delta before pressure from local oil bearing-community groups, non-governmental 
organisations and international industry associations coupled with government regulations 
began to influence environmental practice by oil companies.  While oil companies have 
established Health, Safety and Environmental units and policy, guarantee of policy 
performance and operational systems, external reporting on the state of the environment such 
as safety performance statistics, oil discharge to the environment, gas flares and general 
environmental cost of their activities are lacking in practice.  This does not discount efforts, 
through project developments for improving socio-economic and cultural lives of local 
communities by the oil companies in recent times.  For example, building of  health centres, 
scholarship programmes, construction of roads and many more are now common practice for 
the oil companies.  It appears that the current efforts of these oil companies at providing 
social amenities is in  response to threats to their social license  for  sustained operations from 
local environmental groups. 
 
Environmental monitoring and auditing involves regular checking and inspection of 
equipment, management systems, operational systems (activities) and their impact on the 
environment. Oil companies claim to do this regularly but the reality is that the process is 
ineffective and sometimes not followed through with operational systems.  Indeed, a key 
informant decried their claim of monitoring and auditing.  Oil companies and government 
have inspection units in their organisations but these units are ineffective and usually weak.  




Effective monitoring on the part of oil companies and government has the merit of ensuring 
environmental practice that can result in sustainable development.  The reality in the Niger 
Delta is that, in the case of oil companies, equipment are rarely monitored or checked for 
possible failure or to ensure that they are in good working condition.  For example, pipeline 
leakage, a significant cause of pollution in the Niger Delta, is rampant because the pipes are 
old and need to be replaced.  To do this requires regular monitoring and reporting for 
detection of corroded pipelines.  Oil companies deny that leakages are caused by equipment 
failure. Rather, they blame sabotage and oil theft among youths in the Niger Delta.  The 
government also believes that pipeline leakages are caused by sabotage.243  The reality is that 
monitoring of the state of both the pipelines and the state of environmental impact of oil 
company activities is infrequent.  And when it does happen, they are ineffectively done.  
 
 
Environmental audit is the “practice of comparing environmental regulatory and management 
requirements against the operational and management performance record of a facility by 
evaluating such records and systems against a set of predetermined standards” (Prince and 
Nelson, 1996: 292).  Oil companies in the Niger Delta rarely undertake compliance and EMS 
audit.  The former deals with compliance with regulatory requirements while the latter 
concentrates on the structure of organisation, responsibilities, practices, processes and 
available resources and equipment for enforcing environmental governance (Prince and 
Nelson, 1996: 292).244  Worse, whenever audits are done, the focus is usually on 
environmental audits and not on compliance with government policy, regulations or laws.245  
                                               
243 A senior staff at the Health, Safety and Environmental unit of the DPR insisted that criminal 
activities of youths in the Niger Delta are responsible for pipeline leakages (interview with the 
researcher on the 16th of April, 2008). 
 
244 See Prince, W. and Nelson, D. (1996) “Developing an Environmental Model: Piercing Together 
the Growing Diversity of International Environmental Standards and Agendas Affecting Mining 
Companies,” Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy, Vol. 7, N0. 247, p.292. 
245   Dr. Dike spoke with the researcher and participated in one of the focus group discussions.  He 
works for one  of the oil companies in the Niger Delta. 
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Environmental audit may be carried out internally by organisations or by third parties or both.  
In the case of the oil companies in the Niger Delta, they are rarely done, and if done, they are 
not comprehensive.  
 
In the area of Environmental and Social Reporting (ESR), oil companies in the Niger Delta 
are yet to disclose information regarding their operational environment and social 
performance to government and the public.  The companies prepare annual reports but 
participants claim that these reports do not contain comprehensive information on 
environment, social and economic issues as measures of their environmental social 
performance.  It is expected that environmental reporting would serve individual and 
community “rights to know”, demonstrate oil companies’ accountability for their social and 
environmental impact, and make known their contributions to sustainable development by 
measuring and reporting “triple bottom” impacts. In reality, the annual reports rarely contain 
information on the three key areas of social, economic and environmental impacts.  As yet, 
the oil companies do not undertake environmental reporting in Nigeria.  This situation is 
worsened by the absence of any Freedom of Information law in Nigeria.  Such a law would 
have provided the legal framework for accessing pertinent information from oil companies 
and for ensuring that they do not evade responsibility to provide needed information.  So far, 
the National Assembly in Nigeria has been reluctant to pass into law the civil society 
sponsored Freedom of Information Bill (FoI) before it. 
 
SPDC claims to have adequate environmental programmes for the reduction of 
environmental impact.  As O’Hara (2001:302) notes, “its policy is that all alternatives are 
planned and executed to minimise environmental impacts.”  In fact, SPDC operates within 
the framework of statement of General Business Principles and Policy Guidelines on Health, 
Safety and Environment.  The company has created a new Environmental Impact Assessment 
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Process Manual and plans to incorporate Social Impact Assessment.  In reality, SPDC either 
lacks the institutional capacity or willingness to put its internal environmental programmes 
into action.  According to one participant, “Shell lacks the institutional base to implement its 
environmental policies or even comply with government regulations.”  In reality, SPDC 
rarely conducts EIA before starting a project.246  Government officials at the DPR247 and 
FME concede to this statement.  In contrast, SPDC claims, for example, to have complied 
with 157 items in the DPR Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum 
Industry.  It presently complies with 143 and has obtained permission for the remaining 14 
items.248 SPDC also claims to have a remediation programme that aims to identify and assess 
health, safety and environmental risks from pollution arising from its operational activities, 
by utilising a risk-based methodology -- a world-wide acceptable practice for evaluating 
risks.  The company claims that a majority of its over 800 sites pose no substantial health, 
safety or environmental risks. 
 
In contrast, over 76% of natural gas from oil is flared in Nigeria, against 0.6% and 4.3%, 
respectively, in the U.S.A and U.K.  Gas flares emit heat at a temperature level of 1300 to 
1400 centigrade.  Apart from the hazard of noise pollution, it produces extensive sulphur 
dioxide and carbon dioxide.  Emissions are at 35 million tonnes for carbon dioxide and 12 
million tonnes for methane annually.  From the results of environmental impact assessment 
study of SPDC conducted by Resigner Industries in 1993, mud at the base of the Bonny 
                                               
246  See recorded tape of focus group discussion on the 8th of July, 2008. Members of the Movement 
for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta insist that conduct of EIA by the oil companies in the Niger 
Delta is rare, if at all, it is always after a project has started. 
 
247  Government officials at the Department of Petroleum Resources and Federal Ministry of 
Environment spoke with the researcher in key informant interviews. 
 




Terminal in Rivers State has an amazing high concentration of 1200 pm.249 Besides, 
compensation for acquiring land and destruction of the farmlands by the government are 
inadequate.   
 
An estimated 9-13 million barrels of oil has been spilled in the Niger Delta by oil companies. 
As  a team of experts from the Federal Ministry of  Environment, Nigerian Conservation 
Foundation, WWF UK and Commission on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy, 
notes: 
Oil companies operating in the Delta have not employed best available technology 
and practices that they use elsewhere in the world—a double standard.  They can 
easily improve their environmental performance in the region. Old leaking pipelines 
and installations must be replaced immediately and dumping of waste must stop.250 
 
In the same vein, though oil companies claim substantial improvement in their environmental 
practice, seismic lines still clear substantial forest areas and generate millions of tons of waste 
which are disposed untreated and directly into the ecosystem. At the level of production, 
dredging continues to cause high acidification of water bodies, erosion and spills caused by 
well blow-out and failure of equipment.   Discharge of huge amount of associated water with 
high content of hydrocarbons remains characteristic of oil company production activities.  
Habitat damage and losses have resulted from pipe laying across the region, along with losses 
incurred from pipeline and tanker spills at the level of transportation of the oil.  At the Eleme-
Okrika area where one of the refineries in Nigeria is located, there is constant discharge of 
toxic sludge that pollutes the water ways.   A native of Okrika has this to say: 
                                               
249 See O’Hara, K. (2001). “Niger Delta: Peace  and Cooperation Through Sustainable Development,” 
Environmental Policy and Law, 31/6, 
250 See Report on “Niger Delta Natural Resource Damage Assessment and Restoration Project” of 
experts from the Federal Ministry of the Environment, Nigeria Conservation Foundation, WWF UK 
and Commission on Environmental, Economic, and Social Policy, 31st May, 2006.  The team visted 
the Niger Delta from May 22 to 29 and spoke with village heads, youth groups of communities and 




The management of the refinery is wicked.  Look, now people from Okrika who could 
do a lot of fishing and pick lots of periwinkles251 can no longer do such things because 
waste from the refinery has either destroyed or chased them away.  This is in addition 
to the odour or bad smell emitted from the refinery.  Those of us here are suffering 
and dying slowly.252 
 
According to the report on “Niger Delta Natural Resource Damage Assessment and 
Restoration Project” of the federal government and its partners in 2006: 
The damage from oil and gas operations is chronic and cumulative, and has acted 
synergically with other sources of environmental stress to result in a severely 
impaired coastal ecosystem and compromised livelihoods and health of the regions 
impoverished residents. Rural communities in the Niger Delta have suffered most of 
the environmental and social costs of 50 years of oil development and claim to have 
received very little of the benefits.  This is a significant contributor to the current 
violence, sabotage of pipelines/installations and instability in the region.253 
 
The above comment speaks volumes of environmental practice of oil companies and points 
directly to the ineffectiveness of their internal environmental policy in compliance with 
government regulations or policies.  Understood from the point of view of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), environmental practice of oil companies in the Niger Delta are in 
varied degrees of practice.  For example, SPDC, Agip and TotalFinaElf (formerly Elf) have 
diverse degrees of CSR programmes in their host oil bearing communities which have also 
defined their pattern of relationship with the host communities. Agip and TotalFinaElf have 
better records of CSR than the SPDC, and this has been perceived to explain partly the less 
violent relationship that Agip and TotalFinaElf have had with their host communities against 
the more violent cases of SPDC.  For instance, in Ogbaland, Rivers State, host communities 
to Agip and TotalFinaElf have been in cordial relations with them since 1994 because of the 
                                               
251 It is a type of sea food common in the salt water areas of the Niger Delta.   It was a key supplier of 
iodine for rural people in the past.  It is now almost extinct in nearly all the communities in the region 
due to pollution of the water from oil production activities.  Hunting it for the purpose of selling for 
money was also poverty alleviating for the rural poor in Okrika in the past. 
 
252 This was the comment of an opinion leader from Okrika during the focus group discussion in Port 
Harcourt. The above cases of pollution or despoliation of the environment is by no means exhaustive. 
253    See Report on “Niger Delta National Resource Damage Assessment and Restoration Project,” of 
the Federal Ministry of Environment; Nigerian Conservation Foundation; WWF UK and Commission 
on Environmental, Economic and Social Policy, 31 May, 2006, p.2 
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companies’ practice of CSR.  The oil companies have utilised gas to provide electricity; it has 
built schools and awarded scholarships; and it has built roads and established development 
funds for the different villages Egi, Obagi, Ogbogu and Obrikom.  The provision of these 
amenities is well defined in the Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) between these 
communities and the oil companies.  This is in sharp contrast with the antagonistic 
relationship between SPDC and its host communities.  This is not, by any means, to suggest 
that Agip and TotalFinaElf have had it all smooth and without troubles.  In fact it was the 
violent clash between youths in Obgaland and the oil companies in 1994 that eventually 
redefined relations between the host community on the one hand and Agip and TotalFinaElf 
on the other hand. 
 
 
 Table 5.6. Some severely oil polluted areas in the Niger Delta 
Location Environment State Impacted 
sites254 
Nature of pollution 
Biseni  Freshwater 
swamp forest 
Bayelsa 20 Oil spillage 
Etiema/Nembe Freshwater 
swamp forest 
Bayelsa  20 Oil spillage and fire outbreak 
Etelebu Freshwater 
swamp forest 
Bayelsa  30 Oil spillage 
Peremabiri Freshwater 
swamp forest 
Bayelsa 30 Oil spillage 
Adebawa  Freshwater 
swamp forest 
Bayelsa  10 Oil spillage 
Diebu  Freshwater 
swamp forest 
Bayelsa  20 Oil spillage 
Tebidaba  Freshwater 
swamp forest 
Bayelsa  30 Oil spillage 
Nembe Creek Mangrove forest Bayelsa  10 Oil spillage 
Azuzuama  Mangrove forest Bayelsa  50 Oil spillage 
Jones Creek Mangrove 
Forests 
Delta 35 Spillage and burning  
Opuekeba  Barrier forest 
island 
Delta 50 Salt water intrusion 
                                               
254 Data on the number of impacted sites were not available. 
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Ugbeji  Mangrove Delta 2 Refinery wastes 
Ughelli  Freshwater 
swamp forests 
Delta 10 Oil spillage and well-head 
leakage 
Jessy  Freshwater 
swamp forests 
Delta 8 Product 
Ajato Mangrove Delta - Oil spillage 
Ajala  Freshwater 
swamp Forests 
Delta - Oil spillage 
Uzere  Freshwater 
forests 
Delta - Oil spillage 
Afiesere  Freshwater 
Forests 
Delta - Oil spillage 
Kwale  Freshwater 
Forests 
Delta - Oil spillage 
Olomoro  Freshwater 
Forests 
Delta - Oil spillage 
Ughelli  Freshwater 
forests 
Delta  - Oil spillage 
Ekakpare  Freshwater 
forests 
Delta  - Oil spillage 
Ughuvwughe  Freshwater 
Forest 
Delta  - 
- 
Oil spillage 
Ekerejegbe  Freshwater 
forest 
Delta  - Oil spillage 
Ozoro  Freshwater 
swamp forests 
Delta  - Oil spillage 
Odimodi  Mangrove  Delta  - Oil spillage 
Otorugu  Mangrove  Delta  - Oil spillage 
Ogulagha  Mangrove  Delta  - Oil spillage 
macraba Mangrove  Delta  - Oil spillage 
Rumuokwurusi  Freshwater 
swamp 
Rivers  20 Oil spillage 
Rukpoku  Freshwater 
swamp 
Rivers  10 Oil spillage 
Ebubu-Ochani Freshwater 
swamp 
Rivers  25 Oil spillage 
Eleme  Freshwater 
swamp 
Rivers  - Oil spillage 
Bomu  Freshwater 
swamp 
Rivers  - Oil spillage 
Obigbo  Freshwater 
Swamp 
Rivers  - Oil spillage 
Umuechem  Farm bush 
Mosaic 
Rivers  - Oil spillage 
Obrikom  Freshwater 
swamp 
Rivers  - Oil spillage 
Okpomakiri  Mangrove forest Rivers  - Oil spillage 
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Ke-Dere Mangrove forest Rivers  - Oil spillage 
Krakrama  Mangrove forest Rivers - Oil spillage 
Orubiri  Mangrove 
Forest 
Rivers  - Oil spillage 
Ekrikene  Mangrove forest Rivers  - Oil spillage 
Ekuleaama  Mangrove forest Rivers  - Oil spillage 
Oshie Ahoada Freshwater 
swamp 
Rivers  - Oil spillage 
Oshika  Freshwater 
swamp 
Rivers  - Oil spillage 
Oyakama  Freshwater 
swamp 
Rivers  - Oil spillage 
Ebocha  Freshwater 
swamp 
Rivers  - Oil spillage 
Rumuekpe  Mangrove 
forests 
Rivers  - Oil spillage 
Nonwa  Mangrove forest Rivers  - Oil spillage 
Ekuleama  Mangrove forest Rivers  - Oil spillage 
Bodo West Mangrove forest Rivers  - Oil spillage 
Bonny  Mangrove forest Rivers  - Oil spillage 
Okrika  Mangrove forest Rivers  - Oil spillage 
Source: adopted from Phase 1 Scoping Report of Federal Ministry of Environment, Nigeria 
Conservation Foundation, WWF UK and Commission on Environmental, Economic and 
Social Policy May 31, 2006 
 
The practice of burning and burying spilled oil in sand poses serious health risks for local 
communities in the Niger Delta.  Oil does not burn at 800 degrees Celsius (See Table 5.6).255  
The dense crude remains even after the gas is flared off.  Only a little drop of rain results in 
black spots from buried spilled oil.256  The National Oil Spill Detection Agency 
(NOSDRIA)257 is weak in enforcing compliance standard of oil companies to clean up oil 
spill sites.  For example, NOSDRIA does not presently have a laboratory for obtaining 
scientific information needed for decision-making concerning remediation of polluted 
environment.  The agency only makes estimates in oil spill matters. Besides, the law 
                                               
255 The number of severely impacted sites is quite many as indicated in this table. These oil spillages occur close 
to human habitats.  Villagers living close to these spill sites depend on the polluted water. 
256    See Gambia News Community, Wednesday 13, February 2008 
257    NOSDRIA was created from the Oil and Gas unit of the Federal Ministry of Environment in 
2006 with responsibility for preparedness, detection and response to all oil spillages in Nigeria as set 




establishing NOSDRIA does not compel oil companies to pay compensation to victims of oil 
spill.  This is indeed a problem for the implementation of the National Environmental Policy.  
SPDC, Agip, Mobil and Elf in recent times have awarded contracts for cleaning oil spill to 
contractors who lack expertise in the job and end up burying oil in the sand (an unacceptable 
method in international oil industry practice). As Udeogu notes, “NOSDRIA only mediates in 
cases of compensation.  The law does not empower NOSDRIA to force any oil company to 
pay compensation.  This is a problem for the implementation of the National Environmental 
Policy”.258  
 
 Asked if the NPE is effective, Udeogu responded as follows:  “To some extent it is.”  He 
believes that oil companies have done fairly well in complying with government 
environmental regulations.  However,  he notes that current situation of militancy and oil 
theft are affecting the rate of compliance with regulations as most times spills caused by third 
parties are hardly controlled on time because of the threats and insecurity that militants and 
oil thieves create.  According to him, “NOSDRIA implements environmental policy within 
the bounds of its enabling laws.”259 In rating compliance level of oil companies to the NPE, 
Aroh260 states that: “the extent of compliance by oil companies is about 50 per cent.”  This 
estimate from an environmental scientist and senior officer at the NOSDRIA speaks volume 
of the consequences of the remaining 50 per cent of non-compliance, even if it is a mere 
estimate. It remains clear that government agencies and ministries with specific mandate to 
address different aspects of the environment, especially in relation to the oil industry have 
                                               
258 Mr. E. Udeogu is the Principal Environmental Scientist at the Port Harcourt Zonal Field Office of 
the National Oil Spill Detection Agency.  He spoke with the researcher in an interview in his office on 
the 6th of August, 2008. 
 
259    See field notes of interview on the 6th of August, 2008. 
 
260    Aroh, K. is senior Environmental Scientist at NOSDRA Port Harcourt Zonal Field office.  He 





fundamental challenges that end up always with wide gap between national sustainable 




5.7. Justice and Environmental movement organisations and mobilisation of support 
Local justice and environmental social movement organisations in protests against oil 
companies did not take a linear progression.  It became organised in the 1980s with the Ogoni 
people, at the same time that production of oil also rose significantly.  The rising profile of 
the role of oil in the Nigerian economy led to increased recognition of the interest of the oil 
companies and the government.   As Frynas notes: 
As a consequence, the interest of the oil companies came to play a much greater role 
in government policy than those of the farming and fishing communities in the Niger 
Delta and elsewhere.  In this sense and context, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
development of the oil industry took precedence over the interests of the local people 
(Frynas, 2001: 27-54).261 
 
The increasing role of oil companies in the nation’s economy coincided with the Federal 
Government’s interest in the centralisation of powers over oil matters.  The creation of 12 
states in Nigeria and the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) signalled this 
interest on the part of the government and made local communities remote from decision-
making centres of the government over the oil business.  In fact, the Land Use Decree of 
1978 was intended to centralise this control of the oil business on the part of the federal 
government.  The Land Use Act completely took away land ownership rights from all 
Nigerians including local oil bearing communities of the Niger Delta.  Within the period, 
benefits from oil revenues to the local oil bearing communities by derivation also declined 
sharply.  Derivation implies retention of a part of revenues collected in an oil community for 
that community.  Fifty per cent of tax revenues were retained constitutionally in the area in 
which they were derived before 1960.  By 1970, it had declined to 45 per cent and by 1975, 
                                               
261    Frynas, J.G. (2001). “Corporate and State Responses to Anti-Oil Protests in the Niger Delta,” 
African Affairs, 100, pp. 27-54. 
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had fallen further to 20 per cent.  Derivation was ultimately abolished in 1982 and replaced 
with the creation of a special account for oil producing areas.  One and a half per cent of oil 
revenues were set aside for the development of oil producing areas.  This percentage has 
since increased to 13 per cent. 
 
Economic, political and environmental changes in the region associated with the activities of 
the oil companies in the 1980s and 1990s had increased the potential for violent conflict in 
the Niger Delta.  It was expected that government would address the problems, especially in 
putting back substantial revenues from oil in the development of the Niger Delta.  In fact, 
between 1991 and 2003 there were about 300 oil spill cases in the states of Delta and Rivers 
alone.  It was against this background that the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni 
People (MOSOP) and other groups emerged in the 1990s to challenge the oil companies and 
the government.  It can then be argued that the formation and activities of justice and 
environmental movement organisations in the Niger Delta is the product of oil related 
economic, political and environmental regimes of three historical contexts of colonialism, 
military rule and civil democracy in Nigeria. 
 
 
Ethnicity has also played a significant role in this process, especially with respect to the 
creation of identity for confronting the state and oil companies.  The imperative of 
reconceptualising justice and environmental movement organisations -- from the civil to 
conventional modes -- contrasts with the empirical realities of the 1960s and 1980s in the 
developed countries where the concerns were with issues of conservation of the environment 
and nuclear proliferation.  In the Niger Delta social and environmental issues are targeted 
against the Nigerian state and international oil companies.  Despite their ethnic character, the 
so-called justice and environmental movement organisations in the Niger Delta are so 
labelled because of their preoccupation with issues that are related to oil production, social 
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justice and the environment.  A key feature of these groups, however, is their articulation of 
these environmental issues and social development.  The marriage also forms the basis of 
sustainable development as a key goal or framework captured in government environmental 
public policy.   
 
 
Our research shows, first that local justice and environmental groups mobilise around specific 
issues of control and distribution of the benefits of the oil resource; and second, that they 
challenge the government and oil companies around issues of policies and practices that 
generate poverty and destruction of the environment in specific micro-contexts. It is observed 
in this research that each of the groups’ experience informed their emergence and also 
defined the strategies used by them to confront the state and oil companies.  
 
 
Colonialism, military rule and civil democracy ought to present different political opportunity 
structures.  During the last two years before independence, the people of the Niger Delta were 
well conscious of their minority status and its likely implication for development of the 
region.  Oil was first discovered in commercial quantity in 1956 but was not immediately 
considered a serious political and environmental problem for the key actors in the Niger 
Delta.   By 1960, however, oil was expected to play an important role in the independent state 
of Nigeria.  At this time, though, oil and environment related conflict were not crucial 
features in understanding or analysing the politics of Nigeria.  Nevertheless, ethnic minority 
groups were already agitating for increased roles in the affairs of the Nigerian state.  For 
instance, Harold Dappa Biriye and other Ijaw leaders believed that approaching the issue of 
representation and the pursuit of the interest of the Niger Delta people through formal politics 
(an ethnic political party) would bring about changes and allay fears of domination by the 
major ethnic groups.  Indeed, the formation of the Niger Delta Congress (NDC) represented 
this hope for a change and achievement of the aspirations of the Niger Deltans through 
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formal politics.  They were promised a Niger Delta state before 1960 by the NCNC 
government of the Eastern Region but were disappointed because the promise never 
materialized.  Worse, the Niger Delta region could hardly make any political impact in the 
regional and national legislatures through the NDC.  
 
This study emphasises the point made in several studies that the federal structure adopted in 
1954 during the colonial era was meant to give recognition to the diversity of the country in 
the distribution of power and resources.  Unfortunately, the political atmosphere then and to a 
large extent even now is the perceived federalism in Nigeria to ensure effective 
representation and delivery of development to all segments of the Nigerian society. With the 
advent of the oil economy and destruction of the environment in the Niger Delta, this cry of 




The Nigerian state is a product of colonialism and has retained some of the characteristics of 
that experience.  The colonial state was repressive and driven by the desire for economic 
benefits without regard to the social benefits of sustainability of the environment.  Indeed, the 
policies and politics of the colonial state were meant to achieve the objective of extracting 
raw materials locally and securing markets for manufactured goods in favour of British 
companies abroad.  This is a fact that cannot be denied by any interpretation of colonialism in 
Nigeria.  It was also why the initial administration of the colonial state of Nigeria was done 
by the Royal Niger Company in 1899.   It also explains why the colonial state granted 
licences for oil exploration to only British oil companies and entered into agreements that 
excluded considerations for environmental protection or the livelihoods of the local oil 
bearing communities.  Unfortunately, the political elite who inherited the colonial state 
institutions was unable to convince the various nationalities that make up the country of their  
objectivity in addressing specific demands of these nationalities.  Instead, it appears that in 
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each of the political contexts (colonialism, military rule and civil democracy), the response of 
the state has been largely repressive. 
 
 
The nature of colonialism in Nigeria was such that political structures were made to align 
with the need to effectively manage resources of the environment for achievement of the 
economic goals of colonial rule.  The researcher is by no means inferring that colonialism did 
not achieve any social goals (such as latent benefits of education which eventually served as a 
tool for decolonisation struggles by the nationalists) but there remains this argument that the 
colonial political and economic structures facilitated the conditions that would later lead to 
regular conflict between ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta and the Nigerian state.  After all, 
colonialism promoted urban development while neglecting the rural areas where over 75 per 
cent of the people of the Niger Delta live.  It emphasised the generation of revenues for the 
state in order to sustain it and stabilise effective exploitation of resources of the environment.  
Although oil was not very prominent in the colonial era, the Niger Delta region has been 
noted for possessing other economic resources that were of interest to western civilisation 
before oil was discovered.   
 
In essence then, justice and environmental social movement organisations -- organised 
around specific issues of oil and the environment in the Niger Delta -- did not emerge before 
1960.  However, the socio-economic and political conditions in the years before 
independence influenced their emergence and mode of activities in later years.  The Ogoni 
Bill of Rights presented to the military government under General Ibrahim Babangida in the 
1990s contains the key demands of Niger Deltans.  Socio-economic, political and 
environmental demands contained in the Bill of Rights are made against the paradox of huge 
oil deposit in Ogoni land and poverty among the people.  In this specific case, oil blow-out 
from oil wells and oil spillages and gas flaring from SPDC facilities constantly destroyed 
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farmlands and polluted the environment.  For example, oil blow-out in Bomu in 1970 
destroyed the local economy of the entire community such that widespread poverty was the 
outcome.   Since the community depended entirely on agriculture for its survival, failure to 
give any consideration to the environment would justify the community’s hostility to 
SPDC.262  SPDC promised to pay compensation but defaulted. This is the scenario that 
predominantly characterised operations of the oil sector in the other parts of the Niger Delta. 
 
In 1995, Ken Saro Wiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders were tried by a tribunal set up by the 
General Sani Abacha military government and found guilty of murdering four prominent 
Ogoni men who died during youth protests against the government and their perceived 
collaborators.  The nine Ogoni leaders were sentenced to death.  Abacha ordered their 
immediate execution, leading to international condemnation of the government.  This was 
perceived to be state violence of the highest order against popular protest for environmental 
rights and justice.  The incident became the catalyst for the emergence of similar 
organisations in other parts of the Niger Delta while it dampened the struggle among the 
Ogonis for a long time.  As noted elsewhere: 
The emergence of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) 
helped to inspire the formation of other groups such as the Ijaw Youth Council, 
Egbesu boys, and several others.  Indeed, the intensification of its activities and 
eventual hanging of its leader, Kenule Saro Wiwa along with others aggravated 
tension which led to the   militarization of the region.  With increasing importance  of 
the oil in the region for the state and oil companies and the environmental cost for the 
Ogoni, relationship between the state and oil companies on one hand and the Ogonis 
on the other escalated but not without domestic and international sympathy. This 
situation, in tracing the historical development of irregular forces in the Niger Delta is 
instructive.263 
 
                                               
262   Also based on communication with Professor Ben Naanen, former Secretary General of MOSOP 
on the 23rd of August, 2008 at Aluu, Port Harcourt. 
263   See Allen, F. (2007).  “Irregular Forces and Security in the Niger Delta,” case study produced for 
the project on the ‘Politics of Security Decision-Making’, Conflict, Security and Development Group, 
Kings College London, p.7 www.securityanddevelopment.org  
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A majority of participants at the focus group discussions identified the ‘12-Day Revolution’ 
led by Isaac Adaka Boro under the aegis of the Niger Delta Volunteer Force in 1966 as the 
first organised armed social movement organisation to confront the Nigerian state over socio-
economic, environmental, political and marginalisation issues. Practices of social, economic 
and political exclusion of the Niger Delta were core explanations for the action.  Participants 
were asked in the questionnaire in the section for local environmental groups to say what 
their specific grievances against the Nigerian government are.  Our intention was to know if 
government effort at enforcing national environmental policy is adequate to influence the 
environmental practice of oil companies.  All the respondents claim that the government is 
not doing much.  It seems that the government is weak at enforcing the various laws and 
guidelines already in place.  Thus, pollution of the environment by oil company activities 
continues because of general lack of political will.  The joint-venture partnership between the 
government and the oil majors defines liability patterns in favour of oil companies who are 
the technical operators of the venture.  The government has 55 per cent equity holding in the 
arrangement, which means that in matters of environmental pollution prevention or 
protection, the bulk of responsibility for expenses either for acquiring needed technologies or 
for prevention and clean-up of polluted sites would be borne by the government.  It appears 
that the government (for now) is not showing that willingness.  
 
The researcher asked participants what their specific grievances against the oil companies 
are.  The reason is to be able to assess fairly the motivation for their sustained violent protests 
against the oil companies.  Among factors mentioned by the participants is degradation of the 
environment and its implication for livelihood.   Compliance with environmental regulations 
is expected to achieve sustainable development.  Oil companies in the Niger Delta did not 




The Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) came up with the Kaiama Declaration264 three years after the 
Ogoni Bill of Rights was presented to the government.  In a manner akin to the Ogoni Bill of 
Rights, a key demand made to the government is the issue of resource control.  The 
perception is that control of the oil resource by local oil bearing communities would lead to 
its sustainable extraction.  The formation of the IYC coincided with the emergence of several 
other groups utilising violent strategies in protest against the government and oil companies 
over issues of resource control and environmental practice.  Specifically, the protest against 
the government is over control of the oil resources while the protest against oil companies is 
over environmental degradation caused by oil exploration and production activities.  Both are 
linked by the nature of laws and permissiveness that characterise the oil industry. 
 
It is worth reiterating that the crisis in the Niger Delta pre-dates the discovery of oil at 
Oloibiri in 1956.  Political conflict in the region took the form of agitation for political 
representation and protection against marginalisation (by majority ethnic groups of 
Hausa/Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba) in the years before independence.  Following the discovery 
of oil and its eventual significance for politics and the economy in Nigeria, protests and 
agitation against what the people of the region perceive as neglect, marginalisation, 
environmental degradation intensified and remained marked in 2009 by its current violent 
character.    
 
State responses to the emergence of these groups have been inadequate to meet the economic, 
social, political and environmental needs of the people of the region.  Preparation for 
independence created fears of marginalisation.  The forced marriage of northern and southern 
Nigeria through the amalgamation of 1914 was considered unhealthy and insensitive to the 
needs of the minorities of the Niger Delta.   In any case, the departing colonial state set up the 
                                               
264  The Kaiama Declaration was issued at the end of an all Ijaw youth conference on the 11th of 
December 1998 in Kaiama. 
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Willink’s Commission in 1958 to look into the fears of the people and recommend solutions.  
The recommendation included prescription for constitutional mechanisms for allaying the 
fears of domination and marginalisation of the Niger Delta by majority ethnic groups in 
Nigeria.   It led to the establishment of special development agencies such as the Niger Delta 
Basin Authority.   
 
Perception of threat to the economic, political, environmental and social security of the oil 
bearing communities of the Niger Delta began to sharpen from the time oil was discovered in 
commercial quantity.  As noted earlier, by the 1960s,265 the first violent confrontation against 
the Federal Government by an armed revolutionary group led by Jasper Adaka Boro under 
the platform of the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF) had been recorded.  The Federal 
Government crushed the rebellion by the use of force, arrested Boro and his colleagues, tried 
them for treason and eventually jailed them.  In any case, with the Biafran rebellion and 
events leading to the civil war, Boro was freed along with his colleagues.  His decision to join 
the war on the side of the Federal Government was in gratitude over the creation of states in 
Nigeria but more particularly to fight against the eastern regional government headed by 
Odumegwu Ojukwu. Another interpretation could be that he allowed himself to be used by 
the federal government in undermining the Biafran challenge. 
 
 
On 27 May, 1967, the Federal Government created 12 states out of the existing regional 
structure of the federation of Nigeria.  Rivers, Mid-West and Cross River states were created 
and became the core states of the Niger Delta where much of Nigeria’s oil deposits are found 
and mined.  This action brought a measure of emotional respite to the people of the region in 
terms of addressing their sense of economic marginalisation and political under-
                                               
265  The Niger Delta was recognized as an area in Nigeria that needed special development in the 1960 
constitution. Earlier constitutions also acknowledged the economic potential of the Niger Delta for the 
survival of the federation. See Report of the Special Security Committee on Oil Producing Areas, 19th 
February, 2002. P. 1. 
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representation.  However, for the Nigerian Federal Government, the creation of states was a 
political ploy intended to destroy support for Biafra from the then eastern minority 
communities of the Niger Delta. With the increasing importance of oil for national 
development, the Federal Government began to shift the revenue sharing formula in its 
favour as against the structure that favoured the regional and state governments in earlier 
years.   
 
The structure of conflict in the years following the end of the civil war took the form of local 
communities versus oil companies, local communities versus government, and inter-
community “wars.”  In fact, the armed groups that re-emerged in the 1990s challenged the 
structure of politics and oil economy in relation to how they benefit the people of the Niger 
Delta.  At issue is the underdevelopment of the region in the face of abundant wealth 
generated from oil deposits in the Niger Delta (Ibeanu 2008; Ifeka, 2004: 144; Frynas, 2001: 
27; Ibeanu, 2000: 19; Obi, 1997: 1-3).   For its part, the response of the government has 
generally taken the form of creating special development agencies for the region along with 
the deployment of coercion against protests.266  For example, the Niger Delta Development 
Board was established in 1961 following the recommendation of the Willink’s Commission.  
The Delta River Basin Development Authority was created in the 1976 as a rural 
development strategy for the region.  In 1981, a special fund for the development of the 
region was created under the 1981 Revenue Act for Oil Producing Areas and the Special 
Presidential Task Force for Development of the Oil Producing Areas, which implemented the 
                                               
266   Frynas actually argues that response of the state and oil companies  to anti-oil protests in the 
Niger Delta takes the form of concessions by the state and oil companies through creation of special 
development projects; deployment of violence on the part of the state and oil companies and; use of 
public relations. See Frynas, J.G. (2001).  “Corporate and State Responses to Anti-Oil Protests in the 




fund (1.5% of the federation account).267  In July 1992 the military government under 
General Ibrahim Badamosi Babangida established (via Decree No. 23) the Oil Mineral 
Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) and funded it with 3% of total oil 
revenues accruing to the federation.  With the creation of OMPADEC there was respite 
among Niger Deltans, as the impression was that finally development was to be brought to 
the region through the Commission.  With 3% of national revenues from oil, over USD50 
million was expected as monthly inflow to the Commission.  Unfortunately, ethnicity and 
corruption along with mismanagement and political factors rendered OMPADEC unable to 
deliver on the expectations.  This was despite the fact that the Commission received over 
USD870 million between 1992 and 1997.  Eventually, the Commission was dissolved in 
1996 for failing to satisfy the development yearnings of the Niger Delta.  The Commission 
had merely served as another elite conduit pipe for draining national resources through 
official corruption by way of inflated contracts and political spoils.   
 
The creation of OMPADEC coincided with or succeeded several committees set up to inquire 
into the socio-economic and environmental conditions of the oil bearing communities of the 
region.  For instance, reports of the Justice Alfa Belgore Commission of 1992, Ministerial 
Fact Finding Team of 1994 under the Oil Minister  Don Etiebet, and Niger Delta 
Development Panel headed by Major-General Oladayo Popoola in 1999 were not followed 
through.  Instead, government set aside those recommendations that might have addressed 
adequately the crisis in the region (Frynas, 2001:37).  In January 2001, the Obasanjo 
government established the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) as successor to 
OMPADEC with an annual inflow of 40 billion Naira.  It is funded from: 15% of allocations 
to the nine states of the Niger Delta from the federation account; 50% of ecological fund 
                                               
267   See Ibeanu, O. (2008).  “Affluence and Affliction: The Niger Delta as a Critique of Political 
Science,” 27th Inaugural Lecture of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, delivered on February 20 p.29. 
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meant for correcting ecological distortions arising from oil exploration and production 
activities and; and 3% of the yearly budget of oil companies.   
 
There is widespread scepticism among many groups in the Niger Delta about the credibility 
and capacity of the NDDC to address the socio-economic conditions of the region (see for 
example, ANEJI, 2004:31; Akpe, 2003:14).268  Reports are available that the Commission has 
undertaken several development projects in the region and has done fairly well when 
compared to OMPADEC.  Against the background of  violence, kidnapping, destruction of 
oil facilities, killing of state security personnel, and the general state of youth restiveness in 
the Niger Delta, the Obasanjo administration created the Special Security Committee on Oil 
Producing Areas on the 19th of February, 2002, to inquire into  the “prevailing situation in the 
oil producing areas which have, in recent past, witnessed unprecedented vandalisation of oil 
pipelines, disruptions, kidnappings, extortion and a general state of insecurity especially of 
the oil and gas industry.”269  The government set aside wide ranging and relevant 
recommendations made by the Committee that could have made substantial positive impact 
towards resolving the crisis in the region (such as the security measure of  compulsory 
maintenance of all pipelines in accordance with international standard and statutory 
requirements to secure pipeline integrity and prevent pipeline ruptures; discouragement of the 
use of military force in resolving restiveness in a democratic dispensation of Nigeria as it 
could be counter-productive; and development of the region.  Other political 
recommendations included: increase in derivation to 50 per cent as well as demonstration of 
                                               
268 See recorded focus group interviews in Port Harcourt and some recorded key informant interviews 
with local environmental groups. Also see African Network for Environmental and Economic Justice 
(2004)  Oil of Poverty in Niger Delta; Akpe, S. (2003).  “Of NDDC, Oil Companies and Abandoned 
Projects” The Punch Newspaper May14, p.14 




accountability and transparency in the disbursement and utilisation of the derivation fund by 
states and local governments in the Niger Delta).270 
 
 
With the emergence of Alhaji Musa Yar’ Adua as Obasanjo’s successor in May 2007, hope 
of an end to the crisis was once again raised for many in the Niger Delta and beyond.  This 
was due to his speech during his inauguration address.  He made glowing remarks about his 
intention to resolve the crisis in the region within the space of six months.  However, one 
year after his assumption of office, violence intensified in the region.  The entire economic 
security of Nigeria is under severe threat for the attacks and shut-ins of oil fields in the 
region.   
 
5.8. Conclusion 
Analyses of character of environmental politics in Nigeria show that the issue of 
environmental protection in the oil-rich Niger Delta has come seriously into the political 
agenda of actors in the political system.  Analysis of power relations and how this manifests 
among these actors in the political process over sustainable development goals embedded in 
environmental policy of the government shows that violence in the Niger Delta is a reflection 
of the failure of the government to meaningfully or effectively address the issue of 
sustainable development through the implementation of its environmental policy.  There are 
underlying political and economic, and other factors that appear to have influenced the 
seriousness of the government in tackling environmental problems associated with oil 
company activities in the Niger Delta.  What is important to note is that the environment and 
the humans who live within it remain as victims due to the continuing flaring of gas and 
spilling of oil in the Niger Delta.  Despite existing guidelines, legislations and policies meant 
to achieve sustainable development by bringing an end to despoilation of the environment by 
                                               
270  Ibid, p.26 
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oil companies, the government seems to have allowed these damages to continue.  It is no 
surprise therefore that local justice and environmental movement organisations in the Niger 
delta have taken advantage of this failure of the government to effectively implement its 
policies on the environment by pointing to the environmental effects of activities of oil 
companies in the region as part justification for their choice of violence against government 
security and oil companies operating in the region.  In essence, both the political process and 
environmental practice of the government and oil companies in the Niger Delta do not 
sufficiently promote sustainable development as a key goal in the environmental policy of the 
government.  In other words, there is a lack of synergy between their activities and the 














6.1. Overview  
The study is limited by a small sample size of 45 respondents to the questionnaire and 15 
participants in the key informant interviews.  The focus groups were attended by eight 
persons at each session.  Focus on three oil companies (SPDC, Agip and Elf) is also a 
limiting factor.  Nonetheless, the study provides some insights into how violence in the Niger 
Delta is caused by the failure of the government to implement its national environmental 
policy.  The remaining section of this work summarises, concludes and makes 




Oil companies and the government remain largely indicted by scholars and justice and 
environmental groups for a variety of practices that add to the despoliation of the 
environment in the Niger Delta.  Three of such practices identified in this research are unsafe 
disposal of toxic drilling wastes, gas flaring and oil spills.  Nigerian law gives ownership 
rights of all petroleum resources on-shore and off-shore to the federal government of Nigeria.  
By logical extension, effective protection of the environment from damage caused by the 
activities of oil companies depends on what the federal government does with this ownership 
rights.  Implementation of government policy on the environment is a key responsibility of 
the government and oil companies to ensure sustainable production of the oil and 
improvement in the living conditions of people in oil producing communities of the Niger 
Delta.  For example, as already noted in chapter 5 of this work, environmental monitoring 
and auditing are relevant indicators of implementation and compliance of oil companies to 
environmental policy. They involve frequent checking and inspection of equipment, 
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management systems, operational systems and their impact on the environment. Effective 
monitoring and auditing by oil companies and government has the advantage of guaranteeing 
sustainable development.  The reality is that monitoring and auditing activities by oil 




To reiterate, the study was guided by the hypothesis that: violence in the Niger Delta is 
caused by the failure of the government to implement its national environmental policy.  A 
key finding is that while there is no direct relationship between violence and failure of the 
government to implement effectively its national environmental public policy, there is an 
indirect relationship between the two variables.  Failure of the government to implement 
effectively its national environmental public policy is responsible for the socio-economic 
conditions that have ensued.  The losses of means of livelihood, scarcity of arable land due to 
dispossession through government laws, lack of sufficient compensation, failure to prevent 
pollution from gas flaring and oil spills by oil companies, and inadequate compliance levels 
of oil companies with environmental standards all combine not only to generate poverty and 
unemployment for the bulk of the local people of the oil bearing communities but also to 





Our study reveals substantial evidence of violent antagonism between oil companies and 
government (on the one hand) and local environmental groups (on the other hand).  
Participants of all extractions in the study believe that the relationship is sour, antagonistic, 
repressive, and characterised by the killing and violation of fundamental rights to life and 
dignity of humans.  They also point to specific grievance factors (economic, social, political 
and environmental) as mostly responsible for the conflict in the Niger Delta.   Oil related 
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environmental, economic, social and political factors were identified by members of local 
justice and environmental groups as key trigger of physical violence from local justice and 
environmental groups.  The National Environmental Policy, which was conceived and 
formulated to be an integrative framework for addressing or achieving sustainable 
development, could have provided a palliative for the tensions and conflict in the region with 
a dedicated and effective implementation.  The failure by the government to make 
meaningful progress towards achieving this goal has meant continuous damage to the 
environment.  Indeed, gas flaring and oil spillage by oil companies have remained consistent 
features of the oil industry.  A key finding of the study is that the grievances of members of 
local justice and environmental movement groups in the region include their unhappiness 
with the overall effects of these damages to the environment in which their people have 
depended on for their livelihoods.   
 
A major finding of the study is that government environmental policy is not properly 
implemented.  As already indicated, gas is still being flared profusely by oil companies 
amidst various environmental laws that prohibit the flaring of gas.   Prevention of oil 
pollution is also not a priority for the oil companies.  Some informants believe that the 
government lacks the political will to enforce these laws because of her joint-venture 
relationship with the oil companies.  Besides, the survival of the Nigerian economy has, since 
the 1970s, been dependent on the stability of the oil business from which over 90 per cent of 
the nation’s foreign exchange is derived.  It is feared that strict implementation of 
environmental laws might hurt revenues and profits from oil production.  While this is not an 
inviolable explanation for the failure to implement environmental policy, it may partly 




 Ironically, although the government had earlier ordered oil companies to stop gas flaring in 
Nigeria by December 2008, it continued to lack the will to take necessary enforcement 
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steps.271  Indeed, as already shown, historical records demonstrate that past executive orders 
and relevant laws such as the Gas Re-injection Act of 1979 had failed to bring gas flaring to 
an end in the Niger Delta.  As Karikpo272 states, ‘since the federal government is paying deaf 
ears to end gas flaring, ERA will galvanize  communities,  human and environmental  rights 
groups, politicians, children and religious leaders to put a stop to gas flaring in the Niger 
Delta.’  He blames continuous gas flaring on the government which he says   has failed to 
provide the needed funds, political will or leadership to end gas flaring in Nigeria.  
 
 
This research finds that the end to gas flaring requires firm action by the government.  The 
perception that government is unwilling to enforce policies to end gas flaring contributes 
immensely to the sense of frustration on the part of local oil bearing communities and groups 
whose social and economic conditions have been worsened by the pollution of their 




 The research also notes that oil companies operating in the region have continued to use 
inadequate technology except where it concerns security for their expatriate staff.  Despite the 
use of their advanced security technology, the expatriate staff of oil companies are still being 
kidnapped by armed justice and environmental movement groups.  What remains worrisome 
is the number of oil spill incidents which members of these groups claim are predominantly 
caused by ageing equipment (such as the pipelines) but refuted by the oil companies.  Based 
on our interview with staff of the Health and Safety Departments of Agip, Elf and SPDC as 
well as with staff of NOSDRIA and the DPR, the incidence of gas flaring is entirely the affair 
of government and oil companies.  The case of oil spill has however taken a complex shape 
                                               
271  See interview notes with Egbesu Boys and taped interview of focus group discussion. 
 
272  Mike Karikpo is the Programme Manager for Energy and Climate Change of ERA. See The Port 




where third parties in the form of youths from the oil bearing communities puncture oil 
pipelines in order to attract payment of compensation from the oil companies.  An added 
difficulty has emerged; insecurity caused by threats from armed groups make it difficult for 
the oil companies to report cases of oil spills or to deal quickly with the recovery efforts. 
 
 
Although this researcher does not find any direct relationship between mundane 
environmental issues of conservation and conflict, the failure of the government to implement 
environmental policy is premised on the notion that the goal of sustainable development 
should be approached in an integrative manner capable of engendering economic and social 
progress for communities who depend on the environment for their survival.  The researcher 
finds that this is not the case for social progress among communities in the Niger Delta. 
 
 
In this study, the connection between implementation of government oil related 
environmental policy and conflict in the Niger Delta is complex and not direct.  Rather, the 
relationship partly manifests in the form of lack of good governance with respect to the 
environment.  This is because local oil bearing communities are excluded from key decision-
making and implementation processes regarding oil exploration and production.  The rural 
poor in the region are without sufficient land for the sustenance of their families.  The urban 
poor are either unemployed or underemployed, without sufficient income to take care of their 
primary needs.  In both cases, the oil economy and its environmental consequences are key 
determinants.  For both (rural and urban poor), access to good health care, education, 
nutrition, road infrastructure, potable water and electricity are generally unavailable.  This 
social condition makes youths from families where these basic amenities of modest lifestyle 
are lacking vulnerable to the recruitment efforts of leaders of justice and environmental 
groups against the state and oil companies.  The Nigerian government, in collaboration with 
oil companies, has mined oil for over four decades in the Niger Delta and earned at least 
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N29.8 trillion in revenues273.  Failure by the government to utilize substantial part of the 
revenue for addressing social conditions of the people of the region, amidst environmental 
consequences  of the oil industry, has fuelled anger among youths against oil companies and 
the government.  This is the basis of the current violent conflict in the region.  In any case, 
these social conditions also contribute to the choice of criminality for many of the youths 
now involved in theft (bunkery) of oil and criminality through vandalisation of oil pipelines, 
illegal sale of oil, armed robbery and kidnapping for ransom. 
 
 
  In the area of staffing, oil companies depend more on contract staff than permanent staff.  
The implication is that welfare responsibilities of the companies towards contract staff are 




6.3. Implementation of environmental policy  
The key findings are: 
 Gas flaring and oil spillage are still common practices in oil bearing communities 
where oil companies operate in the Niger Delta; 
 Oil companies are still predominantly involved in the use of inappropriate and 
inadequate technology for the purpose of cleanup and prevention of pollution due to 
oil spill; 
 There is very little improvement in the social, political and economic conditions of 
people from oil bearing communities in the Niger Delta. 
 Oil companies that wish to continue in business increasingly appear to have embraced 
the idea of sustainable development because of threats and the resistance of local 
justice and environmental groups.  The oil majors now have contingency plans and 
have improved substantially in compliance with the NPE.  Indeed, there are some 
                                               
273    See Tell Magazine (2008).  February 18, p. 28 
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claims that (Aror274) 50 per cent compliance on the part of these oil companies is 
already achieved. This level of achievement, if it is true, might be the result of the 
crisis in the region.  However, actions by some  implementing officials at the Ministry 
of Environment, the  Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), National Oil Spill 
Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRIA) and oil companies do not yet conform 
adequately to the goals embodied in environmental policy related to oil business in 
the Niger Delta; 
 Government is yet to show substantial commitment to enforcing  its orders and court 
decisions concerning operations of oil companies and the protection of the 
environment in the Niger Delta; 
 
 Socio-economic conditions of local populations in the oil bearing communities remain 
fundamentally deplorable: they are without good roads, healthcare facilities, schools 
and teachers, jobs, access to legal services, good nutrition and other basic facilities 
that make for good living for a country that has generated over $300 billion in 
revenue from 50 years of oil exploration and production in the region. 
 
  
6.4. Political opportunity structures  
 Court rulings on matters of environmental litigation are regularly not enforced by the 
government.   Beyond socio-economic and political hindrances which oil bearing 
communities face, the issue of violation of court rulings or what should normally be 
seen as contempt of court remains a factor that impedes their access to environmental 
justice.  The judiciary should be more independent and accessible to citizens while 
erring judges should be disciplined.  
 
                                               
274   Aror is senior environmental scientist at NOSDRIA. He spoke with the researcher in an interview 
for this work. 
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 Legal and institutional mechanisms that provide access for various stakeholders to 
participate in the implementation of environmental public policy in the Niger Delta 
are inadequate  in Nigeria; 
 Formal groups and institutions such as the Ministry of Environment and specialised 
environmental and sustainable development agencies -- such as the NDDC, 
NOSDRIA, and FEPA (moribund) -- were established with specific mandates to 
address sustainable development problems but have failed to provide platforms for the 
involvement of local communities in the implementation of environmental public 
policy in the Niger Delta.  Instead, local communities rely on informal and sometimes 
illegal groups to engage oil companies and the government over issues of benefits 
from oil in the Niger Delta; 
  
 Oil companies appear to have embraced the idea of sustainable development and are 
showing commitment to it by creating internal structures such as the Health, 
Environment and Safety departments.  There are also indications that they have 
formulated internal policies to address environmental problems arising from their 
activities.  They have also undertaken substantial projects to improve the living 
conditions of communities where they operate.  Indeed, wide-ranging scholarship 
programmes, health, educational, and economic empowerment projects are already 
being put in place by the oil companies.  However, these efforts have failed to satisfy 
the local oil bearing communities.   Instead, they now desire total control of the 
resources so as to benefit maximally from the oil.  Besides, the Nigerian government 
has continued to fall short of enforcing stringent methods of gaining compliance from 






6.5. Environmental policies 
Our findings for this section include the following: 
 Although environmental policies related to oil policies are adequate, the existing 
National Environmental Policy is not fully implemented. 
 Limited compliance with oil and environment related policies by oil companies is 
responsible for the destruction of the environment and the  consequent social 
conditions that lead to tension in the Niger Delta; 
 The attainment of sustainable development is a key goal of National Environmental 
Policy.  Poor living conditions and consistent agitation for resource control by local 
groups in the Niger Delta are signs that sustainable development is far from being 
achieved.  Besides, policies that are meant to generate practices that improve local 
economic conditions have failed to bring such results, leading to frustrations among 
local communities.  Such frustrations have contributed to rising tensions and violence 
in the region.  Our finding is that economic, political and environmental factors 
interact in the context of sustainable development to explain these frustrations.  
 
6.6. Concluding remarks 
This research investigated the role of government in the implementation of national 
environmental policy in relation to the activities of (major) oil companies in the Niger Delta 
in order to establish the connection between non-implementation of national environmental 
policy and violence in the region.  Three sets of data bases made up of questionnaires, focus 
group discussions, and key informant interviews as well as an extensive base of library 
materials were analysed.  A key finding of the study is that the relationship is clear albeit 
indirect.  Social conditions of poverty, loss of livelihood and unemployment are directly 
related to the activities of oil companies.  On its part, government has been unable 
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(unwilling) to monitor adequately oil company compliance with sustainable development 
principles embedded in environmental public policies of Nigeria.  As lives are shattered by 
the negative effects of environmental degradation -- even as local communities watch as their 
resources continue to be pillaged by oil companies and the national ruling elite – government 
failure to carry out its governance mandate has led to deep local frustrations and the 
predictable emergence of local justice and environmental groups with antagonistic intentions 
toward both the government and the oil companies.  Increasingly, an important aspect of the 
oil/environment related conflict is now the struggle for control of the oil resource by local 




The researcher notes that environmental practice by oil companies and the Nigerian state 
degrade the environment and alter the livelihood patterns of local oil bearing communities of 
the Niger Delta.   Oil is the source of wealth for Nigeria. Efforts at addressing the 
environmental consequences of oil production have been weak and have yielded poor results 
and, as such, have failed to satisfy the local communities of the Niger Delta.  Basically, the 
Nigerian state has failed to ensure that oil companies comply fully with regulations meant to 
promote sustainable economic development.   The situation is worsened by the lack of 
political leadership to effectively address the problem.  As Ifeka (2001: 99-105) notes: 
“…The political class has declined to regulate gas flaring, pipeline maintenance or levels of 
spillage.  Frustrated by their exclusion from the benefits of oil, militant youths attack oil 
company installations, hijack personnel, and lay waste to villages believed to have oil 
reserves, leaving many homeless.”  Content analyses of responses of informants from some 
of the Niger Delta states as well as literature review show that similar arguments are 






It notes that what is conventionally seen as the cause 275 of violence in the Niger Delta is also 
the consequence of the failure of government to resolve the cause of violence over time.  In 
any case, the outcome is the continuation or worsening of the conflict into outright violence, 
and an alarmingly growing level of criminality as opportunists seize the space available due 
to social disruptions and instability to engage in illegal economic activities, kidnapping and 
internecine competition, fighting and killings. It also appears that many criminally-minded 
groups now use the common expression of struggle for resource control, development and 
environmental justice as a shield for their illegal activities -- thus making it difficult to 




Based on the overall analyses, the following recommendations are proposed for the various 
actors in conflict in the Niger Delta: 
 
Oil companies: 
 The management of oil companies should act less politically in matters of internal 
environmental policy and embrace the idea of sustainable development beyond self-
serving policy statements.  Frequent postponement of dates for termination of gas 
flaring in Nigeria by oil companies should end with exploration of investment 
alternatives to re-inject gas into development projects. 
 Oil companies should respect Nigerian environmental and oil laws and observe 
international regulations as they relate to the environment. 
 Oil companies should device good working relations with the state and local 
                                               
275    For example, degradation of the environment by oil companies, lack of sufficient benefit from oil 
revenues, political exclusion, and lack of infrastructural development. 
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governments as well as with local oil bearing communities. 
 Oil companies should honour Memoranda of Understanding signed between them and 
their host communities and, where necessary, avoid conceding to clauses that they 
cannot meet or fulfil. 
 Oil companies should be more socially responsible by delivering social development 
assistance to their host communities in a more transparent way. 
Government: 
 The government, through the NNPC, DPR, FME and NOSDRIA should equip 
officials for more effective involvement in enforcing policies such as the EIA and 
post environmental impact assessment with modern technological tools and skills for 
laboratory work.   
 The federal government should speed up the process of amending the 1999 
Constitution to include provisions for increased level of resources to the Niger Delta 
based on the principle of derivation. 
 The government should stop depending on oil companies for laboratory investigations 
of pollution incidences. Instead, government should develop relevant manpower at the 
various agencies and ministries and establish laboratories in order to also avoid the 
current practices of estimating levels of pollution where scientific procedures for 
specific levels can be obtained.  
 The government should insist on the end to gas flaring in Nigeria without further 
postponement. 
 Inputs by local oil bearing communities should be included in environmental policy of 
the government. The right to a clean environment should be entrenched in the 
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Nigerian Constitution in order to ensure access to environmental justice for those 
whose environments are violated. 
 The government should review upward compensation levels granted to individuals 
and communities for destruction of the environment while insisting on zero pollution 
for oil companies. 
 The government should invest massively in Niger Delta communities by providing 
basic social amenities. 
 The government should organize regular training on non-violent security for members 
of the armed forces and the Nigerian Police. 
 The federal government should enforce adequately anti-corruption laws on all 
agencies and officials saddled with the responsibility of governance and management 
of public funds in the Niger Delta. 
 
Local justice and environmental groups: 
 Youths should desist from the use of violence as a strategy for expressing their 
grievances and seek non-violent approaches.  The Ogoni case is an example of non-
violent struggle. 
 Youths should desist from the current practice of scandalous and criminal 
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An informed consent letter   
Dear Sir or Madam: 
 
I am a PhD student of the School of Politics at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, Scottsville, 
and Pietermaritzburg, South Africa. I am involved in a research on the topic, “Oil Companies 
and Implementation of Government Environmental Policy in the Niger Delta.”  The 
objectives are: To identify and explain the pattern of relationship between the Nigerian 
government and the oil companies on the one hand and environmental local groups on the 
other hand in the implementation of environmental public policy in the Niger Delta; to 
identify and explain specifically what and why socio-economic and political interests shape 
the relationships between the Nigerian government and environmental local groups and oil 
companies in the implementation of environmental public policy in the Niger Delta; and to 
determine the extent to which oil and environmental policy related conflicts between 
environmental local groups (on the one hand) and government and oil companies (on the 
other hand) depend on political opportunity structures in Nigeria. 
 
 
This questionnaire is part of an effort towards the completion of my dissertation, which is 
basic for the award of the Doctor of Philosophy Degree in Political Science at the University 
KwaZulu-Natal.  The research takes the position that “violence in the Niger Delta is caused 
by the failure of the government to implement its national environmental policy.”  The 
questions have been designed to measure the key variables that inform the assumption.  
Therefore, your views will be helpful in determining the validity of the position. 
 
 
You have been identified as one of the appropriate respondents for this study.  As such, I am 
writing to request that you spare some of your valuable time to fill the attached questionnaire.  
Any information you provide will be used only for this study and will be kept strictly 
confidential and anonymous.   Please also note that the decision not to participate will not 
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result in any form of disadvantage to you. Your participation is absolutely voluntary and you 
should feel free to withdraw from the study at any stage and for any reason.  Please do follow 
the instructions when filling it.  Your names are not required on this questionnaire. 
 
 
If you have any questions about the study, kindly contact me at: 207505630@ukzn.ac.za.  
You may also contact my HOD, Prof. Ufo Okeke Uzodike at: Phone +27 33 260-
5285 or Email: uzodike@ukzn.ac.za. 
 














I ----------------------------------------- hereby confirm that I understand the contents of this 
document and the nature of the research project, and I consent to participate in the research 
Project.  I understand that I am at liberty to withdraw from the project at any time, should I so 
desire. 
 
Signature ---------------------------------------- Date……………………………. 






















Interview and Focus Group Discussion Questions 
 
Objective 1:  To identify and explain the pattern of relationship between the Nigerian government and the oil 
companies on the one hand and environmental local groups on the other hand in the implementation of 
environmental public policy in the Niger Delta. 
 
Key question: What is the relationship between government and local environmental 
groups over the implementation of government environmental policy? 
 
Local environmental groups: 
 How would you assess the relationship between government and local environmental 
groups? 
 How would you assess the relationship between oil companies and local 
environmental groups? 
 What are your specific grievances against the Nigerian government? 
 What are your specific grievances against oil companies?  
 How would you rank your grievances in order of their seriousness to your group? 
 What specifically have you done to show willingness to work with the government 
peacefully? 
 What specifically have you done to show willingness to work with oil companies 
peacefully? 
 How has your group reacted to government failure to emplace appropriate or 
implement formal environmental policy frameworks? 
 What are the specific causes of violence in the Niger Delta? 
  What relevance would you ascribe to the failure by the Nigerian government to 
enforce key environmental policies related to oil business?   
Oil company officials: 
 How would you assess the relationship between your company and government? 
 How would you assess the relationship between your company and local groups in the 
Niger Delta? 
 Do you have any specific grievances or concerns about the Nigerian government? 
Specify! 
 Do you have any specific grievances or issues with local groups that are targeting oil 
companies and their facilities?  Specify! 
 What do you believe are the specific grievances of local groups against your activities 
in the Niger Delta?  
 What specifically has your company done to address the grievances of local groups 
agitating against your activities?   
 How would you assess government environmental policies?   
 Are government environmental policies actually adequate to ensure full 
environmental protection for human, animal, and plant life in the Niger Delta region? 
 How would you assess the compliance level of your company to government 
environmental policies? 




 How has your company engaged the government to ensure that it puts in place 
appropriate policies or that it implements its own formal environmental policy 
frameworks? 
 What, in your view, are the specific causes of violence in the Niger Delta? 
  What relevance (to the violence) would you ascribe to the failure by the Nigerian 
government to enforce key environmental policies related to oil business?   
 What are the main factors which negate or slow down the implementation of government 
environmental policies related to the oil business in the Niger Delta? 
 
Government officials: 
 How would you assess the relationship between government and oil companies? 
 How would you assess the relationship between government and local groups in the 
Niger Delta?   
 Given the context of pervasive violence and tense atmosphere, what do you believe 
has gone wrong with the relationship?  
 Do you have any grievances or concerns about the activities of oil companies? Please 
specify! 
 Do you have any grievances or issues with local groups that are targeting oil 
companies and government?  Please specify! 
 How would you assess the merits of the local militant grievances against government 
activities and presence in the Niger Delta?  
 What specifically has government done to address the grievances of local groups 
agitating against your activities and presence in the Niger Delta?   
 How would you assess oil company compliance to government environmental 
policies?   
 How would you assess government efforts to ensure that oil companies comply with 
its environmental policies?   
 Are government environmental policies actually adequate to ensure full 
environmental protection for human, animal, and plant life in the Niger Delta region? 
 Why is government not doing more to identify publicly specific oil company 
violations of environmental legislations and the compliance level of individual 
companies as well as the penalties imposed on each culprit? 
 What has government done to ensure global standards of environmental legislation as 
well as policy implementation and monitoring?   
 What, in your view, are the specific causes of violence in the Niger Delta? 
  What relevance (to the violence) would you ascribe to the failure by the Nigerian 
government to enforce key environmental policies related to oil business?   
 What are the main factors which negate or slow down the implementation of government 
environmental policies related to the oil business in the Niger Delta? 
 
Objective 2: To identify and explain specifically what and why socio-economic and political interests 
shape the relationships between the Nigerian government and environmental local groups and oil 
companies in the implementation of environmental public policy in the Niger Delta. 
 
Key question: To what extent is the lack of political opportunity structures the determining 
factor of choice of political action for local environmental groups in the Niger Delta? 
 
Local environmental groups: 
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 What are the principal objectives of your group? 
 How have you sought to achieve those objectives? 
 What has you group done to engage oil companies and government officials 
peacefully in the pursuit of your objectives? 
 What specific constraints have you faced in your struggle to achieve environmental 
justice for your people? 
 What constrains you from approaching the quest through electoral processes? 
 If the political system becomes more democratic (free and fair), would you be willing 
to use the political arena in lieu of violence? 
 What constrains you from approaching the quest through judicial processes? 
 If the legal system becomes more transparent and accountable to the law (less 
corruptible), would you be willing to use the courts in lieu of violence? 
 Why have you not tried other less violent means such as peaceful demonstrations, 
boycotts, and appeals state authorities? 
 What successes have you achieved through violence? Please specify! 
 In what ways have such successes translated to benefits to you as individuals or to 
communities in the Niger Delta?  Please specify the benefits and identify the 
benefiting communities? 
 Are you able to maintain your family and manage your other responsibilities? 
 Do you believe that members of some other local groups are able to meet up with 
their financial obligations through their violent activities? Which ones? 
  Why did you decide on your present course of action? 
 Given your present use of violence, what would constitute success for you?  
 What are your minimum conditions for abandoning violent activities against oil 
companies? 
 What are your minimum conditions for abandoning violent activities against the 
government? 
 Can you identify any local militant groups that are engaged in violent activities just 
for the money? 
 
 
Oil Company officials: 
 What do you feel are the principal objectives of local militant groups? 
 In what constructive ways has your company engaged government in an effort to look 
at ways to address those objectives? 
 How would you assess their claims of legitimate bases for the use of violence? 
 What specific opportunities do you believe they have for peaceful pursuits of their 
stated objectives? 
 How would you assess their chances in attempting to use democratic or electoral 
processes as a means for trying to address their grievances? 
 If the political system was more democratic (free and fair), do you believe that the 
militants would be more willing to work through the political arena in lieu of 
violence? 
 How would you assess their chances for success in attempting to use judicial 
processes as the means for trying to address their grievances? 
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 If the legal system was more transparent and accountable to the law (less corruptible), 
do you believe that the militants would be willing to work through the courts in lieu of 
violence? 
 How would you assess government’s efforts in using violence rather than persuasion 
techniques to address the grievances of the people of the Niger Delta?   
 Has government done reasonably well, in your view, in addressing the grievances of 
the Niger Delta people?   
 Why have such efforts not borne fruits in terms of the cessation of violence in the 
region? 
 Who do you believe are responsible for the militarization and violence in the Niger 
Delta? 
 Can you identify any local militant groups that are engaged in violent activities just 
for the money? Please specify which ones! 
 Can you identify any local politicians or external role players that are connected 





 What do you feel are the principal objectives of local militant groups? 
 In what constructive ways has government sought to work with them to address those 
objectives? 
 How would you assess their claims of legitimate bases for the use of violence? 
 What specific opportunities do you believe they have for peaceful pursuits of their 
stated objectives? 
 How would you assess their chances in attempting to use democratic or electoral 
processes as a means for trying to address their grievances? 
 If the political system was more democratic (free and fair), do you believe that the 
militants would be more willing to use the political arena in lieu of violence? 
 How would you assess their chances for success in attempting to use judicial 
processes as the means for trying to address their grievances? 
 If the legal system was more transparent and accountable to the law (less corruptible), 
do you believe that the militants would be willing to use the courts in lieu of violence? 
 How would you assess government’s efforts in using violence rather than persuasion 
techniques to address the grievances of the people of the Niger Delta?   
 What has government done to address the grievances of the Niger Delta people?  
Please specify! 
 Why have such efforts not borne fruits in terms of the cessation of violence in the 
region? 
 Who do you believe are responsible for the militarization and violence in the Niger 
Delta? 
 Can you identify any local militant groups that are engaged in violent activities just 
for the money? 
 Can you identify any local politicians or external role players that are connected 




Objective 3: To determine the extent to which oil and environmental policy related conflicts between 
environmental local groups (on the one hand) and government and oil companies (on the other hand) 
depend on political opportunity structures in Nigeria. 
 
Key question: What has government done to implement key environmental policies related 
to oil business in the Niger Delta? 
 
Government officials: 
 What is the government doing to ensure that it has adequate environmental policy 
instruments for dealing with the challenges of oil exploration and production in 
Nigeria? 
 To what extent do existing instruments measure up to global yardsticks in terms of 
their scope and relevance? 
 What is the government doing to ensure adequate monitoring of the environmental 
impact of industrial activities in Nigeria? 
 Who is responsible for monitoring effective compliance to environmental legislations 
in Nigeria and what are they doing to ensure the compliance of oil companies with 
key environmental policies in the Niger Delta? 
 What are the monitors doing in regard to oil spillage? 
 What are the monitors doing in regard to gas flares? 
 What are the monitors doing in regard to oil well blow-outs? 
 What are the monitors doing in regard to damages to marine wildlife? 
 What are the monitors doing in regard to the ongoing modification of the ecosystem 
through species elimination and delay in biota (fauna and flora) succession? 
 W hat are the monitors doing in regard to decreases in both fishery resources and farm 
yields? 
 What has the government done to compensate local Niger Delta communities that 
have borne the brunt of the environmental damages resulting from oil exploration and 
production activities? 
 How has the government worked to engage the local communities to address their 
financial losses and challenges resulting from the impact of environment damage 
from oil exploration and production activities on their land and water resources? 
 How has the government worked to engage the local communities to address their 
health difficulties and challenges resulting from the impact of environment damage 
from oil exploration and production activities on their land and water resources? 
 How has the government worked to engage the local communities to address the 
challenges and the associated distortions in their way of life resulting from the impact 
of environment damage from oil exploration and production activities on their land 
and water resources? 
 How has the government worked to engage the local communities to address the 
matter of adequate compensation for the appropriation of their resources by the state? 
 
Oil company officials: 
 What is your company doing to ensure that it has adequate environmental policy 
guidelines for dealing with the challenges of oil exploration and production in 
Nigeria? 
 
 What is your company doing to ensure that your oil mining activities in Nigeria 
impose minimum environmental impact and burdens on the local communities? 
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 Do you have a dedicated office responsible for monitoring effective compliance to 
environmental legislations in Nigeria? 
 What is the office (your company) doing to ensure your compliance with key 
environmental policies in the Niger Delta? 
 What specifically is your company doing in regard to oil spillage? 
 What specifically is your company doing in regard to gas flares? 
 What specifically is your company doing in regard to oil well blow-outs? 
 What specifically is your company doing in regard to damages to marine wildlife? 
 What specifically is your company doing in regard to the ongoing modification of the 
ecosystem through species elimination and delay in biota (fauna and flora) 
succession? 
 W hat specifically is your company doing in regard to decreases in both fishery 
resources and farm yields? 
 What is your company doing to compensate local Niger Delta communities that have 
borne the brunt of the environmental damages resulting from your oil exploration and 
production activities? 
 What have you done to engage the local communities to address their financial losses 
and challenges resulting from the impact of environment damage from your oil 
exploration and production activities on their land and water resources? 
 What have you done to engage the local communities to address their health 
difficulties and challenges resulting from the impact of environment damage from 
your oil exploration and production activities on their land and water resources? 
 What have you done to engage the local communities to address the challenges and 
the associated distortions in their way of life resulting from the impact of environment 
damage from oil exploration and production activities on their land and water 
resources? 
What have you done (even in collaboration with the government) to engage the local 
communities to address the matter of adequate compensation for the appropriation of their 
resources by the state? 
Local environmental groups: 
 What are the government and oil companies doing to ensure that they have adequate 
environmental policy guidelines for dealing with the challenges of oil exploration and 
production in the Niger Delta? 
 To what extent do existing environmental policy instruments measure up to global 
yardsticks in terms of their scope and relevance? 
 What are the government and oil companies doing to ensure that oil mining activities 
in Nigeria impose minimum environmental impact and burdens on your communities? 
 Which offices of the state or oil companies responsible for monitoring effective 
compliance to environmental legislations have approached you or other local groups 
or communities in an attempt to address environmental concerns or issues? 
 What specific efforts can you identify or are aware of that have been carried out by 
government to ensure compliance with key environmental policies in the Niger Delta? 
 What specific efforts can you identify or are aware of that have been carried out by oil 
companies to ensure compliance with key environmental policies in the Niger Delta? 
 To the best of your knowledge, what specifically is the government doing in regard to 
oil spillage? 
 To the best of your knowledge, what specifically are oil companies doing in regard to 
oil spillage? 




 To the best of your knowledge, what specifically are oil companies doing in regard to 
gas flares? 
 To the best of your knowledge, what specifically is the government doing in regard to 
oil well blow-outs? 
 To the best of your knowledge, what specifically are oil companies doing in regard to 
oil well blow-outs? 
 To the best of your knowledge, what specifically is the government doing in regard to 
damages to marine wildlife? 
 To the best of your knowledge, what specifically are oil companies doing in regard to 
damages to marine wildlife? 
 To the best of your knowledge, what specifically is the government doing in regard to 
the ongoing modification of the ecosystem through species elimination and delay in 
biota (fauna and flora) succession? 
 To the best of your knowledge, what specifically are oil companies doing in regard to 
the ongoing modification of the ecosystem through species elimination and delay in 
biota (fauna and flora) succession? 
 To the best of your knowledge, what specifically is the government doing in regard to 
decreases in both your fishery resources and farm yields? 
 To the best of your knowledge, what specifically are oil companies doing in regard to 
decreases in both your fishery resources and farm yields? 
 To the best of your knowledge, what is the government doing to compensate local 
Niger Delta communities that have borne the brunt of the environmental damages 
resulting from their oil exploration and production activities? 
 To the best of your knowledge, what are oil companies doing to compensate local 
Niger Delta communities that have borne the brunt of the environmental damages 
resulting from their oil exploration and production activities? 
 To the best of your knowledge, what has the government done to engage your 
communities to address your financial losses and challenges resulting from the impact 
of environmental damage due to oil exploration and production activities on your land 
and water resources? 
 To the best of your knowledge, what have the oil companies done to engage your 
communities to address your financial losses and challenges resulting from the impact 
of environmental damage due to their oil exploration and production activities on your 
land and water resources? 
 To the best of your knowledge, what has the government done to engage your 
communities to address your health difficulties and challenges resulting from the 
impact of environmental damage due to the oil exploration and production activities 
on your land and water resources? 
 To the best of your knowledge, what have oil companies done to engage your 
communities to address your health difficulties and challenges resulting from the 
impact of environmental damage due to their oil exploration and production activities 
on your land and water resources? 
 To the best of your knowledge, what has the government done to engage your 
communities to address the challenges and the associated distortions in your way of 
life resulting from the impact of environmental damage from oil exploration and 
production activities on your land and water resources? 
 To the best of your knowledge, what have oil companies done to engage your 
communities to address the challenges and the associated distortions in your way of 
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life resulting from the impact of environmental damage from their oil exploration and 
production activities on your land and water resources? 
 To the best of your knowledge, what has the government done to engage your 
communities to address the matter of adequate compensation for the appropriation of 
your resources by the state? 
 To the best of your knowledge, what have the oil companies done to engage your 
communities to address the matter of adequate compensation for the exploitation of 
your resources by the companies? 




















Instructions: This questionnaire is in four sections. The first, on socio-
demographic/background data simply requires ticking options that are applicable to 
respondent. The other sections are structured to reflect the objectives of this study. Please 




Q.1. Age Bracket 
01) Below 20   
02) 20-30      
03) 31-40      
04) 41-50      
05) 51-60     
06) 61 and above  
    
Q.2. State of Origin 
01) Bayelsa State                              
02) Rivers State                                                 
03)  Other (specify) 
 
 
 Q.3. Are you from oil bearing community? 
 01)  Yes                                                 
 02)   No       
                                           
 
Q.4. Gender 
01) Male    
02) Female    
 
Q.5. Level of Education 
01) Non       
02) Adult literacy       
03) Primary       
04) Secondary       
05) Post secondary: - Diploma, Certificate, etc.    
06) University degree        
 
Q.6. Employment Status. 
01) Unemployed      
02) Public service                              
03) Private sector                               
04) Self-employed                               
 
Q.7. Occupational/Professional Status. 
01) None      
02) Politician   
03) Professional  
04) Student   
05) Trader/Businessman  
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06) Artisan/Technician/Craftsman/Tradesman  
07) Oil company worker                                                         
 
SECTION 2   
Questions for local environmental groups: 
                                       
Objective 1:  To identify and explain the pattern of relationship between the Nigerian government and the 
oil companies on the one hand and environmental local groups on the other hand in the implementation 
of environmental public policy in the Niger Delta. 
 
Key question: What is the relationship between government and local environmental 
groups over the implementation of government environmental policy? 
 
 





































































Q.8. How has your group reacted to government failure to emplace appropriate or implement 





















Q.10.What relevance would you ascribe to the failure by the Nigerian government to enforce 










Objective 2: To identify and explain specifically what and why socio-economic and political interests 
shape the relationships between the Nigerian government and environmental local groups and oil 
companies in the implementation of environmental public policy in the Niger Delta. 
 
Key question: To what extent is the lack of political opportunity structures the determining 
factor of choice of political action for local environmental groups in the Niger Delta? 
 



















Q.3. What has your group done to engage oil companies and government officials peacefully 










Q.4. What specific constraints have you faced in your struggle to achieve environmental 












Q.6. If the political system becomes more democratic (free and fair), would you be willing to 
use the political arena in lieu of violence? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………….. 









Q.8. If the legal system becomes more transparent and accountable to the law (less 
corruptible), would you be willing to use the courts in lieu of violence? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………...... 
Q.9. Why have you not tried other less violent means such as peaceful demonstrations, 
















Q.11. In what ways have such successes translated to benefits to you as individuals or to 

































































Objective 3: To determine the extent to which oil and environmental policy related conflicts between 
environmental local groups (on the one hand) and government and oil companies (on the other hand) 
depend on political opportunity structures in Nigeria. 
 
Key question: What has government done to implement key environmental policies related 
to oil business in the Niger Delta? 
 
Q.1. What are the government and oil companies doing to ensure that they have adequate 
environmental policy guidelines for dealing with the challenges of oil exploration and 








Q.2. To what extent do existing environmental policy instruments measure up to global 







Q.3. What are the government and oil companies doing to ensure that oil mining activities in 









Q.4. Which offices of the state or oil companies responsible for monitoring effective 
compliance to environmental legislations have approached you or other local groups or 






Q5. What specific efforts can you identify or are aware of that have been carried out by 








Q.6. What specific efforts can you identify or are aware of that have been carried out by oil 






















































Q.11. To the best of your knowledge, what specifically is the government doing in regard to 









Q.12. To the best of your knowledge, what specifically are oil companies doing in regard to 











Q.13. To the best of your knowledge, what specifically is the government doing in regard to 













Q.14. To the best of your knowledge, what specifically are oil companies doing in regard to 











Q.15. To the best of your knowledge, what specifically is the government doing in regard to 
the ongoing modification of the ecosystem through species elimination and delay in biota 

















Q.16. To the best of your knowledge, what has the government done to engage your 
communities to address your financial losses and challenges resulting from the impact of 

















Q.18. To the best of your knowledge, what have the oil companies done to engage your 
communities to address your financial losses and challenges resulting from the impact of 







Q.19.To the best of your knowledge, what has the government done to engage your 
communities to address your health difficulties and challenges resulting from the impact of 









Q.20. To the best of your knowledge, what have oil companies done to engage your 
communities to address your health difficulties and challenges resulting from the impact of 











Q.21. To the best of your knowledge, what has the government done to engage your 
communities to address the challenges and the associated distortions in your way of life 
resulting from the impact of environmental damage from oil exploration and production 








Q.22. To the best of your knowledge, what have oil companies done to engage your 
communities to address the challenges and the associated distortions in your way of life 
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resulting from the impact of environmental damage from their oil exploration and production 









Q.23. To the best of your knowledge, what has the government done to engage your 
communities to address the matter of adequate compensation for the appropriation of your 
















Questions for oil company officials: 
 
Objective 1: To identify and explain the pattern of relationship between the Nigerian government and the 
oil companies on the one hand and environmental local groups on the other hand in the implementation 
of environmental public policy in the Niger Delta. 
 









Q.2. Are government environmental policies actually adequate to ensure full environmental 














Q.5. How has your company engaged the government to ensure that it puts in place 













Q.7. What relevance (to the violence) would you ascribe to the failure by the Nigerian 




Q.8. What are the main factors which negate or slow down the implementation of government environmental 






Objective 2: To identify and explain specifically what and why socio-economic and political interests 
shape the relationships between the Nigerian government and environmental local groups and oil 
companies in the implementation of environmental public policy in the Niger Delta. 
 
Key question: To what extent is the lack of political opportunity structures the determining 
factor of choice of political action for local environmental groups in the Niger Delta? 
 
Q.1. In what constructive ways has your company engaged government in an effort to look at 








Q.2. How would you assess their claims of legitimate bases for the use of violence? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………. 







Q.4. How would you assess their chances in attempting to use democratic or electoral 
processes as a means for trying to address their grievances? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………….. 
Q.5. If the political system was more democratic (free and fair), do you believe that the 
militants would be more willing to work through the political arena in lieu of violence? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………. 
Q.6. How would you assess their chances for success in attempting to use judicial processes 
as the means for trying to address their grievances? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………… 
Q.7. If the legal system was more transparent and accountable to the law (less corruptible), do 




Q.8. How would you assess government’s efforts in using violence rather than persuasion 
techniques to address the grievances of the people of the Niger Delta?   
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………… 
Q.9. Has government done reasonably well, in your view, in addressing the grievances of the 
Niger Delta people?   
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………… 















Q.12. Can you identify any local militant groups that are engaged in violent activities just for 








Q.13. Can you identify any local politicians or external role players that are connected 








Objective 3: To determine the extent to which oil and environmental policy related conflicts between 
environmental local groups (on the one hand) and government and oil companies (on the other hand) 
depend on political opportunity structures in Nigeria. 
 
Key question: What has government done to implement key environmental policies related 
to oil business in the Niger Delta? 
 
Q.1. What is your company doing to ensure that it has adequate environmental policy 







Q.2. To what extent do existing instruments measure up to global yardsticks in terms of their 





Q.3. What is your company doing to ensure that your oil mining activities in Nigeria impose 







Q.4. Do you have a dedicated office responsible for monitoring effective compliance to 








Q.5. What is the office (your company) doing to ensure your compliance with key 


































Q.10. What specifically is your company doing in regard to the ongoing modification of the 







Q.11. W hat specifically is your company doing in regard to decreases in both fishery 









Q.12. What is your company doing to compensate local Niger Delta communities that have 










Q.13.What have you done to engage the local communities to address their financial losses 
and challenges resulting from the impact of environment damage from your oil exploration 








Q.14. What have you done to engage the local communities to address their health difficulties 
and challenges resulting from the impact of environment damage from your oil exploration 







Q.15. What have you done to engage the local communities to address the challenges and the 
associated distortions in their way of life resulting from the impact of environment damage 








Q.16. What have you done (even in collaboration with the government) to engage the local 
communities to address the matter of adequate compensation for the appropriation of their 














Questions for government officials: 
 
Objective 1:  To identify and explain the pattern of relationship between the Nigerian government and the 
oil companies on the one hand and environmental local groups on the other hand in the implementation 
of environmental public policy in the Niger Delta. 
 
Key question: What is the relationship between government and local environmental 
groups over the implementation of government environmental policy? 
 
Q.1. Given the context of pervasive violence and tense atmosphere, what do you believe has 












Q.2. What specifically has government done to address the grievances of local groups 






Q.3. How would you assess oil company compliance to government environmental policies?  
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………..  





Q.5. Are government environmental policies actually adequate to ensure full environmental 





Q.6. Why is government not doing more to identify publicly specific oil company violations 
of environmental legislations and the compliance level of individual companies as well as the 








Q.7. What has government done to ensure global standards of environmental legislation as 









Q.8. What are the main factors which negate or slow down the implementation of government environmental 








Objective 2: To identify and explain specifically what and why socio-economic and political interests 
shape the relationships between the Nigerian government and environmental local groups and oil 
companies in the implementation of environmental public policy in the Niger Delta. 
 
Key question: To what extent is the lack of political opportunity structures the determining 
factor of choice of political action for local environmental groups in the Niger Delta? 
 
Q.1. If the political system was more democratic (free and fair), do you believe that the 





Q.2. How would you assess their chances for success in attempting to use judicial processes 







Q.3. If the legal system was more transparent and accountable to the law (less corruptible), do 
you believe that the militants would be willing to use the courts in lieu of violence? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………. 
Q.4. How would you assess government’s efforts in using violence rather than persuasion 
techniques to address the grievances of the people of the Niger Delta?   
…………………………………………………………………………………………………
………….. 

















Q.8. Can you identify any local politicians or external role players that are connected 








Objective 3: To determine the extent to which oil and environmental policy related conflicts between 
environmental local groups (on the one hand) and government and oil companies (on the other hand) 
depend on political opportunity structures in Nigeria. 
 
Key question: What has government done to implement key environmental policies related 
to oil business in the Niger Delta? 
 
Q.1. What is the government doing to ensure that it has adequate environmental policy 










Q.2. To what extent do existing instruments measure up to global yardsticks in terms of their 







Q.3. What is the government doing to ensure adequate monitoring of the environmental 









Q.4. Who is responsible for monitoring effective compliance to environmental legislations in 
Nigeria and what are they doing to ensure the compliance of oil companies with key 









































Q.9. What are the monitors doing in regard to the ongoing modification of the ecosystem 











................. Q.11. What has the government done to compensate local Niger Delta 
communities that have borne the brunt of the environmental damages resulting from oil 







Q.12. How has the government worked to engage the local communities to address their 
financial losses and challenges resulting from the impact of environment damage from oil 







Q.13. How has the government worked to engage the local communities to address their 
health difficulties and challenges resulting from the impact of environment damage from oil 








Q.14. How has the government worked to engage the local communities to address the 
challenges and the associated distortions in their way of life resulting from the impact of 






Q.15. How has the government worked to engage the local communities to address the matter 

















































Niger Delta: Rivers, States, Vegetation 
 
 
Source: Urhobo Historical Society at http://www.waado.org/images/Maps/in_deltamap.gif 

























Variables to be 
assessed 
Target for Data 
Collection 
Method of Data 
Collection 
Data Analysis 
method for each 
variable 
1. To identify  






the oil companies 




the other hand in 
the implementation 
of environmental 
public policy in the 
Niger Delta. 




-Killing of state 
security operatives 
by local armed 
groups.  
 
-Killing of local 
environmental 




on oil company 
facilities by local 




to be injurious to 
the development of 
the Niger Delta. 
 
  -Protests and 
disruption of oil 
production 
activities by local 
armed groups.  
 
-Hostage taking of 
local and foreign 
oil workers by 
local armed groups 
and funding of 
government 
security operatives 






















materials such as 
books, newspaper 
reports and journal 
articles and the 
internet. 
1. Relational 
content analysis of 




2. Tables and 
graphs showing 
frequency counts 
and calculation of 
mode mean and 









policy goals such 














content analysis of 
data in verbal and 
written texts. 
 





as end to gas 
flaring, 
 
- Use of  
appropriate and 
adequate 
technology for the 
purpose of clean 
up and prevention 







people from oil 
bearing 
communities in the 
Niger Delta. 
 
-Degree to which 
actions of 
implementing 







and oil companies 
conform with the 
goals embodied in 
environmental 
policy related to 
oil business in the 







operations of oil 
companies and 
protection of the 
environment.  
 








policy related to 
the oil business in 
the Niger Delta. 
 
3. Officials of oil 
companies. 
and calculation of 
mode, mean and 









oil companies such 
as mutually held 
(shared values) 
goals, coercion in 
the form of threat 
of sanctions for 
failing to comply, 
remuneration such 
as adequate 
incentives to make 
compliance an 
attractive option 
and compliance by 





by  government 
and oil companies 
to implement 
government 
policies meant to 
protect the 
environment in the 
region. 
 






to oil business 
 
2. To determine 








the one hand) and 
government and 
oil companies (on 
the other hand) 




1. Conflict :  
Indicators: 
-Demand for 





- Killing of state 
security, foreign 







-Attack and seizure 
of oil company 
facilities by armed 





2. Local armed 
groups. 
 
3. Officials of oil 
companies. 
 













3. Focus group 
discussion. 
1. Relational 
content analysis of 
data in verbal and 
written texts. 
 
2. Tables and 
graphs showing 
frequency counts 
and calculation of 
mode, mean and 


















provide access for 
various 
stakeholders to 
participate in the 
implementation of 
environmental 
public policy in the 
Niger Delta.  
 
-Access to courts 
by local 
environmental 
groups to seek 








informal groups or 
agencies that 
provide plat-form 
for involvement of 
local communities 
in the 
implementation  of 
environmental 












2. Local armed 
groups. 
 
3. Officials of oil 
companies. 
 









content analysis of 
data in verbal and 
written texts. 
 
2. Tables and 
graphs showing 
frequency counts 
and calculation of 
mode, mean and 




oil companies such 
as mutually held 
(shared values) 
goal; coercion in 
form of threat of 
sanctions for 
failing to comply 
and remuneration 
such as adequate 




 -Regime type such 




















oil companies in 
the implementation 
of environmental 












public policy in the 













3. Officials of oil 
companies 






content analysis of 
data in verbal and 
written texts. 
 
2. Tables and 
graphs showing 
frequency counts 
and calculation of 
mode, mean and 









officials at the 
Federal Ministry 







3. Officials of oil 
companies 




content analysis of 
data in verbal and 
written texts. 
 
2. Tables and 
graphs showing 
frequency counts 
and calculation of 
mode, mean and 
per cent of coded 
variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
